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Recent educational reforms in Hong Kong emphasise the increase of choice, chance,
diversity, equality of opportunity and quality of education for everyone in education.
It is claimed that the present reform policies which encourage 'pak fa chai fong' (Let
hundreds of flowers bloom at the same time) can provide more choice, more
diversity and increase consumer power. It also claims that under the reform policy,
the provider can be free from the control of the government and have the autonomy
to create a first class, quality education in the 21st century for students in Hong Kong.
As secondary schooling affects one's future life chances and educational
opportunities, the kind of arrangements made for secondary schooling, in terms of
policy and its impact on both suppliers and consumers, become important issues.
The researcher comes from a working class background and majored in sociology at
college. She has taught in both primary and secondary education in Hong Kong for a
period of 8 years. During her postgraduate years in Edinburgh University, she
benefited from enlightening lectures and from the input of experienced supervisors.
As a parent of three children who receive their education in the West (i.e. Edinburgh
and California), the researcher is interested in and curious about the relationship
between education, society, economy, culture and politics. In particular, she is
interested in the equality issue of the secondary school choice policy and its related
consequences.
As already mentioned, the main concern of the present research is equality of
opportunities. The advocates of the policy claim that more choice is good because it
is 'classless' and fairer than planned provision (Chubb & Moe 1990). Everyone has
the chance to choose and to decide upon the best providers of goods and services to
meet their needs. In Gewirtz, et al's (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe 1995) research on
'parental choice', they argue that these choices may have 'class bias'. Social and
cultural capitals may play an important role in choice- making and so they conclude
that: first, choice is very directly and powerfully related to social-class differences;
IV
second, 'choice emerges as a major new factor in maintaining and indeed reinforcing
social-class divisions and inequalities' (ibid: 55).
All such literature concerning equality issues of school choice prompts the question:
what are the main effects regarding the new school choice policy implemented in
Hong Kong in 2001? The focus of this research is, therefore, to investigate the early
impact of the new school choice policy in Hong Kong. My aim in this research is to
provide readers with a chance to understand the early impact of the policy on
different stakeholders, mainly, parents and schools through the provision of
qualitative and quantitative evidence.
In this thesis, I have employed multi-methods, which include case study, survey
(questionnaire) and interview as my research strategy in order to investigate the new
secondary school choice situation in Hong Kong. I examined how parents engaged in
choosing schools and what effect the subsequent consequences of the policy, namely,
the early impact on the key stakeholders - consumers and providers.
The framework of this thesis starts with chapter 1 and covers the local context in
Hong Kong. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the Secondary School Places'
Allocation Policy (SSPA) reform. Chapter 3 contains a literature review of quasi-
market and school choice policy. It also provides a historical development of quasi
market policies in education in Hong Kong. In Chapter 4, I present my main research
question and research sub-questions, my research design, its justification, my account
of how I carried it out and its limitations. Chapters 5-7 contain the empirical data on
both the demand side and the supply side. Chapter 8 features a discussion and
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Abstract
Recent educational reforms in Hong Kong aimed to increase choice, diversity and
quality of education for everyone. The advocates of school-choice policies claim that
more choice is good because it is 'classless' and fairer than planned provision
(Chubb & Moe 1990). Everyone has the chance to choose and to decide upon the
best providers of goods and services to meet their needs. However, opponents
(Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe 1995) argue that social and cultural capital may play an
important role in choice-making. They conclude that choice is very directly and
powerfully related to social-class, and that 'choice emerges as a major new factor in
maintaining and indeed reinforcing social-class divisions and inequalities' (ibid: 55).
All such literature prompts the question: what are the main effects of the new school
choice policy implemented in Hong Kong in 2001? The focus of this research is,
therefore, to investigate the early impact of the new school choice policy in Hong
Kong and the reactions of parents and schools. In this thesis, I have employed a
multi-method research strategy which includes case studies of four schools, a
questionnaire survey of 905 parents and interviews with parents, school managers
and policy-makers in order to investigate the early impact of the new secondary
school choice (SSPA) policy in Hong Kong. I examined how parents engaged in
choosing schools and the subsequent consequences of the policy for the key
stakeholders - consumers and providers. The richness of the data reveals the equality
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Chapter 1 The Hong Kong Context
1.1. Introduction
The world is undergoing unprecedented changes, and Hong Kong is no
exception. We are seeing substantial changes in the economic structure
and the knowledge-based economy is here to stay. Hong Kong is also
facing tremendous challenges posed by a globalised economy. Politically,
reunification with China and democratisation have changed the ways
Hong Kong people think and live...In time of changes, everyone has to
meet new challenges. Adaptability, creativity and abilities for
communication, self-learning and co-operation are now the prerequisites
for anyone to succeed...Nevertheless, we must address the inadequacies
within the existing education system to enable the majority of Hong Kong
people to achieve lifelong learning and all-round education...(Education
Commission: Education Blueprint for the 21st Century, 2000: 3).
The above sentences in the Education Reform Proposal of 2000 stated that the world
is changing and that we need to change to meet the new challenges posed by a global
economy. The Proposal set the stage for tremendous education reforms in Hong
Kong. The reform measures include reforms in the academic structure, the curricula,
the assessment mechanism and the interface between different stages of education. In
this chapter, I aim to provide the reader with information on the local context behind
the reforms.
The framework of this chapter thus includes: five historical characteristics of
differentiated secondary education opportunities in Hong Kong education;
development/expansion of the Hong Kong public education system and important
time lines of the Secondary School Choice Reforms in section 1.2; Hong Kong
1
society and the education system in section 1.3; contemporary education policy
making in 1.4; governance, funding, teaching staff recruitment and salary in section
1.5; education expenditure and budget cut in 1.6; and decreasing student population,
enrolment and the disputes over school closures and new schools in section 1.7.
Finally, a brief summary of this chapter will be in section 1.8.
1.2. Expansion and availability of secondary education historically
Before I further engage the discussion on the Secondary School Place Allocation
Policy (SSPA) reform historically, it would be useful at this stage to inform the
reader of five historical characteristics of differentiated secondary education
opportunities; the development/expansion of the Hong Kong public education system
and important time lines of the Secondary School Choice Reforms.
The characteristics of Hong Kong secondary education will be discussed under the
following headings: language as cultural capital, the organisation of selection, the
unequal quality of education, the notion of equity and finally, social stratification.
Firstly: language as cultural capital. Postiglione observed that English as cultural
capital and the support of elite schools was the policy and practice adopted by the
colonial Hong Kong British government with regard to the recruitment of civil
servants for a long time. This also led to the creation of a large Anglo-Chinese
system of secondary schools, as described below by Postiglione:
By gearing up to teach English-language courses that encourage success
on linguistically based civil service examinations, educational changes
have been increasingly fashioned to dovetail with the recruitment of
native Hong Kongese to the civil service. This has been accomplished
through a policy process that reflects the colonial support for elite
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schools and the preservation of the University of Hong Kong as a wholly
English-medium institution. English-language facility and cultural
consonance are essential for the recruitment and promotion of graduates
from the University of Hong Kong in the civil service...this emphasis
also led to the creation of a large Anglo-Chinese system of secondary
schools'(Postiglione 1992:21).
In 1999, Bray & Koo (1999: 53) also noted that 'An enduring debate in Hong Kong
concerns the Medium of Instruction (MOI) for schooling. A twin-track system
emerged historically, with secondary schools which used English as the medium of
instruction (EMI) enjoying a higher status than their Chinese medium (CMI)
counterparts'. They also noted that though most primary schools in Hong Kong are
CMI, parents often favour those that achieve good results in English and seek access
to prestigious secondary schools.
From Bray and Koo (2004:225)'s description, the reader knows the extent to which
Hong Kong parents favoured English and these forces brought a shift in the medium
of instruction in secondary schools during the period 1960-1990. However, Bray and
Koo stated that, in reality, many students were unable to cope with a curriculum
taught fully in English and therefore many such schools taught in mixed code, which
resulted in students having insufficient command or literacy in either English or
Chinese:
Concerning secondary education, among the ironies of the 1980s
and 1990s was that the colonial authorities were keen to
emphasise Chinese in the school system but found that families
were more interested in English...many families favoured
English, first because school leavers who were fluent in the
language were perceived to have an edge over their competitors in
the labour market, and second because English fluency gave more
opportunities for post-secondary studies. These forces brought a
shift in the medium of instruction in secondary schools. Whereas
in 1960s, 57.9% of pupils were in schools that claimed to teach in
English, by 1980 the proportion was 87.7% and by 1990 it had
reached 91.7%... In reality, however, many such schools taught in
mixed code since their pupils were unable to cope with a
curriculum taught fully in English.
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Bray and Koo (2004:225) further noted that both the colonial and post-colonial
government tried to change the situation and claimed that the MOI policy was
introduced for educational reasons, but it was widely perceived as being primarily
driven by political motives (Lai & Byram, 2003:315). Whether it was for
educational purposes or political motives, one thing for certain is that most parents
would generally favour EMI over CMI, regardless of their child's language ability.
One example illustrates this market force quite well. In the late 1980s one school
changed to the use of Chinese as their medium of instruction with the educational
purpose of improving the quality of students' learning and of teaching. Three years
later the school was forced to reverse its policy as the 'quality' of the student intake
was perceived to have dropped, simply because parents of higher achievers were
unwilling to send their children to a CMI school (Morris 1997).
Bray & Koo (1999) stated that various policies were employed in the 1990s: at first,
schools were permitted to teach in either medium according to their resources and
capabilities and various programmes were established to assist students to move
from CMI primary schools to EMI secondary schools. In 1997, the post-colonial
government took a firm stand and designated 100 secondary schools as EMI schools.
As already mentioned, parents favoured EMI schools as EMI schools were perceived
as having a higher status than CMI schools. The fear of a drop in status was thus
created in relation to CMI education among some of those who were omitted from
the list. On appeal, 14 more schools were added to the list of 100 schools, which are
now regarded as being capable of delivering EMI education.
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Bray & Koo (1999: 53) noted that 'At the heart of the issue is the tension between
the post-colonial government's determination to promote trilingualism (three
languages: Cantonese, Mandarin and English) and biliteracy (English & Chinese)'.
Furthermore, whole-person education was considered by the government (Hong
Kong Government Circular 1997) to be best fostered in most cases through the
mother tongue.
However, the language policy which was widely seen as a restoration of 'mother
tongue education', argued by Choi (2003) was, in fact, an elitist language selection
policy. Choi stated that the policy, which provided for the selection of the best
primary school graduates to monolingual education in English in secondary schools,
was designed to be a cost-effective way of training English skills for those who had
the economic and cultural capital to benefit from it.
Hong Kong parents have known for a long time the social, academic and economic
benefits that competence in English can bring and thus desire EMI education for their
offspring (Bray & Koo 1999). English as cultural capital has had such a long history
in Hong Kong. In addition, it is now a world language as regards changes in ICT
(Information & Communication Technology) and so has become a dominant factor
in parents' thinking on school choice in Hong Kong (Lai & Byram 2003).
Secondly: the organisation of selection in Hong Kong from a historical viewpoint.
Education in Hong Kong followed a colonial pattern in its early colonial period, with
a few schools established specifically for the children of expatriates. After the
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Second World War, the Hong Kong school system was gradually designed to serve
the needs of the local population (Postiglione 1991).
In 1978, Hong Kong started to provide a nine-year universal, free and compulsory
education. However, culturally and historically, the Chinese pay a high regard to
education and look on it as the way to social mobility. An increasing number of the
student population chose to study beyond the nine years of free, compulsory
education. By 1980, 87% of the student population studied beyond the nine years
(from Secondary 4 onward) of free compulsory education, although the government
only managed to provide 40% of them with places in the public sector (government
or aided schools) while applying the minimum tuition fees. Those who can afford
and choose to continue their education beyond nine years (from Secondary 4
onward) but who were not selected in the public sector then had to pay a higher fee
in the self-financing private schools.
Quantitatively, as there was more demand than supply of school places in the public
sector, selection was unavoidable. However, the character of the school selection
process in Hong Kong was at that time described by Postiglione as being 'brutal'. In
fact, less than 8 % survived to enter post-secondary and university-level education in
Hong Kong in that period (Postiglione 1991: 24).
Due to the use of the 'Code of Aid' strategy to absorb the privately run 'enterprises'
into an expanded 'aided' public sector, the number of private schools went into a
continual decline. Postiglione (1991:25) noted that in the 1980s Hong Kong was
heading in the opposite direction, while in the same period, many countries moved
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toward the privatisation of education. He also noted that private school places in
Hong Kong were generally 'inferior' to those in the government sector. In fact,
historically, the most popular and prestigious schools are in the public sector, not in
the private sector. This again is very different from private school places in other
countries.
Thirdly: the unequal quality of education in Hong Kong from a historical
perspective. Qualitatively, the government streams both the schools and the students
according to their academic achievement. Public examination was the strategy
adopted by the government to stream, select students and allocate them to different
schools with different academic educational qualities. However, the quality of
schools in Hong Kong varies greatly. One can see clearly the link between the
educational background of parents and the quality of education their children had
(Postiglione 1991:24):
There are striking variations indeed. Hong Kong has some of the best
schools in the world in terms of student attainment... most of the schools
however, leave something to be desired. Facilities, teacher
qualifications, examination results and other indicators of quality rank
low. Students are allocated to these schools for various reasons,
including their test performance and lack of opportunity owing to the
educational and economic status of their parents.
Tse (1998) commented that solely to provide educational opportunities is not
enough. There is too much neglect under the system, while there is a great disparity
in the education resources and quality of education that different primary and
secondary schools offer to their students. In secondary education, he noted that there
are obvious differences in the quality of education offered by schools with different
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modes of funding, with syllabus differences and with different mediums of
instruction.
Tse (1998) also noticed that the general quality of education in the public sector is
better than in the private sector. Grammar schools are better than vocational schools,
while EMI schools are better than those in the CMI. Furthermore, he stated that we
could not neglect the inequality inherent in the popular prestigious schools and the
various hidden inequalities within the system.
Obviously, from the above data, family social background and school characteristics
(the quality of education it offers to students) interweave together to affect student
achievement and, therefore, also affect their future life opportunities.
The fourth issue concerns equality of access to quality secondary education, which
affects students' future life chances and their social mobility. This issue has become
acute and generates so much debate, particularly so in Hong Kong's case. Sensicle
(1992 :66) noted that:
Education is one of the leading issues in Hong Kong and generates
passion and debate. The people ofHong Kong consider that education is
the most reliable path to a successful career, and almost all parents are
ambitious for their children to have the best education available. Degree
level education is most parents' goal for their children and this reflects
attitudes which give rise to some of the characteristics of Hong Kong
people which may seem remarkable to visitors from the West. These
include singlemindness, diligence, a tendency not to question and to
learn by rote.
Many have argued that education credentials are crucial in attaining social mobility
in Asian countries (Lo 1984; Lee 1991). There is a long tradition which originated
from ancient China's Sung Dynasty whereby scholars from very poor families could
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always change their status by achievement in the civil examination conducted in the
imperial court (Cheng 1994). Cheng (1997) noted that in China, examinations have
gained a firm legitimacy as a reliable means of facilitating and regulating social
mobility and this, for centuries, has given hope to millions of families. He further
stated that though extremely few have fulfilled such a hope, public examinations
have successfully pacified the underprivileged masses who would otherwise have
resorted to revolution. This hope and belief still prevails although nowadays many
other factors influence productivity and earnings in the global market.
Historically and culturally, Hong Kong Chinese parents still regard education as a
channel to social mobility (Cheng 1997) and regard the type of secondary schooling
as having a tremendously significant effect on their children's future. Besides, if their
children do not perform well and only gain entry to an unpopular school (Lee 1996),
they will lose face. This explains why Hong Kong parents have become so
emotionally concerned with the SSPA allocation process, of which further mention
will be made in the chapter on findings later.
Furthermore, in 1998, Tse (1998:101-2) commented that though most people in
Hong Kong can enjoy a 9-year free, universal education 'the reality of inequality
under universal education is largely ignored. Equality of educational opportunity has
never been a central concern put on the agenda of both policy and academic circles'
in Hong Kong. After his review of local educational studies on the issue, he
commented that these studies are still largely impoverished and fragmentary when
compared with those studies conducted in Europe, America and Taiwan.
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Tse (1998:101) stated that 'despite the implementation of universal education for
nearly twenty years, an increase in educational opportunities did not result in an
equal sharing of the opportunities or a reduction of inequality. In fact, differences
and inequalities among different levels of school still persist in the current Hong
Kong educational system, which are closely related to the factors like class, family
background, gender and the like'.
He then urged that 'local studies in future should target the following issues: 1.
Exploring the situation of different distribution of educational opportunities; 2.
Inquiring into the causes of these differences; and 3. Analysing various educational
reforms and policies, as well as explicating their direct and indirect long-lasting
influences on the distribution of educational opportunities. He called for greater
responsibility to be taken by scholars in education to explore the causes and
situations of the differences and inequalities of educational opportunities (Tse
1998:101). His concerns inform the present study on the new school choice policy
implemented in 2001.
Lastly, social stratification and the elite class in Hong Kong. Although the average
citizen enjoys the third-highest living standard in Asia, there has been a great income
disparity in Hong Kong. Postiglione (1991:23) stated that the Gini coefficient, which
measures income inequality in a population, is 0.43 in 1971, remained nearly the
same in 1981 and with little change until 1991 in Hong Kong. It is higher than that of
the USA, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore (Postiglione 1991). Postiglione also
observed the emergence of a politically conscious middle class, which is gaining
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more control over the educational system and thus helps ensure that their children
inherit their middle-class status.
As regards the influence of family class background on intelligence, So & Siu (1980)
did not find any significant differences between middle and lower class children. But
in Lee & Mui's (1989) study of early child language development in Hong Kong,
they found that there was a significant link between age, gender and a mother's
education with their own children's language development. Yu & Bain's (1985)
study of 200 primary 1 Hong Kong children on the influence of class and cultural
background on the learning of a language found that working class children have
weaknesses when learning a second language.
Tsang's (1993) study of educational and socio-economic status attainment in Hong
Kong also concluded that both achievement and ascription have joined forces in a
particular way in determining the attainment opportunities of young adults in Hong
Kong. His study also revealed that achievement is not the sole criterion for the
allocation of social opportunities, despite the belief to the contrary of most Hong
Kong residents. In fact, ascription also finds a way of asserting itself into the
educational system. Though there are some exceptional cases, the class structure in
Hong Kong is not, in general, as open as Hong Kong residents believe it to be. By
using the method of mobility-table analysis of the 1981 census data, Tsang (1993)
also revealed that class-situation inheritance is a prominent phenomenon in the social
structure ofHong Kong.
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All the above studies pondered the problem of equity within the Hong Kong
educational system in a historical sense. As Postiglione commented: 'Little has been
done to relieve this problem... this could highlight the gap between the social classes
and increase the likelihood that the schools will become an arena of social class
conflict' (Postiglione 1991:24). His question and concern of more than a decade ago
of 'Whether or not social class conflict can work itself into the cultural fabric of the
Chinese society in Hong Kong in such a way as to avoid becoming dangerously
divisive remains an important question' fostiglione 1991:24). Therefore, such an
important issue as equality within the allocation process is indeed worth researching.
Now let us turn to the development/expansion of the Hong Kong Education system
and inform the reader about the history of the important time line of the Secondary
School Places selection/allocation Reforms.
As mentioned before, the Hong Kong colonial government started its initial moves to
set up public schooling after 1884, but government provision of schooling was
initially small-scale and elitist (Sweeting 1995, Bray & Koo 1999). However, as
more and more new immigrants from Mainland China arrived in Hong Kong, the
education system expanded and changed a lot over a period of three decades. In order
to allow the reader to grasp the main features of the historical development of the
education system in Hong Kong quickly, the author would like to use the five main
themes suggested by Sweeting (1995). The five main themes are expansionist,
sequential, variably private, and increasingly autochthonous and decreasingly
gender-skewed (Sweeting 1995).
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Firstly, expansionist; this means that at any one time, at least one level of schooling
provision was growing. Secondly, sequential; this means the growth was sequential,
starting from primary schooling in the period 1945-1971, then junior secondary and
senior secondary schooling followed. The third major area, which entered an
expansionist phase sanctioned by the Government, was tertiary education. Thirdly,
then, variably private; this means that though the private sector acquired huge
operational importance in the early stages of each growth phase, a strategy was
adopted by the Government to absorb the privately run 'enterprises' into an
expanded 'aided' public sector. From 1973 onward, a 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme was set
up to provide private groups with government funding for education. Then the
number ofmissionary schools increased further.
In 1978, nine years' universal free education was introduced (See table 1.1). This
marked an increased quantity of education provided by the government. Quality
education for common people was pursued by pressure groups in Hong Kong
throughout the 80s. Bray and Koo (1999: 46) noted that 'By 1984, a prosperous,
well-travelled and increasingly influential middle class had emerged' and these
groups put pressure on people to adopt the latest fashions from Western countries.
The expansion meant that more quality school funding was made by the government
to the masses and replaced the quality education previously provided for the 'elite'.
13







SSEE (Secondary School Entrance Examination: English,
Chinese and Mathematics—in one afternoon) & FNSS (Feeder
and Nominated School System)
Allocation by order of merit for students individually in the whole
territory
From 1973 Grant-in-Aid scheme: number of missionary schools increased
1978
Introduction of nine years' free schooling for every child
(Expansion of junior secondary education available for all primary
school leavers)
1979 Comoulsorv, free education for children up to the aqe of 14
1980 Compulsory, free education for children up to the age of 15 who
have not completed S-3.
1978-2001
Sufficient junior secondary education available for all primary
school leavers and introduction of SSPA
1. Academic Aptitude Test (AAT) on verbal and numerical
reasoning
2. Five 'bands' in the order of merit (they were not further
differentiated by order of merit within the same band)
3. Device of regionalisation (school nets) based on the scaled
internal assessment of students in the same school net.
4. Introduction of random factor
2001- New SSPA
Fourthly, increasingly autochthonous; this means the decolonization of British
influence of the Flong Kong colony on education policy and practice. The main
localisation began to take place after the Joint Sino-British agreement on the Future
of Hong Kong in 1984. Fifthly, decreasingly gender-skewed", this means schooling
opportunities for females over the post-war period became virtually equal in
quantitative terms with the expansion of universal education, senior secondary
schooling, matriculation classes and tertiary education.
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1.3. Hong Kong society and the education system
Table 1.2 summarises characteristics of Hong Kong society. Hong Kong is a very
small, busy, modern and convenient city with a dense population. In 1997/98, Hong
Kong had an area of 1,097 square kilometres and, in 2004, had a population ofmore
than 6,800,000. In 1998, Hong Kong had 846 primary schools and 468 secondary
schools with enrolments of around 450,000 in each sector (Hong Kong Annual
Report, 1998). Most of the primary and secondary schools belongs to the public
sector: government and aided (See table 1.3).
Table 1.2. Hong Cong education and society
Categories Descriptions
Population 6,855,125 people (2004 estimate)
Age structure 0-14 14.2%(Male 510,702; Female 465,145)
(2004
estimate)
15-64 73.3% (Male 2,461,914; Female 2,560,382)
65 over 12.5% (Male 394,697; Female 462,285)
Birth rate 7.23 birth/1000 pop (2004 estimate)
Fertility rate 0.91 born/woman
Area 1, 097 sq. Km.
Primary
schools
846 with total 450,000 pupils
Secondary
schools
With total 450,000 students (422 grammar schools, 19
technical schools and 27 prevocational schools)
Source: figures from Hong Kong Year book 1998 and CIA Factbook
Hong Kong. Last visited in February 2005
(http://www.cia.qov/cia/publication/factbook/aeos/hk.htmh
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Given its infrastructure, it is very easy to access anywhere in Hong Kong within two
hours. Generally, Hong Kong parents have high expectations of their children's
education. That means if they can afford to pay for travel, they are willing to pay,
and this means that distance may not be a problem when choosing a school.
Historically speaking, and contrary to other parts of the world, the popular and
prestigious schools belong to the public sector. The differences between
government, aided and private schools are described in section 1.5.
The education system in Hong Kong is closely modelled on that of the England.
Historically, as Hong Kong had been a British colony since 1841, the educational
system is similar to that of the England in its structure, organisation, admission,
examination regulations and curriculum. However, it is by no means just a duplicate
of it (Postiglione 1991), as it has also been strongly influenced by the cultural
traditions ofChina (Bray 1991, Watkins & Biggs 1996).
Bray and Koo (1999:45) commented that modern schooling in Hong Kong 'reflects
the synthesis of the British and Chinese systems in the continued use of traditional
features of British education (e.g. school uniforms, straight rows of desks facing a
blackboard, students standing up to speak to the teacher) and of Chinese education
(e.g. memorisation and an emphasis on effort/diligence)'. Furthermore, Cheng
noticed that national goals are not part of the documented education as is the case in
other East Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. He stated that
among East Asian countries, Hong Kong is the most individualistic and the most
westernised in terms of educational philosophy.
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Table 1.3. Providers of Primary and Secondary Schooling in Hong Kong
1998




Primary schools Government 45 0 45
Aided 696 0 696
Private 89 2 91
All sectors 830 2 832
Secondary schools Government 37 0 37
Aided 352 0 352
Private 82 36 118
All sectors 471 36 507
Special Schools Aided 63 0 63
Practical Schools Aided 4 0 4
Skills Opportunity
Schools
Aided 7 0 7
Generally, the structure of the education system and curricula in Hong Kong are
similar to the old grammar school system in England, with streaming and selection
according to academic achievement, aiming toward higher education. Education
starts at the kindergarten stage. Most children attend kindergarten from the age of
three. All kindergartens are in the private sector, as are international schools. The
qualification level and standard of teachers in kindergartens in Hong Kong varies
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greatly, as does the quality of education offered in different kindergartens. The more
popular kindergartens tend to charge higher tuition fees.
At the age of six, pupils start their six-year primary schooling. Most Primary schools,
however, different from kindergarten, belong to the public sector. Also, historically,
due to the limited space in Hong Kong, they often operate bi-sessionally (both
morning and afternoon sessions share the same school site, in order to double the
places) and the normal class size in public sector schools is about 40 (Hong Kong
Annual Report 1995). This phenomenon is very different from modern Britain and
the United States where they have more space.
In recent years, as the number of primary school-age children decreased due to the
low birth rate in Hong Kong, many primary schools changed into whole-day schools
or just simply closed down. Following the 6 years of primary schooling, a three-year
junior secondary course is attended. Froml980, by law, all children must be in full-
time education and attend nine years of compulsory education from the age of six
until their 15th birthday (See table 1.1) (or on completion of Secondary 3, whichever
is the earlier). At the end of primary 6, students are allocated secondary school
places. Similar to most of the primary schools in Hong Kong, most secondly schools
too, belong to the public sector.
The government provides free 9 years (from primary 1-6, then secondary 1-3) of
education from 1980 onward. So, at the end of secondary 3, students are selected for
subsidised places for the two-year senior secondary programme (secondary 4 and 5),
or to craft courses according to internal school assessments and parental preference.
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After a total of five years of secondary education, those students who have passed the
Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE, which is similar to the
former 'O' level examination in England) can either take the one-year high level
programme (Middle school with Chinese as medium of instruction) or the two-year
A level programme (Anglo secondary school with English as medium of instruction).
Admission to Secondary 6 depends on results in the HKCEE.
At the end of senior secondary education, students take the Hong Kong Advanced
level examination (HKALE). Based on this examination, students are streamed for
entry into university; or to a two or three-year vocational course leading to a
certificate or diploma; or to a teacher education programme. Before the 1990s,
tertiary education was mainly provided by two universities and two polytechnics.
However, it was planned that all students would enter tertiary education after Form 7
and in the 1990s tertiary education expanded and graduates from higher education
increased tremendously. Those leaving full-time education at the end of the senior
secondary had opportunities for part-time study or vocational training through to
degree level. By the 21st century, life-long learning and more flexible access to both
higher and further education had been placed on the reform agenda.
1.4. Contemporary Education policy making
The Secretary for Education and Manpower, who heads the Education and
Manpower Branch of the Government Secretariat, is responsible for formulating and
reviewing education policy, for securing funds in the government budget, for basing
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with the legislative Council on educational issues, as well as overseeing the effective
implementation of educational programmes (Hong Kong Annual Report 1998).
Historically, the Hong Kong Education system has been strongly influenced by
Western external advisers and examples abound. One example was the Llewellyn
Report which was marked by Bray as very 'influential' Besides its recommendation
on language of instruction, access to tertiary education, special education, and the
needs of the teaching services, it recommended that an Education Commission
should be established to give the Governor-in-Council consolidated advice on the
needs and priorities for the Hong Kong education system as a whole (Bray 1991:87).
Thus, since the establishment of the Education Commission in 1984 as recommended
by the Llewellyn Report, Hong Kong education system has been influenced by the
Education Commission's Reports and Proposals tremendously.
Cheng (1991) stated that before 1997, the government had gained legitimacy in
policymaking. It was partly because of its achievements with the economy, and
partly because it had been very deliberate in creating citizen credibility in
policymaking through the wider participation of expert community members and
through consultation with people from all walks of life (20/9/99 Ming Pao
Newspaper).
It is stated that members of the community can play an important part in the
planning, development and management of the education system at all levels by
sitting on advisory bodies such as the Education Commission, the Board of
Education, the Curriculum Development Council (CDC), the University Grants
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Committee (UGC) and the Research Grants Council; and also by sitting on executive
bodies such as the Vocational Training Council (VTC), the Hong Kong
Examinations Authority and the Hong Kong Council for Academic Accreditation.
Members of the community can also sit on management committees of schools and
on the governing bodies of tertiary institutions (Hong Kong Annual Report
1995,1998).
All members in the Education Commission are resident and working in Hong Kong,
they often have strong Western links through their own education and other affairs.
The top personnel in the Education Commission are mainly composed of economic
elite. Postiglione commented that (1991: 30) 'Hong Kong Chinese society differs
from traditional and modern Chinese society in a number of ways: its high degree of
modernisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation: its dominance by market forces;
the erosion of tradition...the lack of a moralising elite; the dominance of an
economic elite.
The quotation from the 'Overview of the Hong Kong Yearbook 2000' recorded
below indicates the tremendous changes that took place that year and how influential
the Education Commission and its reform proposals were:
The year 2000 marked an important milestone in education...In
September, the Commission submitted to the Administration the
report entitled Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong
Kong. The Chief Executive in his Policy Address in October
accepted all the reform proposals put forward by the Education
Commission for the education system, including the academic
structure, the curricula, the assessment mechanism and the interface
between different stages of education. The Government has
embarked on the implementation of the reform measures (Hong
Kong YearBook 2000, Education: Overview).
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It should be noted that 'the interface between different stages of education' in the
above quotation includes the transition mechanism from primary to secondary, that
is, the Secondary School Places Allocation System (SSPA) Reform in 2001.
In 2000, the ED started its restructuring and eventually merged with the EMB,
retaining the title EMB in January, 2003. So, since then, there has not been an
Education Department (ED), as such, in existence in Hong Kong.
1.5.Governance, funding, teaching staff recruitment and salary
We can now look at the governance of education, at funding, staff recruitment and
salaries in Hong Kong from a historical perspective.
With regard to the governance of education, under the Education ordinance, the
director of education controls all government schools and supervises all other
kindergarten, primary, secondary and post-secondary institutions in the territory—
except for the universities and polytechnics. The ordinance provides the director with
broad-ranging powers over the life and practice of schooling, its staff and pupils,
and, in particular, anything that is linked to politics in schools. The government
directly manages a small proportion of government primary and secondary schools,
while all the aided schools are operated by school sponsoring bodies and non-profit-
making voluntary organisations which receive public funds under a code of aid.
Aided school cannot collect tuition fee as DSS and private schools do.
Most schools are in the public sector (Hong Kong Annual Report 1995). Each school
has an unpaid management committee and supervisor appointed by the School
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Sponsoring Body. In most cases, members of the committee are people who are not
involved in policymaking or in the day-to-day affairs of the school. The supervisor
has considerable legal responsibility and usually works closely with the school
Principal in policy and personnel decisions. School Principals, who have absolute
power over the staff and pupils, are appointed to government schools by the ED
(Now EMB) and to aided schools by their sponsoring agencies (Postiglione 1991:12-
13). The aided schools enjoy considerable autonomy.
Secondly, regarding the funding of education, all the schools in the public sector in
Hong Kong are publicly funded. The public sector includes all the government and
aided schools. According to the government's Code of Aid, all aided schools are
funded according to the same formula, regardless of location, sponsorship, or
prestige. Schools in the small private sector are funded mainly by students' tuition
fees and receive no public funding except for those that join the Direct Subsidy
Scheme (DSS) which can receive public funding from the government and at the
same time receive funding from students' tuition fees
Thirdly, we need to look at the recruitment of teaching staff and the standardised
master pay scheme. Although teachers in aided schools are recruited and employed
by School Sponsoring Bodies, for a long time all teachers' salary scales (except for
those in private schools and DSS schools) were standardised and paid by the
government through the implementation of a master pay scheme. Those with
different qualifications had different starting points and a different maximum salary.
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However, discussions have taken place to allow schools to be given a lump sum of
money (that would include teachers' salaries) in the future. This means the Principal
would have the autonomy to decide how to use the lump sum, which includes the
salary scheme of each member of the teaching staff. Thus, the historically
standardised master pay scheme of teachers may be altered.
1.6. Education expenditure and budget cut
With regard to education expenditure, about 1.3 million students, or 19.7% of the
total population, were in full-time education during the year 1997 (Hong Kong
Annual Report 1998). The budget spent on education is about $ 45 billion each year
(3/8/2000, Hong Kong Economic Journal). The total expenditure on education is
4.25% of Gross Domestic product (Hong Kong Yearbook 2000).
In 1997, the Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, identified education as the 'key to
the future', as education was perceived as the way to provide adequate human
resources and so achieve economic competitiveness. He then instituted the Quality
Education Fund (QEF) for school initiatives and research projects. Mr. Tung (PTU
News 13 Oct, 2003), reaffirmed his commitment to education and training in his
2003 policy address. T can assure you that investment in education will remain our
priority, notwithstanding the need to address our budgetary problems.'
However, the main focus of the Financial Budget was to achieve a balanced Budget
by 2006-7. This would largely be done through cutting public expenditure and
education will not be an exception. Mr. Cheung Man Kwong, the President of the
PTU (Professional Teacher Uniopi, protested against such budget cuts in education
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as they were affecting education in all sectors (PTU News 13 Oct, 2003). From table
1.4, we can see the continued increase of total public expenditure and public
expenditure spent on education.













1991-2 108102 19431 18
1992-3 123490
22158 17.9
1993-4 155207 25410 16.4
1994-5 165950 25410 17.4
1995-6 191338 33611 17.6
1996-7 211248 37908 17.9
1997-8 234780 47027 20
1998-9 266447 48479 18.2
1.7. Declining birth rate, decreasing enrolment and new schools
As there is a declining birth rate in Hong Kong, it is said that the demand for basic
education, starting at primary school and then at secondary school, would also drop
dramatically. The fact that enrolment in kindergartens and primary schools is
decreasing (See tables l .5 & l .6) but increasing in new secondary schools in recent
years has attracted much criticism from the PTU (Professional Teacher Union). From
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tables 1.5, 1.6 & 1.7, readers also learn that number and enrolment of aided schools
are the highest among the three types of schools in Hong Kong.
Table 1.5. Enrolment in Primary Day schools (with different modes of
Year Government Aided Private Total
1990 33146 441908 49865 524919
1991 31996 434487 49455 515938
1992 31050 421768 48807 501625
1993 30275 406683 48103 465061
1994 30093 397163 49591 476847
1995 30006 389396 48316 467718
1996 29659 388741 48107 466507
1997 29567 385945 46399 461911
1998 30270 401316 45216 476802
1999 31152 416044 44655 491851
2000 31623 418362 43994 493979
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Table 1.6. Enrolment in Secondary Day schools (with different modes of
subsidy)
Year Government Aided Private Total
1990 37625 325604 68152 431381
1991 38400 337342 60597 436339
1992 38604 349036 58145 445785
1993 39246 358429 58260 455935
1994 39091 362445 56663 458199
1995 38905 366377 54563 459845
1996 37728 372584 55346 465658
1997 37444 367242 53432 458118
1998 36705 365485 53709 455872
1999 36502 367648 49315 453465
2000 36662 371259 48772 456693
Table 1.7. Student enrolment (Full/Day time): 1998/9-2001
Programme Kindergarten Primary Secondary (include lower,
upper & Secondary 6-7)
1998/99 (000): 175.1 477.1 468.0
1999-2000 (000): 171.1 491.9 453.5
2000-2001 (000): 160.9 493.9 456
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1.8 A summary
In this chapter, on one hand, I have provided a general context of the education
reforms with a brief introduction of Hong Kong society, its education system,
structure, policy making, governance, funding, expenditure, development, expansion,
the important time line of Secondary School Choice Reforms and the availability of
secondary education in Hong Kong. On the other hand, specifically, I have also
outlined five historical characteristics of differentiated secondary education
opportunities inherent in Hong Kong society: the inequalities issues inherent in the
organisation of selection, the role of English as cultural capital that leads to the
demand for EMI schools and to debates surrounding the MOI policy, the unequal
quality of education within the private and public sector and the notion of equity in
Hong Kong society.
All these characteristics and inequalities inherent in the SSPA process historically in
Hong Kong, though after the implementation of universal education and increase in
educational opportunities, inequalities, as Tse (1998:101) stated, 'still persist in the
current Hong Kong education system, which are closely related to the factors like
class, family background, gender and the like'. Tse's call for scholars in education to
explore the causes and situations of the differences and inequalities of educational
opportunities informs the present study on the SSPA implemented in 2001.
In the next chapter, we will explain the reform and the official rationale of the SSPA
in 2001 in detail. We will also provide the historical reform of the SSPA before
2001, the scope of choice, the demand and supply of secondary situation in recent
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years in Hong Kong. All these, I hope can let readers comprehend and grasp the local
unique and complicated secondary school choice situation in Hong Kong.
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Chapter 2 Secondary school choice and reforms in Hong
Kong
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I aim to give more detailed background on the SSPA reform in 2001
and before 2001. Thus I will give a brief historical background of the SSPA from
1962 to 2001 and the details of the SSPA reform policy changes in 2001 and its
rationales. Besides, I will present types of secondary schools and the changes of
demand and supply of secondary school places before 2001 to let readers know more
about scope of choice and the secondary school market in Hong Kong.
The framework of this chapter thus includes: firstly, reasons for the education
reforms in 2.2; Secondary School choice froml962 tol978 in 2.3; Secondary School
choice from 1978-2001 and the more comprehensive approach (adding of random
element and mix-ability) in 2.4; the detailed changes (includes the future agenda) of
the SSPA in 2001 in 2.5; scope of choice (classification of secondary schools),
popularity and tuition fee in 2.6. And lastly, the secondary school market situation in
Hong Kong in 2.7.
2.2. Reasons for the reforms
The education reforms in Hong Kong were influenced by exogenous as well as
endogenous forces (Sweeting 1995). Such forces include the region's geographic
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location, population size, socio-political systems, the stages and pattern of economic
development, technological advancement and the level of educational development
(Bray & Koo 1999:4).
Before I present the reforms of secondary school choice historically, it is perhaps
pertinent to look at the variety of factors that affect this issue: namely, the economic,
financial, technological, political, global, cultural, educational and human resources
factors.
Table 2.1 Economic production Ratio (%) 1980-1997
Primaryproduction Secondary production Tertiaryproduction
1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997
Hong
Kong
1 0 32 15 67 84
Sources: Extracted from World Bank (1999), World Development Report, Table 4.2.
Regarding the economical and financial factor, as the policy document stated that
'We are seeing substantial changes in the economic structure and the knowledge-
based economy...Hong Kong is facing tremendous challenges posed by a globalised
economy...' (Education Commission 2000: 3), we know that economic and financial
reasons are the main reasons for the education reforms in Hong Kong. However, I
am now going to add some information on the economic and financial context in
Hong Kong, starting with the substantial changes in the economic structure and the
tremendous challenges posed by a global economy. In 2000, Cheng (2000a: 125-127,
2000b: 3-4), using the World Bank statistics of 1999 to support him, argued that the
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production mode in Hong Kong has been changed from secondary production to
mainly tertiary production (See table 2.1).
The World Bank statistics of 1999 also show that people in Hong Kong are mainly
employed in tertiary industry - male (60%), female (66%). They reveal that the
number of white-collar workers exceeds that of blue-collar workers and that this
trend may increase more in the near future. Cheng (2000a, 2000b) argues that Hong
Kong is advancing towards a knowledge-based economy and as the production mode
changes, so the education mode needs to be changed accordingly. Otherwise, we may
not have an adequate labour force necessary for the economy in Hong Kong.
Furthermore, the economic recession and deficit in Hong Kong placed great pressure
on the post-colonial Hong Kong Government. The Hong Kong economy was
booming in the eighties and nineties. However, after achieving double-digit growth
for four years in a row through open economy links with the rest of East Asia, Hong
Kong was hit hard by the two economic recessions of the past few years. The first
was the Asian financial crisis in the final quarter of 1997. The second was the global
downturn of 2001-2002. We can see the seriousness of the Asian crisis for Hong
Kong in the 1999 and 2000 Budget speeches:
The storm has lasted longer and spread wider. It was more severe
than anyone had expected. Few, if any, sectors of the local
community have been left untouched by its passing. During 1998.
external demand for our goods and services weakened dramatically,
the Hong Kong dollar came under acute speculative pressure, asset
prices dropped sharply and unemployment surged...Many
companies have downsized or closed down. Many people have
suffered a pay freeze, a pay cut or even unemployment... 1998
brought the worst economic setback our present generation has ever
seen (Hong Kong Budget Speech 1999: paragraphs 1-5).
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...our record of uninterrupted economic growth was destroyed as we
fell prey to a sharp and sudden economic downturn...(Hong Kong
Budget Speech 2000: paragraph 2).
In 1999, the seasonal unemployment rates in Hong Kong were 6.2%, 6.1%, 6.1% and
6%. As many people suffered a pay cut and pay freeze, the number of applications
for income support accelerated and rose from 227,454 in December 1998 to 230,681
in December 1999. The amount of money delivered in income support exceeded 14
billion Hong Kong dollars (Hong Kong in figures 2000). Furthermore, as there had
been four years of deficit, it was decided in the 2003 budget that there would be a
five-year plan to constrain public expenditure in order to keep a balance, rather than
have a deficit on the budget. There will be large expenditure cuts in health, social
welfare and education (Hong Kong Budget Speech 2003, PTU News 13 Oct, 2003).
With regard to information technology advancement and human capital factors, the
government also faces the pressure of globalisation and the shortage of adequate
human capital. This adverse factor was mentioned in the Policy address ofMr. Tung
in 1999. The strategic measures mentioned in the Budget Speech of Donald Tsang in
2000 are for Hong Kong to reinvent itself as a knowledge-based and technology
intensive economy by putting special focus on strengthening our human capital and
encouraging our citizens to acquire new knowledge and skills (Budget Speech of
Donald Tsang in 2000 paragraph 53 and 211):
Our prospects in the longer term will be influenced by several major
developments. The two most important are the irreversible trend of
globalisation fuelled by technological advances and our country's more
/rapid development after entering the WTO. Domestically, Hong Kong is
reinventing itself as a knowledge-based and technology-intensive
economy, and this process will entail adjustments on the part of
individuals and businesses as well as the Government ...In this budget, I
have sought to -re-affirm the economic and financial principles behind
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Hong Kong's success as we enter the 21st Century; outline our strategy
in response to the external and internal changes facing us and to position
ourselves to take advantage of the enormous opportunities presented to
us in this new era; provide funding support to enhance social services,
putting special focus on strengthening our human capital and
encouraging our citizens to acquire new knowledge and skills; continue
to improve our financial position and our public services through
controlling government spending and through public sector reform, and
explain clearly the potential problems which could challenge our prudent
management of public finances in the future...
Cheng (2000a, 2000b) stated that in order to face all the challenges posed by the
advancement of information technology and the global economy, education in Hong
Kong needs to be reformed accordingly in order to train the kind of human resources
that we need. He suggested that 'life long learning' for all the citizens in Hong
Kong is the way forward for a 'knowledge-based economy' there. It is what Brown
and Lauder (1997:179) described as:
Underlying these economic forms of investment is a vision of a society
permeated by a culture of learning; for it is the knowledge, skills, and
insights of the population that is the key to future prosperity.
Furthermore, Cheng (2000a, 2000b) urged that our tertiary education should have a
mission to produce the kind of human resources we need: self-learning, organising
concepts, communication, team-work, adaptability and innovation. And therefore,
we need to reform our career education, curriculum, examination and assessment
modes accordingly. We need adaptability, creativity, communication skills, self-
learning and co-operation so that the knowledge-based economy can compete
successfully with other countries globally. The policy makers, therefore, need to
reform the existing education system in order to enable the majority of Hong Kong
people to achieve lifelong learning and an all-round education. This is what a
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number of countries, such as Sweden, Norway, the UK, Holland, Italy, Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore started in the mid-90s (Cheng 2000a).
With regard to skill formation, Ashton (2005) argues that in the past Hong Kong
could be identified as a typical case of market-led development, compared with the
state-led developments of other Asian countries (Ashton & Sung 1997). Now,
however, the government's expectation of education in Hong Kong is to train and
provide the type of human capital and resources for the knowledge-based economy.
The Education Department (ED) was also restructured into the Education and
Manpower Bureau (EMB) and the education reforms in Hong Kong gained
momentum soon after.
Regarding the political transition before and after 1997, Sweeting (1995) predicted
that, politically, the change of sovereignty to China is probably the most momentous
transition to have affected Hong Kong in the period following the end of the Second
World War. His case studies of four educational policy-making processes and
products provided evidence of how and why the multiple transitions that Hong Kong
has experienced before 1995- and is still experiencing - have affected both
educational practice and educational policy. He predicted and argued that the latest
political transition affects education in the fields of curriculum, tertiary education,
teacher education and in planning the infrastructure of education.
Furthermore, Mok (1999) commented that in the post-Mao era, the reformers in the
People's Republic of China have taken significant steps to privatise social policy and
social welfare in the period since the mid-eighties. Guan (2000) also noticed that
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before the Market Reform and the Open Door policy, China enjoyed a high level of
welfare provisions in social security, education, the health services, employment and
housing, and this trend is changing. Guan (2000:115) further stated that 'The general
direction of reform is portrayed as neo-liberal, geared to reducing the role of
government in the provision of welfare and to increasing individual responsibility for
social security and well-being'. The education reform in Hong Kong, too, is heading
in the same direction as that of China, though the policy details of the reforms are
different.
With regard to global factors and the globalisation process, as mentioned previously,
Hong Kong is just one of the many societies in the world that is undertaking a major
'restructuring' of its educational system. Such emergence of similar reforms of
marketisation and privatisation in public sectors across the world suggests that it is a
global phenomenon and this convergence trend is part of a broader economic,
political and cultural process of globalisation (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998).
Although national states can still have room to mediate these globalising forces, no
place in the world can remain immune from them (Whitty et al. 1998; Henry,
Lingard, Rizvi & Taylor 1999, Bottery 1999).
Green (1999) suggests that while policies may converge at the level of discourse,
they are divergent at the level of detail (structure and process). This is because the
policy context in each place is very different. Green suggests three principal ways in
which convergence of policy may occur. Hong Kong probably belongs to the third
category. That is 'policy borrowing', a response or solution for governments facing
common forces and problems. The common forces are: demographic trends,
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economic forces and cultural forces. The ageing of populations and workforces
places great pressure on public resources in general and education budgets in
particular. The intensified global economic competition has led to tight budgetary
controls in order to reduce social costs so as to encourage competitiveness and attract
foreign investment. The pluralization of lifestyles, cultures and values of youth and
adult life necessitate a diversity and flexibility of education and training provision to
suit those in different situations and with different aptitudes (Green 1999).
Bottery (1999:299) argued that "it is incorrect to suggest that the effects of such
global forces upon the institutions within which educationalists work are
unmediated'. And therefore Bottery (1999:299) suggested 'while national
governments may be under pressure, they are resilient, proactive and still extremely
influential in the management of educational institutions'.
Lastly, besides all the factors mentioned above, there is the educational factor to
consider - particularly the 'inadequacies within the existing education system in
Hong Kong' mentioned in the 2000 Education Proposal (Education Commission
2000).
These inadequacies/problems have included a cramped teaching and learning
environment due to limited space; an examination-oriented education system that
causes stress, negative attitudes toward learning; elitism and a lack of care for slower
learners (special needs children) and a common/centralised rigid syllabus.
The method of teaching and learning and cramped classrooms in Hong Kong seems
to hinder the development of creative thinking and motivation in learning. It is very
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common to find small and crowded primary and secondary classrooms that are used
to accommodate 40 students where both students and teachers work in confined
spaces. This has created an impact on pedagogy, as opportunities for mobility and
flexibility within classroom layouts are seriously limited.
It is said that the education system in Hong Kong is examination-oriented and that it
has placed too much stress on narrow academic achievement. The kind of emphasis
also creates lots of stress, labelling effects, failure and negative attitudes towards
learning. Although there are many Hong Kong students who achieve excellent
results in international tests, there are also some students who are fed up with the
spoon-fed nature of the education. In 1999, there were about 23,000 students who
had just given up and achieved zero marks in the 1999 (HKCEE) Hong Kong
Certificate of Education Examination (17/8/99 Ming Pao Newspaper). This has
caused a lot of worry and has meant that the education system in Hong Kong is
considered to be failing and in need of change (25/8/99 Economic Daily, 17/8/99
Hong Kong Economic Journal).
Furthermore, Hong Kong education has been critiqued as being elitist and lacking in
care for students with special needs (slower learners for various reasons).
Traditionally, teachers, as well as parents and society, have high expectations of their
students, even though they have very heavy workloads. For the bright students, this
kind of high expectation is good as teachers can assign them challenges that they can
finish and enjoy doing. However, for some children, especially the slower learner
and for special educational needs' children, their needs are largely ignored.
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There is a high uncertainty-avoidance-culture in school life (Leung 1995) where a
centralised rigid syllabus and rigid time-tabling hinder the teachers' abilities and
attitudes regarding the adoption of child-centred approaches which are said to be
good in developing creative thinking in children. Furthermore, teachers are used to
whole-class teaching, an authoritative style, a heavy teaching workload, fragmented
subject-based orientation, stress order, strong discipline and conformity. Teachers
are also used to planning and working according to plan and in believing students
should be taught the same thing in order to be fair to each student (Leung 1995). All
of the above may explain some of the factors that caused some students lose
motivation in their early learning years. I will let the readers know more about the
rationale behind the SSPA reform specifically in 2001 later in section 2.5
2.3. Secondary school choice—1962-1978
From 1962 onwards, there were two major mechanisms for selecting primary 6
students for Form 1 places. Firstly, there was the Secondary School Entrance
Examination (SSEE), whereby Primary 6 students sat three papers—English,
Chinese and Mathematics—in one afternoon. Those who scored high would be given
places in schools of their high-priority choices. These better-quality, five-year places
were usually in the government, aided or subsidised public sectors. Other students
who did not perform as well were allocated to 'bought places' in three-year private
schools in the private sector. The remainder would continue their education in private
schools paid by their parents or exit formal schooling and enter the job market at that
point.
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A second mechanism of allocation was the Feeder and Nominated School System
(FNSS). Both feeder and nominated schools had their own 'linked' primary or
secondary schools. This system granted discretion to some secondary schools to
select Primary 6 students from their own feeder or nominated primary schools.
Through this arrangement, primary school children could secure places in their
favourite secondary school, according to a whole range of affiliations such as the
status of one's primary school to family connections with particular personnel of the
school authority (Lee & Cheung 1991:149-150).
However, Lee & Cheung (1991:152-4) noted that ever since its implementation in
1962, the SSEE was subjected to constant criticism. The criticism could be best
summarised as follows: First, undue pressure was exerted on Primary 6 students
since their future was determined by a 'one-shot' public examination administered in
one afternoon. If a child failed in the SSEE on that particular afternoon, it meant that
he/she had failed forever, no matter what his overall primary school learning
performance had been.
Thus, both the pressure that was generated and the validity of a 'one-shot' test were
criticised. Second, since only English, Chinese and Mathematics were tested, it
resulted in an unbalanced primary education at the expense of other subjects not
tested in the SSEE. Third, as students were allocated to different secondary schools
according to their performance in the examination, the most academically able
students were creamed off by the "elitist" schools, perpetuating the differential
standards among secondary schools (Lee & Cheung 1991:149-150). The FNSS was
also criticised for its great autonomy in admitting students from its feeder or
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nominated primary schools that were usually the most popular, famous ones in the
territory.
2.4. Secondary school choice—1978-2001
The reform of the allocation of secondary school places which were aimed at
alleviating the problem caused by selection in Hong Kong started in the mid-1970s
and 'spanned the entirety of the 1980s' (Lee & Cheung 1991:149-150). As the public
was critical of the SSEE which was mentioned above in 2.3 and pressed for the
expansion of educational opportunities for all primary-school leavers, the
government then introduced the 9-year universal, free and compulsory education. It
also designed another mechanism, the SSPA, which followed the principles of
regionalisation (organised around geographical school nets) and mixed-ability
intakes so as to regulate the transition of students from primary to secondary schools
and which would replace the undesirable SSEE (Lee & Cheung 1991:149-150).
In 1976, it was announced that the last SSEE would be held in 1977 and a new
system, the Secondary School Places Allocation System (SSPA) would come into
operation in 1978. The 1978 SSPA was different from the SSEE in four ways. First,
the SSPA made internal assessments of students over a period of one and a half years
in all subjects, other than in physical education. This took place from the 2nd term of
primary 5 to the end of primary 6, and replaced the former SSEE testing of students
in only three subjects in one public examination in one afternoon.
Second, whereas the SSEE made an order of merit for students individually in the
whole territory, the SSPA introduced the geographical school nets. The entire Hong
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Kong territory was divided into twenty-four school districts, each of which included
all primary and secondary schools in the same area, forming a school net. Five
attainment bands were defined, based on the scaled internal assessment of students in
the same school net. The top 20 % of students in the same school net go into the first
band, the next into the second band, and so on. Parents expressed their school choice
by filling in and submitting their School Choice Form, and pupils were allocated to
schools in order of bands. By the time the band V pupils were allocated, most
schools in a net would be full and these students were then allocated to the least
popular schools. When the schools in a school net are unable to cater for all the
pupils in that district, it is the band V pupils who will be allocated to schools in
another school net.
The third difference from the SSEE was that instead of relying totally on the order of
merit of each student, the SSPA allowed for a certain degree of randomisation in the
allocation of places. That is, although students in the first band were given the
priority in allocation over students in Band II and below, they were not further
differentiated by order of merit within the same band. Therefore, when schools of
their first choice were over-subscribed, those places would be allocated randomly by
computer.
Finally, some changes were made to the FNSS: participating schools in the system
retained 10-15 % of discretionary places, plus a certain percentage of 'reserved
quota' for the eligible students from their linked primary schools. The maximum
reserved quotas for 'eligible' students was reduced from 85% to 50% for feeder
schools, while that for the nominated schools was to remain at 25%. 'Eligible'
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students were those who were in either Band I or Band II and had chosen the parent
schools as their first choices. The rest of the places in these schools in the FNSS
would be left for open competition in the SSPA.
2.5. SSPA reform and its rationale in 2001
The SSPA reform proposal in 2001 includes the proposed changes in the
Discretionary Places stage (DP) and Central Allocation stage (CA) in 2001 in the
transitional period 2001-2005, the future reform agenda, its rationale and main
procedure of the allocation process in 2001. Let us now look at the reform agenda of
the SSPA and its rationale (See table 2.2).
Table 2.2. Detailed changes of the SSPA during the transition period 2001-5
and the future reform agenda Proposec in 2001














































As already stated, the education system in Hong Kong is examination oriented. After
its review on education, the selective mechanisms at PI and SI were regarded by the
Education Commission as hurdles which put too much stress/pressure on the
intellectual development of students, rather than on the development of their ethical,
physical, social and aesthetic faculties, thus imposing many restrictions on real
learning.
Therefore, it was suggested (Education Blueprint for the 21st Century 2000:44) that:
firstly, the AAT under the SSPA should be abolished to avoid unnecessary drilling;
secondly, bands should be reduced to remove the labelling effect; thirdly, the
proportion of discretionary places should be increased appropriately to broaden the
admission criteria. In the long term, they do not recommend any form of public
assessment for SSPA purposes. The Government then accepted the Commission's
proposals and, accordingly, put forward a reform agenda for the SSPA. These
significant changes were then quickly implemented in 2001.
Briefly, the 2001 SSPA is different from the 1978 SSPA in three ways: firstly, the
AAT (Academic Aptitude Test) which was used to scale students' internal school
performance, was abolished and replaced with the average AAT results of the past
three years (1997-2000) of each primary school. Secondly, the banding of students
were reduced in number from five to three. Thirdly, the number of discretionary
places increased from 10% to 20% in 2001 and may increase further to 30% in 2006.
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Table 2.3. The two stages of the SSPA (Secondary School Places Allocation:















No restriction Based on school net
Who applies Parent Parent
Procedure Apply to the chosen
school (with/without
Interview)
Apply through E.D. by filling in
a choice form (make their
choices from the school net list
and place them in an order of
preference.-1-30 choices)
% places In general, secondary
schools participating in
the system are allowed to
reserve not more than
20% of their Secondary 1
places as discretionary
places for admission of
students before the
central allocation.
All the places in school
deducting the repeaters and
the discretionary places that
have already been offered to
students during first round.
Main
elements
School decision- up to
schools to decide










with scaling mechanism- made




7. ***Scaling & Banding
separately by sex and
allocation separately by sex
Appeal No appeal Can appeal and be reallocated
again (the whole process is
completed within 14 days)
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From the table (Table 2.3) illustrated below, we can see that there are two main
stages within the SSPA: the Discretionary Places (DP) starts early in the period from
January to March, while the Central Allocation (CA) starts in May. The CA also
includes the Feeder and Nominated School Schemes that only involve a small
number of Secondary schools in Hong Kong.
Under the Feeder School Scheme (See Appendix A: 8), a parent secondary school
may reserve, after the deduction of repeater and discretionary places, a maximum of
up to 85% of the remaining places for its feeder primary school.
Under the Nominated School Scheme (See Appendix A), a parent secondary school
may reserve, after the deduction of repeater and discretionary places, only a
maximum of up to 25% of the remaining places for its nominated primary school. As
mentioned previously, parents of the nominated or feeder primary school have
priority in securing places in the feeder and nominated secondary if they choose the
parent school as their first choice in their choice form.
Furthermore, with regard to the application of discretionary schools (See Appendix
A: 9), this is different from the CA (Central Allocation) in that parents can choose a
school outside their local school net. In general, secondary schools participating in
the SSPA are allowed to reserve not more than 20% of their Secondary 1 places as
discretionary places (DP) for the admission of students before the central allocation
(CA). Parents apply to the chosen school themselves from January to March. The
schools may arrange interviews but no written test should be conducted. If a student
is accepted by a school to fill a discretionary place, he/she will not be allocated
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another place in the central allocation (CA) and it is up to the chosen school to
decide whether a student is accepted or not.
If this is compared to discretionary places (DP) before 2001, then those in 2001 or
after seem to increase parental choice in two ways; firstly, secondary schools in the
public sector could only allocate 10% in the past, whereas they can now allocate 20%
of their Secondary 1 places in the period 2001-5, and this may increase to 30% in
2005-6 after a review of the policy in 03-4. Secondly, students who could only apply
for only one discretionary secondary school in 2001-5 may apply for 2 discretionary
secondary schools in 2005-6, although all of this may be subject to change or
amended under the 2003-4 SSPA evaluation.
In fact, the evaluation took place in 2005; we can see the proposed post-transition
SSPA mechanism in table 2.4, column 3.
Table 2.4 The proposed Post-transition SSPA Mechanism (EC, Review of
MOI & SSPA 2005: 36-43)
Existing mechanism Proposed mechanism
DP quota
20% (provide the 'rank
order list' to secondary
schools)
30% (ceasing the provision
of 'rank order list' to
secondary schools)
NO. of DP schools
that can apply to
1 2
Allocation bands 3 No chanqe, remain 3












Use two most recent * Pre-S1
HKAT result (curriculum-
based, perceived as
consistent, valid and fairer) to
derive the instrument foi
scaling the IA results.
*Pre-Secondary 1 Hong Kong Attainment Test
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Having presented the SSPA reform agenda and the changes in 2001, we can now try
to improve our understanding of the seven elements (See table 2.3 Row 8, Column 3:
Elements 1-7) within the computer allocation (CA). The main elements of the SSPA
mechanism (Also see Appendix A: 1-9) can be summarised as the followings:
computer allocation by allocation bands (with internal assessments & scaling
mechanism); by random number, by school nets; by parents' choices of schools. The
readers also need to be informed that there was different treatment of boys and girls
in the 1999-2001 SSPA cycle (See Appendix A: 4 & 7) and will be presented below.
The explanation and illustration are mainly extracted from the official SSPA
document in 2001 (See Appendix A).
Firstly, with regard to the element of computer allocation by allocation bands (with
internal assessments & scaling mechanism), a Primary 6 students' chance of
allocation to a school of his/her preference depended mainly on his/her position in
the order of merit of his/her own school internal record. This order of merit was
based on the schools' internal assessments at the end of Primary 5, both mid year and
end ofPrimary 6.
As different primary schools might have different standard of marking and
assessment might vary from school to school, a scaling mechanism was employed to
scale and convert each school's internal assessments and put all participating schools
into an order of merit. As AAT, the test which used to scale schools, was abolished
in 2001, the average of each primary school's AAT results in the past three years
(1997-2000) was used to scale students' school internal assessment result for the
purpose of determining their allocation bands (See Appendix A:1 & 2).
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The internal assessments of boy students and girl students were scaled separately for
ranking into allocation bands. That was, the internal assessments for all boy/girl
students scaled in a school net were put into a separate order of merit for
determination of their allocation bands, each consisting of 1/3 of the total Primary 6
boy/girl students in the school net (See Appendix A: 4).
As stated in the Outline of the SSPA (See Appendix A), in order to keep a gender
balance of each co-educational secondary school, the places of each co-educational
secondary school were divided into places for boys and places for girls before the
allocation process commences. During the allocating process, boy students and girl
students were dealt with separately in the SSPA (See appendix A: 7).
Secondly, in 1999-2001, the whole Hong Kong was divided into 18 school nets and
generally each school net comprises all the participating primary and secondary
schools within the area. In some cases, a few schools from neighbouring area were
included in the list too (See Appendix A: 3).
Thirdly, the computer-generated random number that was allotted to each student
determined the order of allocation within the same allocation band. This random
number was generated by the computer before the running of the allocation
programme and has no connection with the Student Reference Number (See
Appendix A: 4).
Fourthly, with regard to the element of allocation by parents' choices of school, each
year in early May, parents make their choices from the Secondary School List
provided by the Education Department and place them in an order of preference
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(from 1 to 30) in the School Choice Form. School places allocation procedure was
done according to the order of preference indicated by parents in the School Choice
Form (See Appendix A: 5).
All of the examples and explanations of the SSPA mechanism below are taken
directly from the official document from ED to the public (See Appendix A: 6 & 7).
Table 2.5. Example of allocation by Net, by Band and By Parental Choice in
School Net X
In School Net X Numbers
No. of Allocation Band 1 boy students 1000
No. of Allocation Band 1 boy students choosing School A as
first choice
150
No. of boys' places available in School A 100
Boy Student A Boy Student B Boy Student C
NAME
CHAN LEE WONG
Allocation Band I I I
Random No. 120 50 150
1st choice School A School A School A
2nd choice School B School B School B
Allocation was done on a school net basis and order of allocation depends on
students' Allocation band. That was Students in Allocation Band 1 were first
allocated Secondary 1 places according to their parents' choices, then students in
Allocation Band 2 and 3 respectively. Within the same band, each student was
allotted a random number, the smaller the random number of the student would be
allocated a place first. Within an allocation band, first choices were allocated first,
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then second choices and so on. The following example demonstrates the actual
allocation procedure for a boy student (See Appendix A: 6 & 7). As noted before,
boys and girls were dealt with separately in the SSPA in 2001 and the following
example also applies to girl students but separately (See table 2.5).
As only 100 boys' places are available in School A in School Net X (See table 2.5),
Lee, with the allotted random number 50 will be allocated to School A while Chan,
with the allotted random number 120 may not be allocated a school place according
to his first choice if all the places has been chosen/filled. Then, the computer, after
screening the first choices of all the boy students in the same allocation band, will
read the second choices of all boy students (including CHAN if he has not been
allocated one) in the same allocation band who have not been allocated a place in
their first school choice.
Suppose there are 650 boy students still unallocated after the computer has processed
the first choices of all the Allocation band I boy students, and among them 8
(including CHAN) have chosen School B as their second choice. If School B has 10
places left after the first school choice allocation and has enough places left to
accommodate the 8 boy students, CHAN will be allocated to the school according to
his second choice while WONG, may not be allocated to school B according to his
second choice if other boys with random number before him all choose school B.
The computer will read Wong's third choice, fourth choice and so on in the same
way until he is allocated a school place. However, WONG's order of merit based in
internal assessment may be higher than CHAN and LEE. This is in line with the
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policy of mixed-ability intake for schools by employment of random factor (random
number allotted to students) in the central allocation (See Appendix A: 7).
From the above explanation of the SSPA, we learn that parents' matching of
student's banding with the appropriate school place is the main factor in being
successful in obtaining the school they want for their children. Since matching is
important in the choice process, adequate information from the primary school is
vital for making a school choice in Hong Kong. However, primary staff and parents
have no way of knowing the official allocation band of a child or his random
number, so instead they have to estimate according to primary staffs' past
experience.
Furthermore, relying on this kind of information from primary school staff is
problematic. What if a teacher is new and too inexperienced to give parents accurate
and detailed information? What if individual primary school staff discriminates
against some students or show bias towards the better achievers? What if individual
teachers are only concerned with school statistics and not in genuinely helping
parents? The readers also need to remember the different treatment of boys and girls
in the 2001 SSPA process mentioned above. In that year the ED also adopted a
remedial mechanism to tackle parents' appeals and complaints. Further mention will
be made of this later in the findings chapters.
In short, engaging in this choice game is by no means a simple task. In addition to
accurate information on the allocation band of the child, it also requires a certain
amount of sophisticated skill by parents. On the one hand, parents need to have
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inside knowledge of the school system in Hong Kong. For example, they need to
know which districts have differing numbers of band I, II, III schools and places that
are available for competition, and how many students are competing and the chances
of gaining a favoured school place. The readers need to be reminded that each year,
ED (now EMB) provides an individual school report to each Secondary school of
overall percentages of the school's intake of band I, II, III students and such
percentage may vary each year. The more the school is chosen by parents with band I
students, the more may be the intakes of band I students. Thus banding of schools
can be changed according to the popularity of each school each year.
As a matter of fact, there are indeed no such formal categories (school bands)
according to ED (now EMB). We can say that school bands emerge from the choice
process that links to different degree/level of popularity of schools. Therefore, to be
successful in this game of choice, parents need to know how many school places are
available for their children and how many children are competing for these places in
their local district.
On the other hand, parents need to have a strategy in order to calculate their chances
of securing the place they want and a corresponding strategy in filling in the School
Choice Form and maximising their chances. All first choices are considered before
any second choices. As a result, a second or later choice of a given school is less
likely to be successful than a first choice because the places in these schools may
already be filled, and so on down the list of choices. Parents who make
over-ambitious early choices are doubly disadvantaged: not only will their
unrealistic choices fail, but their more realistic school choices will also
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fail because they are too far down the list. This puts a premium on
information and tactical skill in the choice process.
2.6. Types ofsecondary schools, curriculum, popularity and tuition fee
Now, let us look at the scope/extent of choice and the kind of choices/varieties that
are available to the Hong Kong parents in the SSPA in 2001. The majority of
students attend public primary and secondary schools in their local school net in
Hong Kong. With regard to the public sector, historically, there are many ways to
distinguish schools. For example, they can be seen as religious schools or non-
religious schools, single sex or co-educational schools.
According to the Report on the Secondary school Places Allocation 199-2001 cycle,
there are two main official ways to differentiate secondary school places. Firstly, in
terms of the mode of financing schools in 1999/2001. This includes: government
schools (7.9%), aided schools (87.48%), Caput schools (1.76%) (A secondary school
which receives government assistance in the form of a per caput grant. This
definition suggests that the schools are awarded government funding based upon the
number of students enrolled) and direct subsidy schemes (DSS) schools (2.86%)
(Report on the SSPA 1999-2001 Cycle).
Secondly, in terms of mode of curriculum, which in 1999/2001 includes grammar
(89.03%), technical (3.99%), pre-vocational (6.21%), skills opportunity and practical
education (0.57%) and Jockey Club Ti-I (0.20%) (Report on the SSPA 1999-2001
Cycle). In terms of the mode of curriculum, parents in general prefer grammar
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schools as they pay a high regard to education in the hope that their children can
enter College and University (Higher education).
Ifwe distinguish school places in terms of academic achievement (according to % of
school intake), they include: Band I, Band II and Band III schools. As mentioned in
2.5, school bands are not formal designations but they emerges from the choice
process. They may fluctuate as the % of banding of student intake varies each year
and only the school (which gets the report from ED, now EMB) knows its own band.
In terms of academic achievement, parents prefer Band I schools (most popular
schools academically) so that their children can increase their chances of going to
college. However, the number of available Band I, Band II and Band III school
places vary in the different school nets. In some school nets, there are more Band II
places than Band I and Band III places. In some school nets, Band I places may be
very limited.
Furthermore, as mentioned previously in chapter 1, section 1.2, we can distinguish
schools in terms of medium of instruction. This includes: EMI (English as Medium
of Instruction) Schools and CMI (Chinese as Medium of Instruction) Schools and, as
mentioned previously in the MOI policy, of the 400 secondary schools in Hong Kong
only 104 are EMI schools. I have already mentioned that parents tend to prefer EMI
to CMI.
Regarding school fees, schools in the public sector are free while schools in the
private sector are fee paying. It is stated that 'No fees were collected for participation
in the SSPA and no tuition fees were charged to any student allocated a Secondary 1
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place in a government aided or caput secondary school through the System' (SSPA
Report 1999-2001 Cycle: 8: 4.3).
And as mentioned previously in section 1.2, historically the general public prefers
government and aided schools with their better quality of education instead of
schools in the private (DSS or other privately funded schools) sector. In 1999-2001
SSPA cycle, totally there are only 26 DSS schools participated (2.86%). The DSS
scheme was not popular until the government revised it in June 2001.
Before the discussion of the market policies, it is useful to provide information of the
secondary school market situation in Hong Kong, that is the demand and supply
pattern of different types of school.
2.7. Demand and supply: Secondary school market situation in Hong
Kong
I start by describing the demand and supply of different type of schools in Hong
Kong. The pattern of demand and supply are illustrated by the survey done by the
Secondary School Association of student movement among different type of schools
after the SSPA result in July over a five-year period. Furthermore, the survey result
can also explain changes, that is, increase and decrease in enrolment size of different
types of schools of different popularity.
As the low birth rate and demographic changes have caused a decline in the student
population in Hong Kong, the decrease in enrolment in individual schools may
become a reality in the near future. However, besides the decrease in the general
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student population, there are some other contributory reasons for the changes in
enrolment size in different types of school of different popularity.
Generally, the initial planning and allocation of school places by computer is
centrally allocated and spread evenly with an average class size of 40 in each school.
This kind of planning, however, is disrupted by the enormous amount of activity
carried out by parents and schools after the announcement of the allocation result in
July.
Parental choice does not come to a halt after the results of the allocation are
announced. Hong Kong parents pay a high regard to education and want their
children to obtain places in popular schools. They know that many schools employ a
second round discretionary place policy, which can enable them to make a change
after the result is announced in July each year. All these activities of parents and
schools have contributed to the decrease in the student intake of some schools and to
the increase of the intake in some popular schools.




EMI out-flow rate CM1 out-flow rate
1998 12.09% 5.45% 15.14%
1999 10.56% 3.62% 13.52%
2000 8.19% 3.57% 10.52%
2001 9.90% 1.90% 13.10%
2002 9.02% 2.97% 11.90%
Source: HK Association of Heads of Secondary Schools: Survey on school choice
1998-2002 lhttD:/Avww.hkahss.edu.hk/papers/survev72002)
The shifting around has a pattern. We can clearly see the pattern of the flow or
shifting of students from the findings in the Survey carried out each year by the Hong
57
Kong Association of Heads of Secondary Schools (HKAHSS) in Hong Kong over a
five- year period (See table 2.6). Out-flow rate is the rate of registered (in July after
the result announced) Secondary 1 students transferred to other schools before
September that year.
From tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, one can acknowledge the direction of the flow of
students and the trend/pattern of the shifting of students with relation to schools of
different modes of funding, the different language of instruction and the different
banding (different degree of popularity) of schools.





Average class size in
September
Average class size in
September
Overall all (EMI & CMI) in EMI In CMI
1998 35.6 No data in that vear No data in that vear
1999 38.83 42.01 37.48
2000 38.43 42.26 39.09
2001 38.1 42.6 37.6
2002 38.6 41.3 37.3
Source: F K Association of Heads of Secondary Schools: Survey on school choice
1998-2002 (http://www.hkahss.edu.hk/papers/survey/2002)
Table 2.8. Out-flow rate and class size in different kinds of schools (mode of
subsidies) in 2002
Types of schools Out-flow rate Average class size in September
Overall (all types) 9.02% 38.6
Aid/povernment 8.11% 38.7
DSS 20.22% 37.3
Privatelv broupht places 22.8% 34.4
Source: HK Association of Heads of Secondary Schools: Survey on school choice 1998-
2002 (http://www.hkahss.edu.hk/papers/survey/2002)
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Table 2.9. Out-flow rate of different bands of schools in 2002
Types of schools Out-flow rate Averaqe class size in September
Overall (all types) 9.02% 38.6
Band 1 3.08% 40.5
Band 1 to II 4.82% 41.5
Band II to III 11.04% 37.7
Band III 22.57% 32.9
Source: HK Association of Heads of Secondary Schools: Survey on school choice
1998-2002 (http://www.hkahss.edu.hk/papers/survey/2002)
Regarding schools with different modes of funding, the out-flow rate of DSS and
privately brought places is very high. It shows that parents prefer places in aided and
government schools places than DSS and private school. For the privately bought
places, the out-flow rate is even higher than that of the DSS schools.
From the above, we can learn about parents' preferences and also confirm the fact
that traditionally, the private sector in Hong Kong is weak and is regarded by parents
as offering a poorer quality of education than aided/government schools. In the past,
especially before 1986, only those who failed in the examination and could not get a
place in aided or government schools had to find places in the private sector.
Students who achieved success in the examination could gain a free place in an aided
or government school. They did not need to pay the tuition fees demanded from
students who studied in the private sector. This is a situation very different to that of
the UK where independent schools are often regarded by parents as being better than
schools in the public sector.
Regarding the banding of schools, the out-flow rate of Band II to III is more than
double that of Band 1 to II schools. And again, the out-flow rate of band III schools is
more than double that of Band II to III schools.
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From the out-flow rate of students in Band III schools, one may acknowledge the
impact of parental choice on the enrolment size of different types of secondary
school in Hong Kong. Though the figure is an average, one can still see the trend or
the general impact on different types of schools.
In short, from the above pattern, we can see Hong Kong parents generally favour
schools with a high academic level or status (e.g. band I & EMI schools) rather than
match children to the special characteristics of diversified schools. After all, there
was not such a wide spectrum of diversity of schools in Hong Kong. Thus, one can
say Hong Kong parents generally compete for a hierarchy of schools defined by
academic level or status (vertical competition) rather than for a choice of schools
with diverse characteristics or specialism (horizontal competition).
After I have mentioned all the unique local secondary school choice situation and
issues in Hong Kong historically behind the 2001 reform, I think it is time to present
a literature review of the quasi-market in education and the debate around the
parental choice policy internationally. And this will be in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 Literature review of quasi market policies and
school choice
3.1. Introduction
As mentioned previously in the preface, marketisation policies have been fashionable
reform policies since 1988 in Hong Kong and gained speed after 1997. These
policies resemble those introduced in the United States, Britain, Australia and other
English-speaking countries in the 80s and exemplify the 'quasi-market' approach in
social policy.
In addition to the SSPA itself, and especially its provisions for parental choice of
school, this cluster of 'quasi-market' policies in Hong Kong includes: first,
encouraging famous, popular government aided schools to become DSS (Direct
Subsidy Scheme) schools, in order to provide more diversity and competition. New
DSS schools were given valuable land and significant financial support. DSS schools
also enjoy much more autonomy than aided schools. They can employ 100%
discretionary places. Second, the 'quasi-market' policies also include the devolution
of school management (The Self Management Initiative SMI); third, a quality
education (Quality Education) emphasising quality control with close
inspection/supervision; fourth, the publication of league tables.
All of these policies are represented as giving more 'informed choice' and power to
the consumer, whilst encouraging competition and reducing bureaucratic control
under the free play of market forces. Such marketisation policies which emphasise
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market competition are presented as intended to lead to an improvement in the
quality of education and so eventually benefit the entire society of Hong Kong
(27/8/99 Hong Kong Economic Daily).
In this chapter, 1 review the literature on the marketisation policies employed in
education in Hong Kong, the development of quasi-market and privatization trend in
Hong Kong and the controversial issues inherent in the debate surrounding
specifically, parental choice.
3.2. Concept of Quasi-market and its application to the Hong Kong case
The term 'quasi-markef is explained by Le Grand & Bartlett (1993:10) in the
following terms: 'They are "markets" because they replace monopolistic state
providers with competitive independent ones. They are "quasi" because they differ
from conventional markets in a number of key ways...':
These welfare quasi-markets thus differ from conventional markets
in one or more of three ways: non-profit organisations competing for
public contracts, sometimes in competition with for-profit
organisations; consumer purchasing power either centralised in a
single purchasing agency or allocated to users in the form of
vouchers rather than cash; and, in some cases, the consumers
represented in the market by agents instead of operating by
themselves. (Le Grand & Bartlett 1993:10).
Walford (2003:69) also argues that the situation differs from classical free markets,
particularly in relation to the demand side, parents and the supply side, schools, in
the following five aspects. First, 'money need not change hands between the
'purchaser' and the 'supplier'. Second, society forces all families to make some sort
of 'purchase'. Third, on the supply side, schools may not be privately owned or,
indeed, profit maximisation may not be regarded as the main objective.
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Fourth, there is strict control and regulation on the entry of new suppliers in the
supply side. Fifth, on the demand side, the purchaser is not necessarily the
"consumer" of what schools offer. There are a variety of beneficiaries (Walford
2003:69). Carroll and Walford (1997:4) also make the point that if the wrong choice
is made, then, in reality, the option to buy a different brand may not exist:
...more fundamentally, children realistically only have one chance of
receiving basic education. If the wrong choice is made, the option to buy a
different brand does not really exist.
When compared with other countries that employ quasi-market approach in
education, the choice discourse and reform of SSPA in Hong Kong resemble a lot of
them. One can compare the typical features of such policies in England and Wales in
1980-1990 mentioned by Croxford and Raffe below (2007: 39):
The typical features of educational quasi-markets are parental choice
of school, the publication of information to inform this choice,
enrolment-linked funding, the granting of management powers to
schools, the corresponding reduction in the powers of educational
authorities to plan education, and encouragement to schools to
diversify.
Such policies in Hong Kong as the DSS policy, encouragement for the diversity of
the school curriculum and other innovations may provide more diversity of schools
for parents to choose. The gradually increasing percentage of discretionary places
proposed under the SSPA agenda and the encouragement for aided schools to change
to DSS status with 100% autonomy in enrolment resemble 'open enrolment1 in the
English education. The 'enrolment linked funding1 of the DSS schools from the
government resembles the 'per capita' funding in England and Wales. Though the
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difference is, DSS schools in Hong Kong are allowed to receive tuition fees from
their students while this is not the case in the UK.
In Hong Kong information is published to inform parental choice, including the
Secondary School Profile and schools statistics including HKCEE results and
University entrance rates. The restructuring of ED into EMB and the SMI (Self
Management Initiatives) policies are similar to the UK case, reducing the powers of
educational authorities to plan education and encourage schools to diversify.
However, the EMB in Hong Kong can exert strong control through inspection and
quality control in the central. This is stated in the 1997 Education Commission No. 7
Report.
All these policies resemble the characteristics or definition of 'quasi-markef policies
1 will discuss them as the followings:
Firstly, for the 'non-profit organisations competing for public contracts', in the Hong
Kong case, as mentioned before, government and aided schools belong to the public
sector and the funding of these schools is provided by government. The increase in
competition from DSS schools is a case of non-profit organisations competing for
public contracts, resembling a quasi-market, though DSS schools, while increasing in
number, are not yet the main form of provision.
As most of the DSS schools, besides receive funding from EMB, also collect tuition
fees from parents, the Hong Kong case seems also to be going towards 'privatisation'
(there are different types of DSS schools in Hong Kong, most of them collect tuition
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fees, a few do not collect tuition fee in SI-3). As a matter of fact, DSS schools can be
profit organisations, though the maximum amount of fees is controlled by EMB.
Secondly, regarding the consumer purchasing power, in the Hong Kong secondary
school education, consumer purchasing power, we can say are centralised in a single
purchasing agency, the EMB but not allocated to users in the form of vouchers. And
the purchaser, EMB, is not necessary the consumer, the parents or the students.
There are no 'vouchers' in any form in secondary education in Hong Kong. Thus, we
can say money changes hands from EMB to both the public sector (government and
government aided school) and the DSS schools which may or may not collect tuition
fee. Parents of some very famous DSS schools may need to pay great sum of tuition
fee. With 100% discretionary places of some famous DSS schools, parents then can
apply directly to the DSS schools. The purchasers, in this case, are the parents. So
this is very different from aided schools parents. Furthermore, parents who lack the
material resources, may lack purchasing power in such DSS schools.
Thirdly, regarding 'society forces all families to make some sort of purchase', in the
past, regarding secondary education allocation, we can say, it is highly centralised.
But with DSS schools seems provide more diversity, autonomy and increasing
discretionary choice, families are encouraged to shop around. The shopping activities
are likely to expand with the recent reform policies: the increase of DP% in SSPA,
the DSS policy and the MOl policy.
Fourthly, in Hong Kong, aided schools and some DSS schools are not privately
owned, so profit maximisation may not be the main objective, at least overtly. This
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cannot be a real market but resembles a 'quasi-market'. Also, there is strict control
and regulation on the entry of new suppliers on the supply side. EMB in Hong Kong
has strict control and regulation over the supply side- government, aided or DSS
schools, though DSS schools have comparatively more autonomy than aided schools.
From the above definition and the discussion of how the definition applies to the
Hong Kong case, readers learn that there are similarities and differences from other
countries which also employ quasi-market policies. The diversity of education
markets, or the variations in market strength in different countries, stated by
Croxford & Raffe (2007) is caused by three factors: the market model, market
conditions, and educational cultures.
The market model can range from a fully planned system to a free market system
(Woods et al 1998). The variation depends how many market features there are. That
is, the more market features, the stronger the market regime (Croxford & Raffe
2007). Market conditions include all the factors which can affect the operation of the
markets such as student population, school size, proximity and diversity. Educational
cultures mean the pre-existing practices, beliefs and values of all the participants in
the education system such as: parents, educators, principals, local
administrators...etc.(Croxford & Raffe 2007).
Besides the above variations in the strength of the quasi market and the factors
contributed to it, Hirsch's (Hirsch 1994, Adler 1997) distinction of demand-led or
competitive choice versus supply-led or pluralistic choice policies is also very
important to the present study of parental choice in the Hong Kong school market
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situation. It is stated that demand-led policies aim to encourage competition and
supply-led policies aim to increase types of schools available to choose from.
Below, I will present the development of quasi market and privatisation trend in
Hong Kong, with the local policy context and details I mentioned in chapter 1 and 2,
readers can then have a better picture of the quasi market situation in Hong Kong.
3.3. Development of quasimarket and privatisation trend in education
in Hong Kong
In this section I will describe the historical development of the market approach,
apart from the SSPA which has already been discussed in chapter 2, the discourse of
choice and the privatisation trend of secondary school education in Hong Kong.
The official case for choice in education in Hong Kong can be found in the policy
document of the Education Report No. 7 Quality Education (Education Commission
1997: 7.18-19). It describes the government's aims for education as follows:
In the Government's Statement of Aims published in 1993, we
recognise that one of the aims of education is that as far as
possible, parents should be able to choose the type of education
best suited to their children, and should have adequate information
on which to make informed choices (7.18).
Regarding diversity and privatisation in secondary education, it proposes that the
government should review the DSS policy in order to make it more attractive to
aided schools aspiring to even greater management and funding flexibility. It states
that the private sector can thus become an alternative to public sector school
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education, given that more diversity and choices can provide parents with the
opportunity to meet the different educational needs of our younger generation:
In the light of the need to inculcate a quality culture in the school system
by providing more flexibility in school-based development and more
educational choice to parents, we have recommended in paragraph 4.25
that ED should review how the DSS can be made more attractive to
aided schools aspiring for even greater management and funding
flexibility. In this connection, we recommend that the Government
should re-examine the role of and the administrative support to the
private schools, and their interaction with the aided sector, with a view
to optimising resources; encouraging school-based development which
reflects the characteristics of individual schools; and developing a viable
alternative to public sector school education which can provide more
diversity and choices to meet the different educational needs of our
younger generation (7.19).
In 1999, the government launched the pilot Direct Subsidy Scheme and the number
of DSS schools participating in the SSPA rose from 9 in 1999 to 24 in 2000 and 26
in the 1999-2001 SSPA cycle.
The year 2000 is described as a milestone in education in Hong Kong, as changes
flooded every sector (Hong Kong SAR Government 2000 Yearbook). In fact, the
DSS policy for the development of the private sector (privatisation policy) in
education in Hong Kong came much earlier, in 1991.
As mentioned above, traditionally, the private sector was small and weak when
compared with the public sector. Furthermore, it was perceived as offering inferior
quality of education than the public sector.
The Direct Subsidy Scheme, which was introduced originally in Hong Kong in 1991,
was revised and updated in June 2001 (after the 1999-2001 SSPA cycle) in order to
attract more aided schools to change their status to DSS. Under the updated model, a
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DSS school can receive a recurrent government subsidy of about HK$29,500 per
student, providing its tuition fees do not exceed HK$68,864. The DSS offer is made
even more attractive by allowing new DSS schools to also receive their existing
aided subsidies during a five-year transition period. It is also stated that while the
majority of students in DSS schools are fee-paying, schools must set aside about half
of the fees collected for funding scholarships or financial assistance schemes for
economically disadvantaged students (World Education News ICP online October
2001).
In October 2001, a few very prestigious, famous aided schools started to consider
and apply for DSS status. However, the few prestigious DSS schools (former famous
aided schools) did not change into DSS status until September 2002 after the
ED/EMB revised the DSS package in June 2001. In 2002, September, St. Paul co-ed,
St. Paul College and Tak Mong Secondary School changed from aided schools into
DSS schools.
With all the autonomy that DSS schools have, one element that makes the issue more
complicated is the contentious MOI language policy implemented soon after the
handover of sovereignty to China in 1997. The medium of instruction in aided
schools is constrained and decided upon by the ED/EMB on the basis of the ability of
the students. However, schools in the DSS scheme have no such constraint and are
allowed 100% autonomy in deciding the medium of instruction they wish to employ,
regardless of the level of ability of their students. This policy was criticised by the
Professional Teaching Union (PTU News 27 Oct, 2003):
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...More schools of direct-subsidy scheme are yet to be built. These
schools have the advantage of adopting English as the medium of
instruction without further justification of their students' language
competency, thus recruiting more students from low-banding
subsidised schools. This contradictory effect of language policy and
the adverse state of competing to attract students among schools are,
in reality, the direct aftermath of EMB's mismanagement.
Regarding quality and information, the Education Commission Report proposed that
the quality of the product/service provided in each school should be inspected and
reported to the public for reference. Thus after the consultation period, it
recommended that a well-developed framework of indicators of school quality,
context, process and output indicators should commence not later than 1998
((Education Commission 1997). A 'two-pronged approach to quality assurance' is
recommended in the same policy document (Education Commission 1997: 3.1-3.3).
This consists of 'internal quality assurance by school, and an external quality
assurance mechanism'.
For the internal quality assurance by school, it is recommend that it should be
achieved through: a. school-based management; b. co-operation of key players in the
school system; and c. self-evaluation (Education Commission 1997: 3.3):
...quality assurance within schools can best be achieved through
practising school-based management, which allows key players of
school education to participate in setting school goals and developing
quality indicators which best meet the needs of schools and
students...We endorse the spirit of the SMI as a key factor in the
enhancement of quality school education.
It thereafter recommended that by the year 2000 all schools should have put in place
school-based management through which internal quality assurance can be achieved.
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For the external quality assurance, it included the recommendation of setting up of a
Quality Development Committee (QDC), the employment of a whole-school
approach to inspection, and to designate and reorganise the staff concerned as
Quality Assurance Inspectorate (QAI) in the provision of quality education. It also
stated that some respondents suggested that the QAI should develop guidelines with
input from front-line educators, release inspection reports for public reference, and
assist improvement in school performance (Education Commission 1997: 3.17).
3.4. The debate: benefit and problems of choice
Literatures of quasi-market and school choice abound. Bartlett & Le Grand (1993:
14) proposed four criteria for evaluating the quasi-market reforms: namely,
efficiency, responsiveness, choice and equity. As the present research aims to focus
on the latter two, I will present in detail below the benefit sought and problems of
choice in such policies proposed by the opponents and proponents.
Three main advantages of school choice, as summarised by Gorard, Taylor & Fitz
(2003: 14-17) are: Firstly, the libertarian notion of choice for its own sake.
Secondly, increased equity: the choice of school extends a privilege to all.
Previously, this choice, suggested by Coleman (1990, 1992) was only available to
those able to afford houses in particular high-income catchment areas. School choice
thus can empower parents who were previously trapped in what Coleman
(1990,1992) called the 'iron cage of zoning'. Thirdly, market choice may drive up
educational standards (Chubb and Moe, 1990). Through market competition,
successful schools will grow stronger while weaker schools will become more
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unpopular, progressively losing their per capita funding until they either improve or
close. Over time, therefore, the general standard of schools will become higher
(Gorard et al 2003: 14-17).
However, though the above advantages of the 'quasi-market' in education look very
attractive and persuasive, it is not without problems and critique, as suggested by its
opponents.
Regarding the first claim, the libertarian notion of choice for its own sake, there is
problem concerning 'whose choice is the focus of concern' and it also leads to the
implication of "increasing the choices open to one set of people may reduce the
choices open to others' (Bartlett & Le Grand 1993: 16-17). Besides, there are other
problems inherent in the nature of choice itself, as suggested by opponents. These
problems include the following: the problem of who is the consumer? The
assumption of the 'rational' choice of parents; the assumption of informed choice,
the 'perfect' information that every consumer has; the problem of illusory choice-
real choice or lottery choice, the problem of structural inequality that may be found
in the system, the problem of mechanism of choice: per capita funding and consumer
power.
The first problem to deal with here is the argument about who is the educational
'consumer'. Indeed, it can be the child or the parent who may act as the agent or
proxy for the young (Jonathan 1997). Difficulties arise when the interests of parent
and child (student) differ. Employers also claim that they are consumers and that
education ought to provide the kind of employees they need. Obviously, difficulties
72
emerge when deciding 'who is the consumer and whose need should have priority at
any one time' (Bowe, Ball & Gold 1992: 26).
The second problem of the choice policy concerns the assumption that all the parents
make 'rational' choices. Regarding this, the policy advocates stated that the policy
increases parental choice, in this case meaning the policy increases the choice of
each consumer/parent who makes a choice of school for his/her children. However,
the opponents argued that not all parents choose schools in this way (Bowe, Ball &
Gold 1992: 26). Indeed, research data shows that 'choice means different things to
different people in different settings' (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe 1995: 55).
Feintuck (1994) also claims that 'there is strong evidence to suggest that only a
minority of parents have in practice been able to encash such rights and this has had
negative knock-on effects for those less able or not willing to pursue their claims...'
(Feintuck 1994: 52). Jonathan also points out that 'people do not differ merely in
their preferences and their resources for obtaining them. They also differ in abilities,
understanding, experience and cultural capital, all of which structure preferences,
making some possible and others not' (Jonathan 1997: 51).
The third problem concerns the 'perfect information' of informed choice. Lawton
(1992:85-86) states that many parents choose without such 'perfect information':
A free market in education is likely to be inferior to a system planned
by professionals, because a free market is only efficient if there is
"perfect information" or at least very good information and the
ability to pay. Many parents are not in a position to know what is on
offer, or to know how to judge its quality, nor to pay for what they
would like.
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The provision of adequate information is specially important in the education setting
because it is difficult and costly for parents to detect the quality of education
provision before the pupil has spent some time at a school (Bartlett 1993:143). 'It is
relatively difficult and costly for pupils to switch schools if the quality of educational
provision does not meet up to expectations'.
Furthermore, Bartlett stated that the quasi-market mechanism 'will not work well
where imperfectly informed consumers base their choice of school on non-
educational characteristics such as the predominant social class...A "bandwagon
effect" may develop with some schools becoming increasingly popular and desired
whilst other schools develop a poor reputation even though they may be capable of
providing effective levels of educational quality. As a result, a minority of relatively
privileged schools may be able to reduce costs and increase incomes, while other
schools may suffer financial instability'. Thus, Bartlett (1993: 144) argued that
inequality in levels of educational provision may increase if such effect occur as a
result of a lack of adequate information.
On the other hand, Bowe et al (1992: 27) suggested that the form of information
which arises solely from test or examination results is one- sided. A good intake of
students may result in them having good results. This does not necessarily mean they
have attended a very good school. Furthermore, the imposition of testing (league
tables) by the government may, in fact, constrain or construct for the consumer
notions of what counts as 'good' or 'desirable' forms of education (Bowe et al
1992:27). In fact, the idea of 'free choice' or 'goal-directed individual choice' can
only be preserved by ignoring those factors which influence or construct choices in
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the interests of the producers (such as advertising) or the government (such as
propaganda, control of the media...) etc (Bowe et al 1992).
With such difficulties concerning information, Lawton argues that 'to talk of a free
market is either naive or hypocritical; it can also be argued that what parents want
may not always be in the best interests either of the children or of the community as a
whole' (Lawton 1992: 85-86). The more sophisticated latest device using the
multilevel-analysis model with value-added data in assessing the performance of
schools (schagen & Hutchison 2003, Schagen & Schagen 2005) may be more
convincing and may give more accurate information about schools.
The fourth problem concerns whether there is real choice or just 'lottery choice',
which can be merely illusory. It is argued that education is a positional good (Hirsch
1977. Brown & Lauder 1997), that is, something which is desired not because of its
intrinsic value but because of its scarcity value. Since the scarcity value of a
positional good diminishes as the number of people possessing it increases, 'first
order choices' provide 'second order choices' as people attempt to retain their higher
status.
Brown and Lauder (1997:187, 190) also argue 'when education becomes a positional
good and where the stakes are forever increasing in terms of income, life-chances,
and social status, powerful individuals and groups will seek to maximise their
resources to ensure that they have a stake in the game by whatever
means...Therefore, how the state intervenes to regulate this competition in a way
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which reduces the inequalities of those trapped in lower socio-economic groups must
be addressed...'.
They further argued and concluded that 'state intervention, planning, regulation...are
needed for the creation of a post-Fordist economy'. Moreover, historically and
culturally, the Chinese have a high regard for education as it is perceived as offering
the chance of social mobility. This may serve to create competition when over¬
subscribed schools do not have the flexibility to increase places (there is a standard
size for all secondary schools in Hong Kong).
Competition for this choice will become more severe as more parents compete for
the limited number of places. Lawton distinguishes the difference between offering
real choice (where there is a high chance of meeting those choices) and 'lottery'
choice (where parents might be encouraged to choose, but where there will be a very
low chance of satisfaction). 'The idea of parents being able to choose schools was
splendid in principle, but in many areas there were now bitter complaints about the
failure of the system to deliver choice' (Lawton 1992:105-108).
The fifth problem concerns the structural inequality in the system. It is claimed that
more choice is good because it is 'classless' and fairer than planned provision
(Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe 1995:11). Apparently, everyone has the chance to choose
and to decide upon the best providers of goods and services to meet their needs.
However, the reality here is that this 'choice' is not neutral or classless. In Ball's
research on 'parental choice', the reality is that these choices have 'class bias'.
Social and cultural capital may play an important role in choice making.
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'Knowing how to approach, present, mount a case, maintain pressure, make an
impact and be remembered' (Gewirtz et al 1995: 25) is obviously important. They
then conclude that: first, 'choice is very directly and powerfully related to social-
class differences'; second, 'choice emerges as a major new factor in maintaining and
indeed reinforcing social-class divisions and inequalities' (Gewirtz et al 1995: 55).
For increasing diversity and choice (more freedom or consumer sovereignty) to
consumers in curriculum terms, is not an easy objective to achieve. The fact is that,
in practice, students do not have real freedom or real choice (Vickers 1991). Case
studies in English education show that choices are never 'free' nor truly just 'our
own'. Choice, indeed, is always 'relative to the power that can be exercised within a
particular social position' (Vickers 1991:145-147). All students, parents and teachers
may choose sometimes in some sense. However 'the evaluative basis of choice is
never individual only, but always conforms to some code or set of values shared with
someone else'. The writers then concluded: 'From most social positions most of the
time, choices are between evils: between "last resorts" and something better'
(Vickers 1991:145-147).
The sixth problem concerns the claim that the mechanism of choice and per capita
funding will increase consumer power is argued by opponents, as being illusory
(Bowe, Ball & Gold 1992:53). They argued that individual consumers may not have
any real power in the educational market, although, as suggested by Bowe and Ball,
it is not quite as simple as it seems. In fact, schools are competing to attract greater
cultural capital in the hope of yielding higher returns (Bowe et al 1992:53).
Feintuck also states that 'one would not resolve potentially inegalitarian
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consequences of oversubscribed schools being able, by whatever means, to select
their pupils' (Feintuck 1994:64) and this kind of selection by may cause further racial
segregation in the English educational market (Feintuck 1994).
Bartlett & Le Grand (1993:32) also suggested that there may be 'discrimination by
either purchasers or providers against the more expensive users', for example, in
education, 'the disruptive child from a deprived background'. 'If "cream-skimming"
occurs: purchasers can choose for whom they will purchase, and providers can
choose for whom they will provide, that is, if they can skim off the cream, then
welfare services may not reach those who need them most and equity will not be
achieved'. So, they (Bartlett & Le Grand 1993:34) argued that there should not be an
incentive for providers or purchasers to discriminate between users in favour of those
who are least expensive.
However, there is circumstantial evidence that selection of students from better
background did occur (Bartlett 1993:150). Thus Feintuck stated that, choice may not
empower parents, but may, on the contrary, just encourage selection by
oversubscribed schools (Feintuck 1994: 64). Lawton states that the effect of choice
may be a risk if minority interests are fostered and the quality of education for the
majority is not being improved (Lawton 1989).
Regarding the second claim of increased equity, Coleman (1992) suggests that
changing the basis for allocating school places from one based on 'catchment area'
and fixed attendance zones, to one based on choice and 'open enrolment' with no
restriction of catchment area (in the case of Hong Kong, there is no individual school
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zoning or catchment area as there is in the UK and USA, but one school net
composed of 25-40 schools of different bands), will simply alter the basis for
segregation, rather than increasing it. Coleman suggested that schooling systems in
unequal societies are often socially stratified by income and race. School choice
could lead to more equity and to a school system stratified by performance and
behaviour (Coleman 1992:260). He suggested that reducing bureaucratic rules and
procedures (such as catchment areas) would enable families to choose good schools,
which were previously inaccessible to them because of zoning.
In the U.K, Aldridge (2001:83.c) also states that the catchment areas of public
schools are the greatest barrier to social mobility. One of his policy recommendations
to tackle the problem is by 'reducing the weight given to geographical catchment
area as a determinant of access to the best State schools (to counteract the scope for
middle class parents to buy a good education for their children by moving to the right
area)'. In this way, choice can reduce school stratification by mortgage/income.
However, Ball (1993) argues that whether the market works in the way its
proponents suggest is an empirical question. To the contrary, opponents argue that
market policies undermine welfare states as they may have the effect of dismantling
the machinery through which equity is achieved (Ball 1993, Gewirtz et al 1995).
For the definition of equity, Bartlett & Le Grand (1993:19) define it as 'equity in
relation to need', 'we shall consider an equitable service to be one where use is
determined primarily by need and not by irrelevant factors such as income, socio¬
economic status, gender, or ethnic origin'. For need, they regard it as 'referring to
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the resource requirements of the individual concerned, with the specific implication
that the more care resources an individual requires to bring his or her level of welfare
up to some predetermined level, the greater is his or her need'. Thus Bartlett & Le
Grand (1993:19) stated that the question to be asked of a quasi-market service with
respect to equity is 'whether it improves the correspondence between individuals'
resource requirements and their use of a welfare service'.
Whether the choice policy increases equity or segregation, some scholars suggested
an examination of the social composition of different schools to determine whether
the choice policy increases the inequality of access and increases the polarisation of
different social groups or not. Gorard et al (2003:51-52), in using national data to
analyse whether school choice increases segregation or not, found that there was a
slight temporary increase in the segregation index at the start of the process. They
explained this phenomena as a policy-related 'starting-gun effect' where some
advantaged groups are likely to be better off at the beginning of the reform.
However, segregation will decline and settle after an initial rise:
After an initial rise, segregation then declines and settles at a lower
level than before, as the market becomes "established'. If some
sections of society are more aware of changes in policy and more
attuned to their new rights as "consumers' (alert clients') one might
expect that they would produce a shift towards stratification in the
immediate aftermath of choice reforms whatever the long-term
outcomes. Put simply, after any change in legislation, some sections
of society will be quicker off the mark in utilising any new-found
rights, and it is likely that these sections will comprise those who are
already more privileged in some sense. This is what we term the
'starting-gun effect'.
Thus, for Gorard et al (2003), the required skill for school choice can be learned, and
once the market becomes established, the segregation index will settle. Their findings
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and conclusions are that school choice is better than selection by mortgage and that
there is no positive link between education markets and school segregation. Though
the disputes over how to measure social differences, which techniques are
appropriate for analysing the concept of segregation and the argument over ways of
interpreting research evidence (Gorard & Fitz 2000, 2006, Gibson & Asthana 2000,
Croxford & Raffe 2007) render the issue even more complicated.
The third claim made on behalf of quasi-markets is that in a free market the
aggregate of individual decisions to buy and sell will improve the quality of services
and goods through the mechanism of supply and demand.
However, opponents suggest that it is problematic to treat schools as supermarkets
that merely respond to the unlimited demands of consumers. Schools have limited
places, different localities and traditions. How can schools open new branches like
supermarkets? If a school can open new branches, the quality of education that can
be offered is already different from the original school (Morris 1994: 31).
Opponents suggest that this kind of 'choice' alters the goods themselves, rather than
improves standards. Adler, Petch& Tweedie (1989), after their research relating to
parental choice in Scotland (where open enrolment was established in 1981), state
that when significant numbers of parents and children leave their original school, the
resources of the original school may thus be reduced and the quality of education for
those children left behind may be affected.
And when dealing with the promise of raising standards claimed by the market
supporters, Adler et al (1989) also note that there is no evidence that the choice
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policy has contributed to an overall improvement in standards. With the difficulties
in defining the 'quality of education', or what is termed as being an 'effective
school', it is difficult to measure whether market forces can drive up educational
standards. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, opponents argued that the
consequence of marketisation in education might result in school selection,
exclusion, segregation and the polarisation of school intakes.
In Hong Kong, Tsang (1997) stated that, inherent in the equality of the 9 years of
educational opportunity in Hong Kong, was the inequality of the education process.
Tsang (1997) indicated that the development of the universal 9 years compulsory
education in Hong Kong was, in fact, just a development from exclusionary elitism
(unequal opportunity in access to secondary education due to limited space in the
past) to segregated elitism (segregation of social economic composition among
schools).
Opponents claimed that the market approach of diversity and choice in education
cannot be self-correcting as its proponents suggested and that it may, in fact, bring
more harm than good. However, Hargreaves (1996a: 131), though he recognises that
parental choice may bring some form of selection in oversubscribed schools, argues
that unless there is sufficient evidence to show that the costs of choice outweigh the
benefits, then diversity and choice is defensible and is based on firm ground through
the UN's universal declaration of human rights. He stated that: 'In the absence of
conclusive evidence, the discussion and debate is openly speculative... much of this
writing is best treated as rhetorical rather than in any sense scientific'. He further
argued that 'diversity and choice in the UK are defensible and desirable unless and
82
until: first, some convincing argument and evidence can be adduced that the costs
greatly outweigh the benefits, second, it can be shown that any costs incurred cannot
be reduced or overcome by limited state intervention...In UK, it is incompatible with
a libertarian position to return to either a pre-1965 selective system or to a pre-1979
comprehensive system'.
For Hargreaves, alternative policies, such as strong inspection and strict control over
admissions procedure, would minimise the costs of market diversity and choice and
thus there can be no adequate justification for politicians to deny diversity and choice
in the UK. Hargreaves (1996a: 131) regards that the most promising way of balancing
individual rights and collective welfare, 'is to retain an anti-selective comprehensive
principle within a system characterised by unaccustomed and innovative diversity
and choice'
On the other hand, Walford (1996a) holds a very different view to Hargreaves's cost-
effect approach and questions the validity of weighing or balancing. To Walford,
weighing depends very much on values. Furthermore, he (Walford 1996a: 143)
stated that Hargreaves's cost-effect approach is biased towards choice: 'this bias
shows itself both in the initial formulation of the "balance" and in the practicalities of
evidence gathering'. For Walford (1996a:144) the benefit of increased choices are
easy to perceive. They accrue to small groups of individuals in the short term, while
costs are more likely hidden and to be borne collectively by particular disadvantaged
groups and society as a whole. Thus he sees no reason for accepting Hargreaves's
bias towards choice:
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...Benefits are likely to be far easier to perceive as they are usually
visible in the short term and accrue to a small number of individuals
who are aware of those advantages. In contrast, the costs are likely to
be longer term, initially hidden, and paid (often unknowingly) by a
large number of people.
Walford (1997:517) also indicates that current government policy and the now
desirable and widespread view of choice did not simply come out of the air, but had
to be generated by government. He states that there is actually very little demand
from parents for true diversity in the UK and choice is not naturally paired with
diversity, but with selection and inequity of provision. Walford (1996a, 1996b, 1997)
believes that, in reality, those policies that emphasise choice and diversity have
undeniably led to increased selection and inequality of provision and that greater
government controls on admission or more state interventions are not likely to reduce
the cost.
In short, its advocates claim that the market approach increases consumer power,
choice and diversity. It is also claimed that market competition will bring about
rising standards and a good quality of education. Their arguments, as identified and
summarised by Adler (1997:307), are that: 'choice might be a fine idea but it will not
work in practice; choice might work but it will have undesirable side effects; choice
in education in self-defeating; putting power into the hands of parents will make
schools more conservative and throttle innovation'.
Adler (1997:307-308) further stated that choice policies vary across countries in
terms of: 'whether choice is optional or mandatory; whether or not limits are set on
school rolls; how places are allocated when they cannot all be met; whether reasons
for choice need to be given or are taken into account; whether or not choice is
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restricted to schools within the parent's education authority; whether or not choice is
restricted to public schools and whether or not it extends to private schools and
whether or not assistance with transport costs is available.'
Besides the formal arrangement of school choice, for scope/diversity of choice, Adler
(1997: 308-309) listed the following considerations: 'whether or not different types
of school exist; whether or not schools are required to follow a national curriculum
and how prescriptive this is; whether or not schools can specialise; whether or not
schools are encouraged to adopt distinctive teaching and learning strategies; whether
or not the government or the education authorities actively encourage or actually
decree diversity'. All these considerations are relevant to the present study of school
choice in Hong Kong.
With such a hot debate and complex situation of quasi market regime and school
choice mentioned above, what will the early impact of school choice in a unique
policy context in Hong Kong on parents and on schools? What kind of response will
Hong Kong schools and parents experience and face under the market competition?
Will it increase parental choice, or will it increase selection of popular schools. What
kind of selection strategy might schools employ? Will there be any change of school
intake social composition? Will there be increase of school social mix? Will there be
inequality issues related to class, gender and race? All these related to the main and
research sub-questions in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 Researching the early impact of the SSPA
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the author aims to give a brief account of the research design
and methods used in the current study of the early impact of the SSPA in Hong
Kong.
Firstly, every research has a perspective, focus or has aims and research question to
achieve and this will be addressed in 4.2. Secondly, before an account of how the
research was carried out, the reader needs to be informed of the review in research
methodology in the field, in order to understand the rationale and justification of the
choice of methodology employed. Thus, the literature review of the methodology,
my rationale and philosophy of the research mode employed, how the research
instruments were constructed and used, how triangulation was achieved and the
justification of the research methodology, will all be included in section 4.3 and 4.4.
Next, I include an account of how the research was actually carried out: including
research diary, strength, limitation of the current research with problems in access,
sampling, revised research strategy and an account of the quality of the data will be
in section 4.5. Lastly, before I present the Findings in Chapters 5 to 7, a summary of
all the limitations, issues of validity and the reliability of the present research, and
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the manner in which the researcher is going to treat her evidence and draw her
conclusion will be provided in section 4.6.
4.2. Research question, focus and aims of enquiry
The main corresponding research question is: what is the early impact of the new
SSPA on the two key stakeholders: namely, parents and schools in Hong Kong? The
research sub-questions related to the impact on parents include the following: Firstly,
how do parents make their choice in the system? Secondly, is there inequality of
opportunities for parents to exercise choice in the new SSPA? Thirdly, how do
parents comment on the changes of the SSPA from their own perspective, and on the
basis of their own experience of the reform. The research sub-questions related to the
impact on schools include the following: firstly, how do schools with different
popularity respond to the changes of SSPA? Secondly, how does the new SSPA
impact on schools with different popularity? Thirdly, how do school administrators
(principals and delegate) regard the changes of the SSPA impact on their schools?
As I mentioned previously in the literature review, the issue of equality of
opportunities for school choice informs the current research. Therefore, the research
focus is to investigate the early impact of choice policy on the key stakeholders, and
not on how policy is formed or on the process of formation or policy borrowing
through globalisation (Green 1999). In addition, the present thesis also serves the
following purposes: firstly, to provide the general public in Hong Kong with a
perspective, other than the government/formal/official one. Secondly, to add
literature to the research arena within a unique location such as Hong Kong, where
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'...east can meet the west, north can meet south, better than in almost any other
society' (South China Morning Post, 7th, February, 2004). Lastly, to provide both
parents and educators with a channel/opportunity to voice their comments on the
policy in a systematic way.
4.3. Methodology and justification
In this section, general issues concerning my choice of research mode and my
underlying assumption will be presented.
When one considers the research method to be adopted, it is helpful to be reminded
of Burgess's comment (Burgess, 1985:179) that 'the fundamental principle involved
in the use of research methods is that any method of social investigation has to be
selected for use in relation to the sociological problem... In this sense, the evaluation
of the strengths and weakness of different research methods can only be done
effectively in relation to real problems and real research.' Waslander and Thrupp
(1997:339) stated that 'Markets need to be studied in context because the outcomes
generated by educational markets will be determined by both the formal properties of
a market and informal arrangements within that market.'
As my main research question is "what is the early impact of the new SSPA on the
two key stakeholders: namely, parents and schools in Hong Kong? 1 aimed at
providing the policy context, that is, the formal properties of a market and how
schools response to the formal properties, that is the informal arrangements within
that market.
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However, while every research method has its pros and cons, the choice of the
present research method may not be perfect but is grounded in the critical literature
review of the field in different countries in the past.
First of all, the research on school choice in education in the USA follows a strong
quantitative mode, while in England and Wales qualitative approaches are often used
(Whitty et al 1998) in small-scale projects porard et al 2003). Research in New
Zealand and Sweden combines qualitative and quantitative approaches (Whitty et al
1998). Furthermore, research on the equality of opportunity of school places in Hong
Kong in the past has often used quantitative data (Lee & Cheung 1991, Tse, 1998,
Ho, 2002) and lacked detailed in-depth qualitative data.





















Source: Gewirtz et al (1995:4)
As this present research aims to research the early impact of the SSPA and give
stakeholders the opportunity to voice their experiences and perspectives on the
policy, it makes sense to use both quantitative and qualitative data. The researcher is
also aiming at obtaining information from different perspectives and levels. Thus the
key stakeholders - parents, administrative staff and policy makers were selected for
interview in order to achieve the aim of triangulation.
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Secondly, policy of the education market can take different forms as mentioned
above, I admire and thus adopted a research mode that is similar to the research
template by Gewirtz et al (1995:4) in table 4.1.
For parents' demand of school place in Hong Kong, I used a questionnaire survey
and conducted semi-structured interviews with parents to obtain data of parents'
criteria of choosing schools. For schools' response to the school choice reform, 1
conducted case study of schools with different popularity to see how school response
to the SSPA, that is school strategies (the informal properties) in the market place in
response to the SSPA reform (the formal properties). In the case studies of four
schools, I also tried to obtain data regarding who 'chooses' and the impact of choice
on the four schools' recruitment patterns to understand more about distribution. I also
conducted documentary analysis (Newspapers & DP Application Forms) to analyse
the process of recruitment to schools in Hong Kong from January to March during
the Discretionary Places (DP) application stage (see table 4.2).
Furthermore, as King (1987:243) stated: 'all methods have their limitations. There is
no best method in the sociology of education, only suitable and feasible methods, so
we should try as many as possible'.
Thus the present research employs multi-methods (See table 4.2. below) which
include, on the one hand, a parental survey (using a questionnaire) and 12 semi-
structured parental telephone interviews to obtain a general picture of the policy
impact on parents. On the other hand, a case study (with policy documentary
analysis; and observation and interviews with administrative staff) of four
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theoretically sampled schools will give a detailed, in-depth picture of the policy
impact on schools of different bands (schools with different degree/level of
popularity) within the Hong Kong area.













Survey Parents who chose
secondary school
places in 2001
The early impact of the











The early impact of the





a. 3 principals and
one delegate
b. 12 parents
c. 2 policy makers
The early impact of the
new SSPA on HK
schools and parents.
In addition, semi-structured interviews with two policy makers (One delegate from
the Education & Manpower Bureau and one from the Education Commission-one of
the three who led the reform and drafted the Education Reform Proposal) are also
included in order to collect data for triangulation.
Thirdly, I did not have national data from EMB to have statistical analysis of
'choice-making, appeals and recruitment profiles. So for the distribution aspect, what
I have is the data from my 905 questionnaires returned from parents, the four case
study schools and documentary analysis in order to understand schools' recruitment
profiles and some descriptive analysis of choice-making, parents' success and
failure.
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The lack of national data is a limitation regarding researching distribution. However,
as the researcher had tried in vain to obtain the national data from ED (now EMB),
the researcher was able to obtain three reports published by ED on the SSPA from
1999-2002 for complementary evidence.
The case study approach has been criticised as having a lack of external validity
(generalizability). However, one can still have analytic or theoretical generalisation
(Firestone 1993). Three threats (Teelken 1998:45) to the internal validity of case
studies are: firstly, the hypothesis cannot be supported statistically. Secondly, the
presence of the researcher may influence or change the phenomenon. Thirdly, the
researcher may be biased in his/her point of view, interpretation and selective
perception. Therefore, the researcher must bear in mind these three threats and try to
avoid them during the research process.
Four strategies were adopted to tackle the above threats of validity within the case
study method. Firstly, an in-depth study of the phenomenon was adopted, while the
phenomenon was explained in its natural context (Teelken 1998:45). Secondly, a
certain level of standardisation was sought during the research (observation,
interview...etc) (Teelken 1998:45). Thirdly, the data was analysed using a thematic
approach (Miles & Hubman 1994). Fourthly, the coding and findings were discussed
with supervisors (Silverman 2000).
However, in using a survey, the researcher also had to bear in mind the two main
problems of reliability (is the survey measuring things consistently?) and validity (is
the survey measuring what it says it is measuring?) The researcher had also to adopt
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a reflexive approach towards the quality of data that was produced and had to ensure
that each word and question in the parental questionnaire (the survey) and in the
interview schedules, was constructed with care so that valid and unambiguous
answers could be collected.
As there were so many constraints on researching the SSPA in Hong Kong, the
present choice of research design is regarded by the researcher to be the most
suitable and possible, given the various limitations (power, finance, time...etc) and
the severe problems of gaining access.
4.4. Sampling, research instruments constructed and used
Theoretical sampling was employed. The four case study schools are selected to
include schools with different levels of popularity. The popularity of Hong Kong
schools may be understood as a changing continuum which emerges from the school
choice process; schools are not formally categorised by pupil ability levels but they
are informally perceived to belong to different bands according to the composition of
their pupils (that is % of banding of student intake each year), as I have explained
earlier in chapter 2. It therefore makes sense for the theoretical sampling to be based
on schools from different (informal) bands, that is, with different levels of popularity,
so that we can compare and contrast them.
Both the survey questionnaire and interview schedules were constructed according to
the Hong Kong local policy context with reference to studies in Scotland (David et al
1986) with both closed and open-end questions.
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The parental questionnaire in the survey is composed of two main parts (See
Appendix B3). Part I is composed of four sections. Section I is about the
Discretionary Places System (DP). Section II is about the Centrally Allocated Places
System (CA). Section III is about the Appeal Mechanism. Section IV is about how
satisfied parents were with their children's present school after one year on.
Both the survey and interviews were carried out after two pilot studies (mention of
these will be given in detail in 4.5.) and amendments had been made, particularly
with regard to the list of factors (See Appendix B3 questions 1.5 & 2.2) parents
considered when choosing schools, as 'the list is usually incomplete' (Gorard a 1997:
47).
It is hoped that the use of multi-methods can help solve the problem of validity.
However, readers should be informed that problems discovered with the
questionnaire after the data collection stage mean that the researcher should handle
the data produced with great care. I will discuss the validity of some of the results
later.
Part II concerns the biographical data of the respondents. As the debate on school
choice concerns equality of opportunities among students from different social class,
the question of how to measure the socio-economic status of Hong Kong parents and
their subsequent division into different groups has to be considered. Therefore,
questions about respondents' education, qualifications, employment and income
level are used in the questionnaire to measure parents' social-economic status.
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However, during my pilot studies, I discovered that parents regard that employment
(there has been high unemployment in Hong Kong in recent years due to the
economic situation in Asia) and salary are their personal secret and so they have been
unwilling to reveal any information on these two very sensitive questions. After
revision, questions on qualifications and the educational level of parents remained in
the questionnaire to obtain data on parents' social-economic status. However, similar
to Carroll & Walford (1997:8), obtaining data on parents' qualifications also 'proved
problematic'. I will discuss how I divided the parents into different groups in the next
section.
Moreover, as the questionnaire was composed of two main parts with totally five
sections of both closed and open-ended questions, it was considered to be too long
and too time-consuming to complete. As the researcher aimed to collect sufficient
data to answer the research questions and has tried her best to simplify it, it was
regarded as acceptable. The readers may find the high response rate (65%— -905
returned out of 1400 delivered) interesting.
A questionnaire that requires respondents to answer so many questions was
obviously time-consuming but some respondents seemed to enjoy it and even spent
more time in voicing their opinions and experiences with regard to the SSPA.
Parental interviews were conducted after the survey and consent for participation was
gained at the end of each parental questionnaire, rather than through the schools, in
order to reduce bias in sampling.
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Interview schedules (See Appendix CI, C2, C3) were constructed with the aim of
obtaining more in-depth genuine opinions and experiences of parents, school
administrators (3 Principals and 1 Delegate) and policy makers' toward the new
SSPA. In addition, as my aim was not to apply the interview schedules too
bureaucratically (Flick 1998) and to encourage the interviewee's openness, it was
decided that all the questions and their sequence could be altered according to the
context and their relevance to the respondent (Flick 1998). As Jones (1991) stated
that the interviewer's personality and role can have a very complicated effect on the
interview process, I had to be careful with the kind of relationship I established with
the interviewee.
Furthermore, as my aim was to encourage the interviewee to talk freely and openly, I
tried to establish and maintain a trustful, egalitarian relationship (Jones 1991).
However, this was to prove difficult when interviewing one of the policy makers. 1
will discuss this later when looking at the difficulties encountered. Conducting
telephone interviews with parents also had its drawbacks, as emotional clues from
facial expressions and body language cannot be observed and studied. But since the
researcher was the interviewer herself, she could still detect and record the
respondents' feelings through their voices. Judgement of the quality of data that was
collected can be made later.
Another issue of concern is the internal validity issue of interviews, but, as the
researcher was the only one interviewer involved, there was no problem of
consistency in this aspect. For the other possible sources of internal invalidity in the
current research, I will talk about them in the later stages.
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4.5. My empirical story, problems encountered and quality of the data
As Silverman stated (1985), the kind of approach a researcher has toward his/her
interview data, has a direct bearing on the kind of reflexive account he/she has. I
believe that a reflexive account of the whole process can uncover problems and
therefore lead to a more careful and valid data collection and data analysis (Miles &
Hubeman 1994). Thus, in this section, the writer has aimed at producing an honest,
critical and reflexive account of how the research was actually carried out and what
kind of quality of data I have.
This enquiry is mainly composed of two phases (See table 4.2.). Phase I contains a
parental survey, while Phase II includes the case study of four schools (detailed study
of four schools with different level/degree of popularity, Band I, l-II, III.), interviews
with school administrators (3 Principals and 1 Delegate), 12 parental interviews
(three from each case study schools), interviews with the two policy makers and
documentary (e.g. school homepages, newspaper reports, DP application forms)
analysis were included for triangulation.
All the in-depth studies were used to investigate what had actually changed in terms
of school choice and the consequences of these changes in the new arrangements.
Initially, letters and telephone calls of invitation were sent and made to all the
secondary schools in one local district, Tai Po in Hong Kong. However, only 1
school gave its consent to the survey and the case study. Later, the researcher learned
that student population in Tai Po had dropped tremendously and that schools were
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busy competing for intake. Perhaps this was the reason that schools in Tai Po were
reluctant to participate in this research.
As time was running out for the researcher, every attempt was made to gain access.
Letters of invitation were revised and then sent to all the secondary schools in Hong
Kong. In addition, emails, telephone invitations and personal contacts were
employed to contact schools. Finally, 11 schools (cover single-sex school and co-ed
schools) from 11 school districts (See table 4.3) gave their consent to participate in
the survey, including 6 schools (2 band I, 1 band I-II, 3 band III schools) which gave
their consent to the case study. None of them were among the few schools that
changed into DSS schools in 2001-2, though the researcher has sent email, letter and
made phone call of invitation. From the description of the difficult process of gaining
access, it should be noted that the sampling here is what Gorard (a 1997:47)
describes as opportunistic in nature and that researchers need to be cautious.
A further sampling problem was that, other than 1 band I-II school, there was no
other band II schools which gave their consent. Originally, 1 band I school, 2 band II
schools and 1 band III school were to be selected for the case study. In the event four
schools: 1 band I, 1 band I-II, 2 band III schools were chosen from the 6 schools for
case study.
Schools' bands were determined on the basis of the composition of pupils. At first,
information on the banding of the six schools came from friends inside the ED/EMB
(unfortunately, banding information about two schools was found to be incorrect
later).
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Later information was obtained from the schools themselves. This information was
found to be more reliable, based on the overall percentage of banding of students
allocated to the schools given by ED/EMB officially to the schools. However, the
readers should be informed that, according to EMB, there was no banding of school
in Hong Kong officially, the banding of school, we can say, is just a convenient way
to classify schools of different popularity.
More than 1400 questionnaires with letters of invitation and consent forms were sent
to form I parents through the 11 schools, which had given consent to the current
research. 905 questionnaires were returned during the period April to July 2002, after
students had been studying in secondary school for nearly a year. Though the 11
schools comprised three boys' schools, three girls' schools and five co-educational
schools, it is found that among the 905 respondents (905 returned questionnaires),
the number of respondents with a male child was nearly double that of respondents
with a female child. This may affect the validity of some of the findings related to
gender of child and parental choice.
After gaining consent for interviews from parents directly through the parental
questionnaire, the researcher conducted the 12 parental telephone interviews to
collect more in-depth qualitative data in February and March, 2003. The case study
of four schools and face-to-face interviews with the policy makers were conducted
during this period too. The Research diary and field notes were used as a device to
note down unexpected issues (Miles & Huberman 1994). This device is believed to
allow the checking of accuracy of information and also provides information for
reflexive thinking afterwards.
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Although the empirical qualitative data of four schools and 12 parents is a small
number and I cannot generalise my findings for the whole of Hong Kong, it can still
offer some rich, detailed pictures to complement the quantitative data from the 905
returned questionnaires. There are also many useful pieces of qualitative data from
the open questions in the survey, which I will discuss later. All the interviews were
recorded with the consent of interviewees and were transcribed.
School documents, for examples: school reports, meeting minutes, school
brochures...etc, were analysed. University guidelines for the protection of research
participants were followed. Confidentiality was guaranteed but all the information
(interviews transcriptions, survey result and documents) are stored in a data bank.
Reflexive self-criticism (Silverman 2000) was used to ensure the validity and
reliability of the research. Thus the question of validity of data was often in the
researcher's mind throughout the whole process of researching, data collecting, data
entering and data analysis stages.
As mentioned in the previous section, there were some problems found with the data.
The first problem was in the method of distribution. The parental questionnaire was
delivered and collected through the 11 participating schools from 11 different school
nets out of the total of 18 school nets in Hong Kong. It was considered as a
convenient and efficient way to first contact, then to collect information from the
parents. However, after the return of data and data entering stage, the researcher
discovered two problems with this method.
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First, the researcher had foreseen that misunderstandings of the link between
researcher and school may occur and so had employed two measures to guarantee the
confidentiality of the data given. One measure was to provide each questionnaire an
envelope with the sign "Edinburgh University Parental Project" to seal the
questionnaire. Another measure was to provide a covering letter with the
questionnaire, clearly stating the independence of the researcher and that there was
no link between the researcher and the school.
However, misunderstandings were still found in the returned questionnaires as a few
respondents expected the researcher to change some of the policies in the school that
they thought were not good. To a certain extent, this kind of misunderstanding may
have affected some of the respondents' answers and thus may have affected the
validity of the data provided. Fortunately, the number of such responses was small.
Another problem was the irrelevancy and inconsistency of some of the answers to
one or two of the questions in the questionnaire. This may have been due to
confusion over the wording or layout of the questions or perhaps it was due to the
educational level of some of the respondents, or perhaps it was the respondents'
intention to do so.
As for the former two reasons, the researcher had already carried out two pilot
studies to ensure the validity of the instrument and data collected before the parental
survey was conducted.
The first pilot study was conducted in 2001 in July with 20 questionnaires delivered
to parent friends (who had engaged with the SSPA before) of the researcher and
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which were subsequently returned. Some problems in the wording of questions and
layout were found and amended. The second pilot study was conducted in December
2001 with 50 questionnaires delivered to Form One parents (the targeted population),
collected and returned through three teacher friends of the researcher.
The problems found have to be taken into account when analysing some of the data
in the questionnaire. The researcher bore in mind that just counting the frequencies
and not assessing the relevance of the data is meaningless and may alter the research
findings. Thus the weighting of evidence and validity of evidence were always in the
researcher's mind during analysing stage. This point will be discussed along with
some of the findings from the questionnaire at a later stage.
Regarding the problem of collecting information about parents' socio-economic
status, as already predicted, only a few parents would give data on their
qualifications and some (178, or 20% of the sample) were reluctant to give data even
on their level of education. Fortunately, a significant number of parents did give data
on their own education level (80%) or on that of their partner (69%) (See tables 4.5
& 4.6). With this crucial data, 1 therefore managed to create an aggregate measure of
parental education based on the higher education level of the two parents (See table
4.7).
Unfortunately, the national figures do not give information about student/parent's
socio-economic status/background. Therefore I cannot compare my results with the
national figures.
102








Band 1 4 463 51.2
Band II 3 247 27.3
Band III 4 195 21.5
Total 11 905 100
As mentioned previously, through the 11 schools from 11 different school nets (See
table 4.3 above), around 1400 questionnaires were delivered and 905 answered
questionnaires returned (a total of 910 returned questionnaires, with 5 blanks found).
Again, it could be expected that the same person who actually filled in the School
Choice Form and chose a school for his/her child in 2001 filled in the questionnaire
(See table 4.4 below).





Male guardian 5 0.6





However, during the parental interviews, it was found that in one case, due to the
illiteracy of the parent, it was the student in the household who completed both the
parental questionnaire and the School Choice Form, instead of her parent. After
double-checking the data, it was found that only a very few respondents and their
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partners (723 out of 905 willing to answer the educational level question, among the
723 who answered this question, 4 respondents and 3 of the respondents' partners
reported without education) reported that they had no education at all.












For this group of respondents, though the researcher had no way to know how they
managed to reply in the parental questionnaire, or it is reasonable to think that a
family member, fdled in the School Choice Form for them. Luckily, after I aggregate
the household education level, only one family with both parents have no education
at all (See tables 4.5, 4.6 & 4.7).










Missing data (0) 274
Total 905
Furthermore, I am still not sure if only one parent or both parents made the school
choice making decision. From table 4.4, 639 respondents are the mothers and 190 are
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the fathers. From table 4.7, one can find that the biggest group lies in the secondary
sector, (61%). The primary sector consists of 16% and the group that includes
secondary 6-7 to postgraduate is 24%.










Missing data (0) 174
Total 905
From the three tables above, we can see some of the characteristics of the survey
respondents, their education level, their gender and their identity.
Furthermore, it is also interesting to note that some parents even used the blank space
in the questionnaire to express their opinion. Thus, lots of rich qualitative data can
also be found in the questionnaire. This kind of eagerness in answering
questionnaires came as something of a surprise to the researcher. As already
mentioned with regard to the research instruments used, completing a five sections
long questionnaire is a very time-consuming task, but most parents took the time to
complete it. Another aspect of parents' eagerness to express their views can be
shown in the uncommonly high return rate - 64.6%, being 905 returned out of around
1400 delivered.
Of course, one could argue that the high return rate might be due to the
misunderstanding of the link between the school and the researcher. Whatever the
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case, the researcher had already acknowledged and predicted the problem beforehand
and had already done all she could to avoid the misunderstanding of the link in this
project. From the eagerness of the parents' response to the open questions, the
researcher believes that the questionnaire, to some extent, at least, acted as a channel
that parents used to voice their opinions on the policy and the education reforms in
Hong Kong. It has to be noted that a few respondents (not more than five) also
commented on the time-consuming aspect of the questionnaire, while a few
respondents expressed their appreciation of the questionnaire and this project.
Four schools, 2 EMI (English as Medium of Instruction) band I schools (one later
become band I-II) and 2 CMI (Chinese as Medium of Instruction) band III schools,
were selected for the case study. The differentiation of EMI and CMI, as noted in the
background chapter, is due to the difference of language being used as the medium of
instruction in junior secondary schools years, from Form I to Form III.
Due to the heavy workload of the Principals, only one face-to-face semi-structured
interview was conducted in each school in Cantonese. The interviews were recorded
with the consent of the interviewee and transcribed and translated into English. The
time period with Principals varied from 1 hour to three hours, depending on the time
available of each Principal and the eagerness of the Principal to share his/her
personal views on the SSPA and on the various education reforms in Hong Kong.
The Principal in CMI1 is new this year and, therefore, an administrative staff
member was appointed by the Principal to be interviewed by the researcher. This
particular staff member was a bit reserved and his interview was the shortest I
conducted.
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Another school Principal, in School CMI2, was very eager to talk and took every
chance to promote the school and, so, the time taken on this interview was the
longest. In fact, this Principal was very positive about the education reforms in Hong
Kong. The reputation of the school had been very bad in the past, but the Principal
stated, in the four years he has been in the post, has inspired a significant
improvement.
The views of Principals are important to the present study, but the researcher also
acknowledged she should treat data from Principals with caution and with a critical
stance. It is because Principals may attempt to justify their positions. Thus the
readers will be informed how information from Principals was triangulated with
other sources in finding chapter 6. More information on this is shown in the findings
later. In general, then, the interview relationships were informal and friendly. All the
data needed from schools for this project were collected on the day of the interview
or received later by email and by post.
Out of the 905 returned questionnaires, 99 (10.9%) parents from eleven school
districts gave their consent and their contact phone number for the telephone
interview in their returned questionnaires. 12 parents, 3 from each of the four case
study schools, were then selected for telephone interviews with the aim of comparing
parents' participation and experience in DP. Thus, the criteria for the selection of the
12 parents was based mainly on whether they participated in DP or not, and whether
they were successful in their choice of school or not.
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After selection, the researcher also met problems when some parents refused to
participate in the telephone interview though they had given their consent in the
questionnaire. However, the problem was a minor one and was resolved promptly.
Finally, after re-selection, 12 parental telephone interviews (Table 4.8) were
conducted in Cantonese in February-March 03. Again, they were all recorded with
the consent of the respondents, then transcribed and translated into English. The
duration of telephone interview ranged from around 20 minutes to 1.5 hrs. The time
difference depended on the eagerness of the interviewees to share their experiences
with the interviewer, on the time availability of the interviewee and on the
uncontrollable telephone interview context...etc.
The interview schedule was semi-structured. Overall, the interview relationships
were friendly and relaxed, as it was the parents' wish to be interviewed, and there
was no compulsion on the part of the school to take part. Again, two parents asked
about the role of the interviewer and whether she had any link with the school. Such
frank enquiry from parents was a good thing as the interviewer could take the chance
to explain that she had no link to the school and that the confidentiality of parents'
answers in the parental questionnaire was assured.
Besides the data from parents and from the four case study schools, two policy
makers, one officer (delegated by Mrs Fanny Law, the Permanent Secretary of EMB
in 2003) from the Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB) and one from the former
Education Commission (EC) committee, (who was one of the three main advocates
who led the education reform in Hong Kong and participated in the Education Blue
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Print proposal), were also interviewed regarding their perspectives on the changes in
school and the impact on parents regarding the changes in the SSPA and the reforms.
The interview relationships were friendly but unequal. Being a student researcher
facing a high-ranking official in the government made the interview understandably
unbalanced in terms of power. This became immediately obvious when the policy
maker from EMB asked, 'Are you the student researcher?' The readers need to
appreciate the difficulties of obtaining answers from this high-ranking officer during
the limited one-hour period assigned by the officer. Regarding the validity of the
qualitative data collected, the researcher had to decide whether each piece of
interview data be treated as giving direct access to 'experience' or as actively
constructed 'narratives' (Silverman 2000).
Silverman (2000) has suggested that the realism and narrative approaches should be
used to analyse interview data. In general, according to the evidence of my
observation and my interview diary (field notes), I know that most of my
interviewees trusted me and opened up to share their personal experiences with me.
However, the researcher also realises that some of the data should be regarded with
caution. Interview data from Principals and delegates is one example and how the
researcher validates the information given will be presented in the finding chapters.
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The following table shows the characteristics of the 12 interview respondents in the
four case study schools:
Table 4.8. Characteristics of the 12 interview respondents from the four case
study schools (3 parents from each school)
EMU EMI2 CMI1 CM/2
Respondent 1. Mother 1. Mother 1. Mother 1. Father
s 2. Mother 2. Mother 2. Mother 2. Mother
3. Father 3. Mother 3. Mother 3. Mother
Education 1. Secondary 1. Secondary 1. Secondary 1. Primary
level 2. Secondary 2. Secondary 2. Secondary 2. Primary
3. Secondary 3. Secondary 3. Secondary 3.?
Present 1.CP 1st 1.CP 2nd 1. Find own 1.CP 31st
School place 2.CP 2nd 2.CP 11th one 2.CP 20th
and choice 3.DP 3.CP 1st 2.CP 31st 3.CP 31st
(31st choice 3. Find own
means did one (can not
not choose accept 29th
the school choice)
Participate I.Yes but 1.No 1.No I.Yes but
in DP failed (will 2.Yes but 2.No failed (?)
(If second choose failed (will 3.Yes (will 2. Yes but
chance, will same) choose choose failed (will
you choose 2.Yes but same) differently) choose the
the same or failed (will 3.Yes but same)
different?) choose failed (will 3. Yes but
same) choose failed
3.Yes got the same) (will choose
school the same)
Appeal 1.No 1.No 1. No I.Yes but
2.No 2.Yes but 2. Can not failed
3.No failed accept but no 2. Yes but
3. No appeal failed
3.No 3. Yes but
failed
Change 1. No 1. No 1. Parent 1. Yes, but
school? 2. No 2. No wanted , but can not
3. No 3. No child afford
disagreed 2?
2.Yes, will try 3.?
3.No
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Two approaches were used to analyse interview data. Firstly, the thematic approach
was used. After the transcription and translation process, the researcher re-read the
transcriptions until all the main themes were identified. Secondly, a comparative
method was employed to understand the factors associated with similarities and
differences.
Both the quantitative and qualitative data presented later in the Findings chapters
aimed at giving a more in-depth view on schools in competition with each other, and
on conflicts faced by accountable school managers and on the responses from the
policy makers. However, in the next section, we need to summarise all the
limitations of the present research, while issues of interpretation need to be addressed
also.
4.6. Limitations and issues of validity and reliability
While reading through the empirical story and evidence, one may agree with the
saying that 'doing research is in no way a tidy enterprise but a messy one'.
Furthermore, data collection through survey and interview seems simple and
straightforward. However, as Silverman (1985, 2000) states, one cannot simply take
the face value of the data, but, instead, one has to be reflexive in preparation, both
during and after the data collection, about what may have affected the data obtained.
So, in this section, before I present our findings, I aim to sum up all the limitations
and will, hopefully, inform the readers of this in a reflexive, honest and objective
way.
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There are lots of limitations in this research on the impact of the secondary school
choice SSPA policy. Firstly, other policies complicated the matter. Originally, the
researcher just wanted to investigate the impact of the SSPA on parents and schools.
However, this was found to be impossible at a later stage of the research process. The
researcher discovered that it was difficult to disentangle the effect of concurrent
policy changes, as the cause and effect, or pattern, may not be linear but multi¬
dimensional.
This is sometimes caused by the impact of other policies such as DSS, language
(MOI) policy, SMI and Quality Education...etc in Hong Kong. This is what Johnson
(1990:119) said in her research of parental choice in the UK:
When we look at the effect of a policy for parental choice on schools
it is, as with the effect on sub-systems of education, difficult to
separate one effect of the Reform Act from another. The introduction
of local management of finance immediately causes schools to look
at one another in a different way...Assisted Place...we can see
examples of how maintained and independent schools related to one
another in a competitive situation...
Secondly, the researcher could not ignore the time factor, as 1999-2001 SSPA cycle
was the first stage of the reformed school choice policy. On the one hand, schools
were found to be in the early, experimental stage of trying different strategies in
order to attract more students. Thus, this thesis should be cautious in making claims
to assess impact as the effects and consequences of impact and diversity may not
emerge very quickly. Therefore, I may be able to track the early impact, to measure
perceptions of impact, and possibly to measure short-term changes in the distribution
of students across schools; but the time scale is too short for a full impact
assessment.
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Thirdly, theoretical sampling according to the popularity/banding of schools is
merely one aspect to be considered. Another aspect to think about is that different
individual schools have their own history, characteristics, educational philosophies
and strategies. The case study of four schools can give us some idea of the four
particular schools, but whether the four schools are representative of other schools
from the same band (similar degree/level of popularity) is still questionable.
Another issue that may affect the validity of the findings related to gender and
parental choice is the composition of the sample of the case study schools: the fact
that a single-sex boys' school (the most popular one) was included in the sample,
while a single-sex girls' school was not (Remarks: Survey sample of parents is
different from sample of the four case study schools).
Furthermore, regarding the data obtained from a handful of self-selection schools, the
researcher must be cautious that the schools may have hidden agenda participating in
this research and thus may not provide the truthful account of the school. Thus for
the interview data from the four administrators, the account they gave have to be
treated carefully and have to be triangulated with other data.
Fourthly, research design is limited by the problem of access. As I only have four
case study schools, generalisation must be taken cautiously.
Fifthly, again, is the sampling problem caused by the problem of access. As only 11
out of a total number of 400 secondary schools participated in the school choice
parental survey, a question regarding the problem of sampling surfaces. 'How
representative is the result, even though 905 questionnaires have been returned?'
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Nevertheless, I can at least be satisfied that the 11 schools are from 11 different
school nets out of a total of 18 school nets in Hong Kong. So, looking at it in this
way, one could say that I have covered a fairly wide representation of what is a very
complex Hong Kong market. The problem now is: 'How many claims can I make
from such a representation?'
Sixthly although, as mentioned in section 4.5, the 11 schools cover single-sex and
co-ed schools, it is found that among the 905 respondents, nearly twice as many had
a male child as had a female child. This too may affect the validity of some of the
findings related to gender of child and school choice.
Lastly, in order to measure whether the policy caused social segregation, large-scale
and longitudinal studies of school intakes before 2001 and after were required. That
is, ten or more years of official statistical data of the social composition of students
in different schools would be useful in collecting more concrete evidence. However,
in the present study, a longitudinal approach is not feasible for a PhD study, given
the limited 3-5 year period available. However, the present data do provide some
evidence of the changes in intakes of our four case study schools in three years time
(2001-2003).
With all these limitations in mind, the writer acknowledges the importance of the
issues of validity and reliability of her empirical evidence. She also acknowledges
that the way in which she uses the data as evidence, as well as the issue of
interpretation, are very important issues.
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However, she must bring her own judgement on the data, without necessarily taking
it at face value. Moreover, she must weigh each piece of evidence with triangulation
before any conclusions can be drawn and be cautious regarding all the limitations of
the current research. Lastly, since this is a research on early impact and equality of
opportunities of the school choice policy, the researcher needs to keep at a critical
distance and be reflexive at all times. Hopefully, reflexivity and objectivity can be
achieved.
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Chapter 5 Parental choice in Hong Kong
5.1. Introduction
The findings surrounding the main research question and research sub-questions will
be presented in the following chapters 5-7. The findings will be presented in raw data
form by themes with a few relevant comments attached.
The main focus of this chapter is on the early impact of the choice policy on parents
(on the demand side). I will present the quantitative evidence (905 cases- using both
open and closed questions) and the qualitative evidence (12 parental interviews and
documentary analysis) side-by-side. The presentation of the main themes found will
be presented in nine sections. To begin with, in section 5.2, I will analyse parental
preference and the kind of competition for school places in the Hong Kong context.
This also includes an analysis of the demand for co-ed or single sex education in the
Hong Kong society.
In 5.3 I will present the findings on the impact of the new SSPA in 2001. In addition,
the confusion caused by the abrupt change of the SSPA, as well as the feelings of
parents on hearing the results of their applications will also be presented.
Then, since the main focus of this dissertation is on the equality of opportunities
issue of school choice, I will also examine the two prerequisites of informed rational
choice: that is, (1) information regarding the making of a rational choice and (2) the
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ability to make a rational choice of different groups of parents. Thus, in 5.4, I will
present the findings concerning sources of information, types of information and the
differences in information different groups of parents have.
I will also present the problem of the transparency of selection criteria in DP schools
in 2001. The data on the link between information and success, the kind of skills
needed for parents in choosing schools within the Hong Kong school system and the
matching of banding of child with a particular school will also be examined. All the
findings will focus on information regarding different groups of parents, including
different educational groups and parents with child of different gender. In 5.5, 5.6,
5.7, I will present the choice barriers, DP participation, skills, abilities, success and
the issue of equality of opportunities different groups of parents have.
In 5.8,1 will present the findings surrounding the number of appeal cases, the success
and failure of parents in the appeal mechanism in that particular year. In 5.9, I will
look at the end-product and the perceived satisfaction of different groups of parents
regarding their children's present schools a year further on in time. The themes
include parents' satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) about their children's present
schools, whether they want to change schools and whether there are any
barriers/difficulties for parents to change school if they do not like the school.
5.2. Parental preference, choice availability and vertical competition
As advocates of the choice policy claim that parents can act as consumers in
shopping around and choosing what they want, the issues surrounding real choice
and increased choice were the two main themes examined here.
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In the survey, parents were asked two separate 'open' questions: why did they
choose the DP school and: what was the most important criterion in ranking schools
in the CA? Their responses have been coded into the categories shown in table 5.1.
Firstly, it is interesting to note that parents' answers to this open question include
'more chance and possibility' and 'computer lottery decides everything'. Some
parents mentioned "more chance and possibility' as the most important factor in
ranking schools in the CA, suggesting that some parents could be very calculative
and had a strategy to encash their right of choice. On the contrary some parents
mentioned that the 'computer lottery decides everything' in the CA, suggesting that
they felt rather powerless to choose.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that some parents regarded the advice of others
such as primary school staff, family and friends as the most important factors. It
seems that these parents may have just relied on others' advice but not had their own
analysis and judgement of how to use the information they collected. This group of
parents may have lacked the knowledge or ability to do so, though they are not the
main groups of parents.
Thirdly, factors such as the physical environment of the school, a wider choice of
subjects, more extra-curricular activities, religious affiliation, school tradition, and
whether the school was single-sex or co-educational were not the main
considerations ofmost of Hong Kong parents in making school choice. I discuss the
methodological issues which may affect the findings about preferences for single-sex
and co-educational schools later in section 5.2.
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Table 5.1. The most important factor in choosing a DP school and in ranking
CA schools (answers to t he two open c uestions with frequencies & %)
DP Most important
factor
F % CA Most important
factor
F %
School ethos 143 28.3 School ethos 138 25.3
Proximity 83 16.4 Match my child-
academic band
108 19.8
EMI 37 7.3 Band of school 69 12.7
Band of school 33 6.5 Advice from primary
school
31 5.7
Good education 30 6.5 EMI 30 5.5
Match my child-
academic band
28 5.5 Proximity 29 5
Sibling(s) in school 21 4.2 *More possibility &
Chance
23 4.2
Good teaching staff &
principal
20 4 "Computer lottery
decide, not me
22 4
Mv child like the school 18 3.6 Good education 14 2.6
Good future prospect 18 3.6 My child decides 13 2.4
Famous/popular 16 3.2 Famous/popular 15 2.8
Advice from primary
school
14 2.8 Good future prospect 10 1.8
Religious affiliation 13 2.6 Good teaching staff &
principal
9 1.7
School tradition 9 1.8 School tradition 9 1.7
Ease of traffic 5 1 Ease of traffic 8 1.5
Single sex education 4 0.8 Nice environment 3 0.6
Advice from family &
friends




2 0.4 Advice from family &
friends
2 0.4
*Try to avoid worst
school
1 0.2 Single sex education 1 0.2




Co-education 1 0.2 Religious affiliation 1 0.2
*Special, not found in the other column
Fourthly, good discipline and a good school ethos were seen as the most important.
However, good discipline and a good school ethos in Hong Kong are often
associated with band I schools, while band III schools have a reputation often
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associated with bad school discipline and a bad school ethos. It is interesting to note
that, in DP applications, among all the respondents, only one parent considered
avoiding the worst school as the most important factor.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that most of the parents who referred to matching their
child to the school as the most important factor, most parents described this match in
terms of academic aspects (banding), but not other aspects such as talent or the
school's social environment. Only very few parents considered these other aspects in
the survey (See table 5.1).
Besides the open questions about the most important criterion in DP and CA, I also
asked parents two sets of 'closed' questions to pick 5 important factors and rank
these factors in terms of importance (scale 1-5, 1 is the most important) for
triangulation. After 1 compare the means and modes of the rank 5 results, I then
found out the 5 most important factors that parents considered in choosing DP and
ranking in CA. The findings in the open question are thus triangulated with the
closed questions (See tables 5.2 & 5.3).
It is interesting to note that the factors for DP and CA are very similar in that factor
such as school ethos, band of the school, proximity, good education and EMI are
common factors. Parents often rank school ethos and EMI first. They often rank
good education and band of schools (that is: popularity level of schools) second or
third (See all the modes listed in table 5.3).
The list of factors indicate that the competition for schools is primarily vertical rather
than horizontal (See tables 5.2 & 5.3). The findings are similar to the shifting around
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pattern and the type of competition I mentioned in chapter 2. Vertical competition is
based on choice from a hierarchy of schools defined by academic level or status,
while horizontal competition is based on choice among schools with diverse
characteristics or specialisms that are not hierarchically ordered. This can be seen
when I add up the numbers for good school ethos, bands, EMI and good education
and compare them with proximity and matching. Furthermore, as mentioned above,
in answering to the open question parents often refer to matching students to school
academically.
Table 5.2. Pick five most important factors in the choice of DP and CA








1 School ethos 430 75 1 School ethos 625 75
2 Band of school 267 47 2 Band of schools 412 49
3 EMI school 258 45 3 Proximity 366 44
4 Proximity 248 43 4 Ease of Traffic 321 38
5 Good education 225 39 5 Good Education 320 38
6 EMI School 311 34
Total 571 100 Total 836 100










1 School ethos 406 2.31 1 1 School ethos 595 2.25 1
2 Band of school 251 2.34 2 2 Band of schools 389 2.33 2
3 EMI school 246 2.59 1 3 Proximity 336 3.17 5
4 Proximity 239 3.07 5 4.Good Education 309 2.72 2
5.Good
education
227 2.74 3 5. EMI School 301 2.62 1
6. Ease of traffic 161 3.71 5 6. Ease of Traffic 284 3.73 5
*After comparing the means and modes of the rank 5 result, the frequencies
of the top five/six are listed.
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In the open question concerning the reasons why parents choose a particular DP
school, many of them also said that they wanted the school because of academic
level and content (Band, good education, EMI, high university entrance rate). In both
the survey and interviews with parents, it was confirmed that the university entrance
rate was also a very important criterion besides the five most important criteria I
listed above, as many parents regard university education is the main aim of
secondary schooling. One parent told us his main criteria:
The main criteria are their rate of university entrance and their history of
success in HKCEE and A level... our aim after secondary schooling is
university education.
In the interviews with parents, I have more evidence that parents value the EMI
schools more than CMI schools. One parent worried so much that she planned a few
years ahead to get an EMI place for her son:
I wanted him to get into an EMI School. The reason is that traditionally
English is very important. Chinese is not OK. I worried a lot at that time.
I was very concerned about it... My English is not good. I don't know
English. But I started to learn English myself and then taught my son. I
helped him in his dictation. I started to help when he was in Primary
four...Luckily he got a place. I have tried hard to think how to help with
his English. If his English were not good enough he would not get into
an EMI. I worried a lot at that time. I was very nervous at that
time...There was no other factor, only EMI. Every country uses
English...English is very important.
In the interviews with parents, parents confirmed that their main concerns were about
their children's future life chances. Their preference for EMI Schools was a bigger
priority than proximity and a bigger campus:
I think so. I myself found a job. They always required me to know
English. English is the top priority, no matter what kind of job I applied
for. They may not require Mandarin, but they require English and
Cantonese...I visited X (EMI1) and found that the environment was not
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OK, very small. But as long as it's an EMI school, I think it's better... 1
don't care whether it's near or not. It's not important. The most important
is it's an EMI school. I just listened to other people's advice. A few
parents who have children study in X. They told me that in XX there was
another school that is not as good as X. I then tried my best to help my
son to get a place in X.
Another parent also expressed that English is a very important factor in finding a job.
An EMI School is her aim for her son:
You listen to me...(inaudible). Now people in Peking speak beautiful
English, I hope my son can study in English school...It's because you
can learn lots of things in an English school. When you find a job, they
all require English. If Western people want to invest in Hong Kong and
you don't know English, it's no use.
A few parents in the interview also related their view on the importance of EMI
education to their own experience in job searching. One parent said that 'Even I
found job in a restaurant, they asked me whether I know English or not.'
Table 5.4. Naming each factor as important, by parental educational level
Parental
education level
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(Include postpraduate)
Important
Factors
DP CA DP CA DP CA
School ethos 60% 62.5% 80% 80% 78% 83.5%
School bands 38% 45% 47% 47% 51% 63%
Proximity 45% 50% 41% 45% 42.5% 33%
Ease of traffic 34% 44% 30% 38% 31% 31.5%
Good education 32% 39% 42% 38% 39% 39%
EMI school 36% 20% 47% 37.5% 56% 52%
Furthermore, as I was interested in finding out whether groups of parents with
different educational backgrounds have different preferences, I cross-tabulated the 6
factors with different educational groups and found the following results (See tables,
5.4, 5.5 & 5.6):
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Table 5.5. Whether chosen DP school was inside/outside local school net,










12.5% 25.5% 31.5% 26%
Inside local school net 87.5% 74.5% 68.5% 74%
Total 56 294 130 480
Chi square:7.449, df.2, p<0.05
Table 5.6. Present school inside or outside local school net by parental
educational level
Respondent child Primary Secondary






23% 27% 39% 29%
Inside local school net 77% 73% 61% 71%
Total 99 412 168 679
Chi square: 10.016, df.2, p< 0.01
Regarding the DP, firstly, parents with the lowest education level thought that school
ethos was not as important as the other groups of parents. Secondly, I find that the
link between parents' education and their regard of band was an important factor. I
find that the higher the educational background of parents is, the more they regard
school bands as being important. Thirdly, I find that the lower the educational
background of parents is, the higher they regard proximity as being an important
factor. Fourthly, I also find that the higher the education of parents is, the more they
regard the provision of a good education at school as being important. Lastly, I also
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find that the higher the educational level of parents, the more they regard attendance
at an EMI school as being an important factor.
For the most important factors in CA, firstly, parents with the lowest education level
think that school ethos is not as important as the other groups of parents. Secondly, I
find there is a link between parents' education and their regard of band as being an
important factor. I find that the more the education of parents, the more they regard
the school band as important. This may be due to the fact that the matching of band
with the school is highly significant in the success levels of the CA.
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that the higher the educational level of parents, the
less likely they were to regard proximity as important. This may also be affected by
the economic situation of parents as they can afford the transportation fee. And thus
distance is considered not as important as other factors to the higher educational
group of parents. This, however, may also reflect greater knowledge of more distant
schools. Table 5.5 shows that the higher the educational level of parents, the more
likely they were to apply to a DP school outside their local school net; the association
is statistically significant. Furthermore, table 5.6 shows that the higher the
educational level of parents, the more likely their children were to get into a school
outside their local school net; this association is also statistically significant.
Fourthly, regarding the provision of a good education by schools, I can not really
find a link between the educational background of parents and the demand for this
factor.
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Fifthly, with regard to the EMI factor, I can say that there is definitely a positive link:
the more the education of parents, the more they demand EMI as a factor.
In short, from the above findings, I found that the better educated the parents are, the
more substantially they are influenced by considerations of 'academic' level or
content (Band, good education, EMI).
Besides being interested in choice preference of different educational groups, I am
also interested in how parents with child of different sex make their choice of school
(See tables 5.7, 5.8 & 5.9). The readers need to be informed that, due to the
theoretical sampling strategy (based on the degree of popularity of schools), the fact
that a boys' only school is included in the sample of the case study schools while a
girls' only school is not, may affect the validity of the case-study findings related to
gender and parental choice. This does not affect the findings of the current analysis
which is based on a survey of parents in 11 schools which included three boys-only
and three girls-only schools. However, nearly two-thirds of the respondents were
parents of male children. This suggests that the biases associated with responding to
the survey may have been different for parents of male and female children.
Comparisons based on the child's gender therefore needed to be interpreted with
caution, although it is difficult to estimate the likely nature or extent of any bias.
Table 5.7 Choosing co-education or single-sex as an important factor for
Hong Kong parents
Important factor DP CA
F % F %
Co-ed.
42 7.4 71 8.5
Sinale-sex ed. 72 12.6 82 9.8
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Generally, most Hong Kong parents do not regard co-educational or single-sex
education as an important factor (See tables 5.7 & 5.8).
Table 5.8. The most Important factor by child gender (open question)
DP (% within child
sex)
CA (% within child sex)
Most important
factor/Gender of child
Male Female Male Female
School ethos 28.2 30.3 24.9 21A
Proximity 14.9 18.8 4.7 6
School bands 11.1 15.2 12.7 12.1
Good education 10.7 7.2 4.5 3
EMI school 8.2 6.1 6.8 3.5
Future career and
education prospect
4.7 1.8 2.4 1
Ease of traffic 0 3 1.8 1
Sinqle sex ed. 0.9 0.6 0.3 0
Co-ed. 0.3 0 0 0
* this table summarised 2 tables (both are statistically not significant)
Table 5.9 Picked five most Important factors by child gender (closed
question)
DP CA
(% within child sex) (% within child sex)
Most important Male Female Male Female
factor/Gender of child
School ethos 77.6 73.3 75.6 76.2
EMI school 50.1 39 40.9 31.5
School bands 44.8 52.1 49.3 49.8
Good education 41.6 36.4 38.8 37.3
Proximity 40.1 46.5 42.2 44.3
Ease of traffic 33.1 29.8 33.1 29.8
Future career and 28 35 28 34
education prospect
Sinqle sex ed. 15 7.5 12.2 4.8
Co-ed 7.4 7.5 8.1 9.2
*this table summarised 18 small tables
When I cross-tabulated the most important factors named by parents with children of
different genders (See table 5.9 above), I found the following: firstly, parents with
child of both genders all regard school ethos as the most important factor. Secondly,
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for EMI education, it seems that parents with male child regard it as more important.
Thirdly, regarding school bands, it is interesting to note that for DP school, parents
with female child regard it as more important when compared with parents with male
child. Fourthly, for DP choice, parents with male child regard good education, as
important factor is slightly higher than that of parent with female child. Fifthly, it is
interesting to note that, parents with female child regard proximity as the most
important factor is higher in both DP and CA than parents with male child.
Table 5.10 Choose DP school locally or not by child qender
DP school
Male (%) Female (%)




Chi square:4.826, df:1, p<.05
Table 5.11 Present school outside or inside local sc nool net by child qender
Present school
Male (%) Female (%)





Fifthly, it amazed the researcher that more parents with a female child regard future
career and education prospects as an important factor than parents with a male child
in both the DP and the CA.
Fastly, as mentioned before, very few Hong Kong parents regard single-sex or co¬
education as an important factor. However, parents with a male child seem regard
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single-sex education as more important than parents with female child in both DP
and CA (See tables above). The demand for single-sex education in CA for male
student double (or more than double) that for female students. From the findings in
the above tables, to a certain extent, there is not much difference in the criteria for
parents in choosing schools, no matter whether they have male child or female child.
Though, regarding EMI education, parents with male child regard it as more
important while parents with female child regard future career and education
prospect as more important. I can say, parents with male or female child, are similar,
both regard academic vertical criteria as important. Again, due to the theoretical
sampling strategy (based on the degree of popularity of schools), the fact that a boys'
only school is included in the sample of the case study schools while a girls' only
school is not, may affect the validity of the case-study findings related to gender and
parental choice. This does not affect the findings of the current analysis which is
based on a survey of parents in 11 schools which included three boys-only, three
girls-only schools and five co-educational schools.
From the findings in the above tables, to a certain extent, there is not much difference
in the criteria for parents in choosing schools, no matter whether they have male
child or female child. Though, regarding EMI education, parents with male child
regard it as more important while parents with female child regard future career and
education prospect as more important. I can say, parents with male or female child,
are similar, both regard academic vertical criteria as important.
In short, after the analysis of gender and social class differences, regarding the issue
of choice availability and parental preference, I found that in Hong Kong, the
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favoured school choice is for vertical competition where parents compete seriously
for band 1 EMI schools. As regards parents, the matching of students to schools, to a
greater extent, concerns the matching of bands academically, rather than with
concerns about the variety of schools with different curricula or with those schools
that specialise in music/sport or that have differentiated teaching methods. And
parents with male or female child, are similar, both regard academic vertical criteria
as important.
For choice availability, the readers need to be informed that band I and band II
schools are unevenly distributed throughout the 18 Hong Kong school nets. It is
possible, therefore, that there are not enough band I schools available for band I
students to choose from in some areas. Though in the case study schools, the two
band I administrators stated that there are a good proportion of band I schools in their
school net.
5.3. Choice results and experience of different groups ofparents
The result of the 1999-2001 cycle of SSPA was announced on 17/7/01. A reporter
(17/7/01 Ming Pao Newspaper) stated that it had broken the SSPA record that had
stood for the past 23 years in that 56% achieved their first choice and 73% achieved
one of their first three choices. The ED Official stated that the reason for this might
have been due to the increase in DP from 10% to 20%.
However, it was also reported (17/7/01 Ming Pao Newspaper) that three band I
students in one primary school in Wong Tai Sin did not get band I school places, but
were allocated to band II and band III schools. It was also reported (17/7/01 Hong
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Kong Economic Journal) that some schools discovered that a number of good
achievers and poor achievers were allocated to the same school. They believed that
this was due to the cutting of bands from 5 to 3, and that the luck and random factor
had increased tremendously in that year. It was also revealed (21/7/01 Sing Tao
Newspaper) that appeal cases rose to 7,722. Most of the appeal cases were centred in
Shatin, Tai Po and Kwan Tong.
When comparing the results of my survey with the national figures (E.D. Report on
SSPA 1999-2001 cycle), I can identify the following findings (See table 5.12 below).
In my survey, the chances of securing one of the first three choices is lower than the
national figure reported by the ED, while the result of 'residual allocation' in my
survey is much higher than that of the national figures reported by the ED.
Table 5.12. Comparison of national figure and my survey
1999/2001 SSPA My survey National figure
Allocation according to student's first three
choices
66.58% 73.95%
Residual Allocation (i.e. none of students
own choices was successful)
7.8% 2.69%
Although I do not know the precise reason for the discrepancy between my figure
and the national figure, possible explanation is the non-response bias to the survey;
that is, dissatisfied and unsuccessful parents are more likely to participate in my
survey. Or the discrepancy could reflect the way the official statistics have been
calculated. However, I do not have sufficient knowledge to confirm which factor is
the most valid in explaining this discrepancy.
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Table 5.13 Choice outcome by child gender




F % F %
1-5 406 75.6 205 73.7
6-27 67 12.5 53 19.1
28-30 4 .7 1 0.4
31, did not choose the school 52 9.7 17 6.1
Others: move house...etc. 8 1.5 2 0.7
Total 537 100 278 100
Chi-square:9.568, df.4, p<0.05 (s tatistically significanl0
Table 5.14 Present school place by child gender




F % F %
Through DP
46 8.3 24 8.4
Throuah CA 391 71 169 59.3
Throuah appeal 17 3.1 24 8.4
Find another myself
24 4.4 14 4.9
Do not know 69 12.5 50 17.5
Moved house 4 0.7 4 1.4
Total 551 100 285 100
Chi-square:19.077, df.5, p<0.01 (statistically significant)
As mentioned in chapter 2, ED employ different scaling system for boys and girls in
2001, it is interesting to note the choice result of the respondents' with child of
different gender and their acceptance of allocated schools (See tables 5.13 & 5.14).
From table 5.13, boys have slightly higher rate in getting one of the first five choices
than girls. I also cross-tabulated this data with parents' acceptance of allocated
school places, I find the following results (See table 5.15): firstly, parents with boys
accept their allocated school places more than parents with girls and more girls
appeal and get another schools than boys. However, as noted above parents with a
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female child formed a minority of sample members and in this sense a more self-
selected group, so these results may have been affected by different non-response
biases among parents of male and female children.






F % F %
Yes, Accept the school
438 82.5 214 77.5
No, No, appeal and get another
10 1.9 15 5.4
No, appeal and did not get
another
34 6.4 18 6.5
No, did not accept or appeal
find own solution
49 9.2 29 10.5
Total
531 100 276 100
Chi-square: 8.257, df.3, p<0.05 (statistica ly significant)
Besides the interest of the choice result of parents with child of different gender, I am
also interested in choice result of parents with different education attainment. When I
cross-tabulated the success rate (First three choices) and residual rate (None of
students' own choices was successful) with the educational level of parents, I have
the following results (See tables 5.16 & 5.17.). Regarding the lowest educational
group, we can see they have the lowest rate in attaining one of their first three
choices. The secondary education group records a higher figure than the highest
educational group, although the difference is just one percent. With regard to the
parents' residual allocation (None of students' own choices was successful- Choice
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31-did not choose the school), we can see that the higher the educational group, the
lower the percentage is (12%, 9%, 8%).
Table 5.16. First three choices & residual allocation by parental education
level (simplified version)
2001 survey Primary group Secondary group Secondary 6 andabove
First three choices 62% 66% 65%
Residual allocation 12% 9% 8%






F % F % F % F %
Choice 1-5 74 69.2 321 74.4 126 75.9 521 74.1
Choice 6-27 17 15.9 66 15.3 23 13.9 106 15.1





13 12.1 37 8.6 13 7.8 63 9
Others 0 0 5 1.2 4 2.4 9 1.3
Total 107 100 430 100 166 100 703 100
Chi-square value: 16.448, df: 8, p< 0.05 (statistical y significant )
In the interview with a policy maker in the EMB, he stated that only the first five
choices are significant. So by cross-tabulating the educational attainments of parents
with the first-five choices (See table 5.17), I found that the higher the educational
level of the parent, the more chance there was of their being successful in their first
five choices, while their chance of failure was less. When using chi-square to test the
degree of confidence of association, it is found that the association is statistically
significant.
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Table 5.18. Accept the al ocated school by parental education leve
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(includino postaraduate)
Total
F % F % F % F %
Accept 78 72.9 349 81.5 135 82.3 562 80.4
Do not
accept
29 27.1 79 18.5 29 17.7 137 19.6
Total 107 100 428 100 164 100 699 100
Pearson Chi-square value: 15.077, df: 6, p< 0.05 (statistically significant)
*This originally is a 4x3 table (one accept and three not accept: a. appeal, b. not appeal and
c. not appeal but find own solution, simplified into a 3x2 table.
The result from the 2001 survey shows that (See table 5.18) many more parents
accepted the allocated school than those who did not accept. Furthermore, the more
educated the parents were, the more they accepted their allocated school. When using
chi-square to test the degree of confidence of association, it is found that the
association is statistically significant.
From the above evidence, we can see that, regardless of their satisfaction with regard
to primary information, the greater the educational attainment of parents, the more
they manage to secure their preferred school. That is, they are more successful in this
particular school choice game.
However, as I will mention in section 5.4 later, securing these first 5 choices
statistically may not in reality lead to total success since in a small number of cases
parents were forced to rank their schools of choice in order by primary school staffs.
I would now like to look at the banding of the child (provided by the respondents, not
official) and the banding of their present secondary school (provide by my source,
not official) to see whether they have the right match.
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Table 5.19. Banding of respondent child (provided by the respondent) and













F % F % F %
Band 1 1 23 76.7 167 88.8 99 92.5 289
II 4 13.3 18 9.6 6 5.6 28
III 3 10 3 1.6 2 1.9 8
Total 30 188 107 325
Chi-square:10.413, df:4 p<0.5, (statistically significant)
Band II 1 4 21.1 24 27.6 8 38.1 36
II 11 57.9 53 60.9 10 47.6 74
III 4 21.1 10 11.5 3 14.3 17
Total 19 87 21 127
Chi-square:2.672, df:4 (statistically not sic nifican 0
Band III II 4 36.4 5 16.1 0 0 9
III 7 63.3 26 83.9 5 100 38
Total 11 31 5 47
Chi-square:3.4 72, df:2, (statistically not sic nifican t)
Do not know / 11 22.9 39 30.5 15 37.5 65
II 17 35.4 39 30.5 15 37.5 71
III 20 42.7 50 39.1 10 25 80
Total 48 128 40 216
Chi-square:4.121, df:4, (statistically not significan t)
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When I compare the children's own banding (See table 5.19) and the banding of the
school they are in now, I find that band I children were more likely to gain entry to
band I schools the higher the educational level of their parents. Conversely, the
lower the educational level of parents, the wider the discrepancy between their
children's banding and the banding of their present school.
Regarding the Band II children (See table 5.19), we again find that the lower the
parents' educational group, the more pupils enter lower-band schools. Only among
Band III children, whose sample numbers were much smaller, we found the opposite
association. However, when use chi-square to test the associations, it is found that
the association is statistically significant only in the band I table.
As Hong Kong parents compete to get limited popular school places. I can conclude
that, the higher the education of parents, the more they can get more popular schools
for their children while the lower the education of parents, the less they can get
popular schools for their children.
In the interviews, when asked about their overall feelings toward choosing, most
parents stated that they were very nervous and anxious about the process:
Very panicky, every parent is the same, panicky and nervous. Always
fearful that he won't get into the school I want. It's nonsense when
people say they don't care whether the school is EMI or not. It's
nonsense.
It is more difficult when parents do not accept the allocated school. It is common for
parents to walk around trying to get another school place. One parent told the
researcher that she was exhausted but she had to do it:
137
I have to. You know, when we found that the school was not good, at
that time, we, my husband and I went everywhere for a few days to find
a school for my son. We nearly went to every school...I was anxious.
Some schools told me they had no places. Some schools said the school
was already full. I was exhausted walking here and there for a few
days.... exhausted. Every body said, why were you allocated this one?.. .1
felt very bad. very distressed. My son didn't like it. Maybe because he is
my eldest son, I am very concerned.
Another parent told the researcher that she was very disappointed even although she
had tried hard throughout the process:
This experience made me feel very disappointed. When I filled in the
form, 1 asked the primary school teacher what kind of banding my child
was in. She told me firmly that my son belonged to band I. I asked her
again whether she was sure. She told me she was very sure. Of course I
believed her and had no doubts about it then. Then I conducted a small
research myself. I attended the seminar "How to choose a school'
organised by the government. 1 asked them how many primary 6
students in X this year. As I remember, they told me that there were
about 6000-7000 pupils. I can't remember the exact figure now. I then
counted how many Band 1 schools there were in X. There are about 13
band I schools and on average there are about 200 places in each school.
Then 1 estimated the number of band I places is about 2400 in X this
year. I counted one third of the 6000 to 7000 students. I know that there
is enough band I places for band I students in X this year. After my
counting, 1 then felt secure and put the 13 band I schools into order
according to proximity and academic level. But the result is my son was
not allocated to these 13 schools. We only got our 16th choice school. At
that time I was very disappointed. I quickly asked the primary school
teacher why. She told me she might have estimated wrongly. I feel very
bad about her. 1 was very angry but I couldn't say anything.
She is also very angry at the government's policy and repeatedly stated that it's
wrong for the government to keep the banding of students secret. The researcher
could feel her emotion and anger during the interview:
The government needs to tell us which band our child is in so that we
can choose the school correctly. The government wants us to estimate.
How can we know if our estimation is correct? It all depends on
yourself, whether you fail or succeed; it all depends on your own
decision. If you don't announce it, we have to guess, I feel that this is
very wrong. From the beginning the government has the responsibility to
tell us ofour child's banding before we choose a school. Then we parents
can decide whether to take the risk or not. This is the parent's personal
decision. Fail or succeed, the parent can bear the responsibility. You
can't just depend on luck and random factors...this is absolutely unfair
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and not good. I don't think it's right for the government to put the choice
of a child's school as a kind of gambling, to put his academic
achievement at stake, it's not right. The government needs to tell us the
banding, as we can then decide whether we take the risk or not...I feel
very unhappy but I can't say anything. The primary school teacher can
only estimate. It's possible that she estimated it wrongly, as the
government didn't give us any information. But why should you have to
put a student's academic achievement at stake, as a guess. Why don't you
tell him in the first place? Whether the parent wants to take a risk or not
all depends on himself/herself, but you need to tell him/her. If a band I
parent doesn't know his child's banding and chooses a band II School, he
may get into a band II School successfully, but it's not fair to him. If a
band II student who is very lucky and gets a place, it's not fair. I think
this policy is allocating the places very unfairly. It is very wrong.
One parent told the researcher that he felt trapped and that he had no way out after
the result was announced.
However, for some parents the experience is not so bad. One parent told the
researcher that she was concerned but not too nervous:
To a certain limit. Not too seriously but of course I think of his
future...it is important. But it didn't make me too nervous.
5.4. Information, success and equality of opportunities
The information given to parents in choosing schools is universally important, as
stated in the literature review chapter. It is even more important in the case of Hong
Kong, and particularly so as the situation intensified more in the surveyed year due to
the abrupt change of the policy. Though parents have to follow the matching rules of
the choice game, there is a higher possibility ofmaking errors in the 2001 SSPA. It is
because of the cutting of bands, the abolition of the AAT test and through the use of
the past three years' results as the basis of the new scaling system. This is
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problematic because a scaling system based on previous results is an imperfect
indicator of the school performance of the coming year.
Obviously, school results can vary from year to year. They may improve or get
worse each year. Furthermore, serious consequences can follow when the wrong
estimation of banding is made. The problem of who is to blame has to be addressed
and the accuracy of the estimation of banding from primary staff therefore is vital to
parents' success. Other variables such as teachers' individual experience and
eagerness to help also played an important role here. Are all the parents satisfied with
the information received from the primary school?
Regarding the information-gathering period and the sources of parents, findings
show that the information-gathering period of Hong Kong parents varies from a few
months to a few years. In the interview with parents, some parents stated that they
started gathering information at a very early stage, even, for example, when their
children were in Primary 4 or 5. Moreover, they have different channels of gathering
information. From around November to March, it is quite common to find parents
talking about school choice in the street, on the bus...etc.
This phenomenon is common, as traditionally Chinese parents have a high regard for
education. They see it as a way of achieving upward social mobility, as stated in
chapter I. One parent, a housewife, told the researcher that she had more time to
collect information, visit schools and ask questions:
I am lucky. I am a housewife. When I had time, I talked to my friends. I
asked the parents I know. I went to have a look at the school
environment. Then I thought they were OK. Then I attended their open
days. I only asked a few questions, not too many. It's because at that
140
time I was not sure whether my son would go there or not. The main
reason is to have a look at the school environment, to make sure that it's
ok or not too bad. I asked the parents whether the teachers have patience
or not. I just asked very general questions.
Different types of parents, however, have different kinds of knowledge about the
system. This parent seems to have friends from the education sector and knows the
system well before she made her choice of school:
It was several years before I actually chose the school. We also had
information from primary school teachers and the Principal.
Table 5.20. Important sources of information in SSPA (both DP and CA)
DP CA
F % F %
Read school
information
103 24.6 214 30.4
Visit schools 50 12.0 76 10.8
Talk to primary 147 35.2 249 35.3
Talk to secondary 7 1.7 15 2.1
Contact ED 3 .7 8 1.1
Talk to family and
relatives
35 8.4 45 6.4
Talk to other children 6 1.4 4 .6
Talk to friends or
neighbours
33 7.9 55 7.8
Newspapers 7 1.7 11 1.6
School web site 18 4.3 21 3.0
No information aboui
school
1 .2 0 0
Others 7 1.7 7 1
By word ofmouth 1 .2 0 0
Total 418 100 705 100
From table 5.20, we learn that among the 418 respondents who participated in the DP
and answered the questions, the most important sources of information provided for
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parents to engage in choosing their preferred school were: talking to primary school
staffs (35.2%); reading school information provided by the primary school (24.6%);
visiting secondary school (12%); talking to family and relatives (8.4%); and talking
to friends or neighbours (7.8%). The sources of information with regard to the CA
were very similar.
From the above evidence, readers may be curious to know why parents regard the
information from primary school as being so significant when making their choice.
In the interview with the policy makers regarding the provision of information for
parents, the policy maker from the Hong Kong Manpower Bureau emphasised that
parents were not on their own and that they have access to all kinds of support:
Regarding the SSPA, firstly, we have many seminars for parents to help
them how to choose schools. Secondly, I think the primary school
teachers can provide parents with sufficient information. That's because
primary teachers are very experienced. On the one hand they know more
about the ability of their pupils, while on the other hand they know
something about secondary schools. In general, for so many years, the
most reliable help has been from primary school teachers. Their advice
is the most important for reference purposes.
Information from primary schools is very important. On the one hand, as no official
banding is given to parents, the staffs of primary schools are the ones who know the
abilities of an individual child best, and this is a crucial factor in matching each child
to a particular school. If parents want to succeed in this game of choice, they have to
follow the rules of matching (as explained in the policy document in Ch. 2), or
otherwise they will lose out.
On the other hand, staff of primary schools is also the one who perhaps knows how
to evaluate the quality of education in the secondary schools. They may have more
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inside knowledge about the school system, for example, about the places that are
available for competition and about the chances of success in a particular school net.
Therefore, they are the ones who can best help parents to be informed and make the
most sensible and rational choice for their child.
However, it would be of interest to know just how satisfied parents are regarding the
information they receive from the primary schools. Bearing in mind that the
information from the primary school is crucial to achieving success in this choice
game, it is time to look at the research findings to find out more about this issue. By
examining this, we can test the claim that all parents have an equal start when
playing this particular game of choice.
Table 5.21. Types, sources and contents of printed material given to P.6
parents by the primary sohool:
Types/name of
information




Government Secondary school profiles
of different districts








Government Explanation of the details
in the SSPA




Primary school Allocation statistics of each
primary school
Generally, information from primary schools included official printed matter from
the ED and consultation meetings with teachers Official printed materials were
delivered through the participating primary schools to all parents in early May 2001.
These printed materials (See table 5.21) included: a 'Secondary school List' of the
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school net to which the student belonged; an "Outline of the Secondary School
Places Allocation system' and a "Secondary One Choice of Schools Form".
Some primary schools informed parents of their individual primary school statistics
that indicated the types of secondary schools their former students had been allocated
to in the past, and which could act as a reference point for the parents choosing
schools in 2001. Some parents also collected the Secondary School Profile from the
ED (See table 5.21). Some other primary schools, however, delivered this document
to parents. From table 5.22, we can identify the different types of information parents
received from primary schools in general.







Person who gave talks to
the parents
First conference























In the individual parent consultation sections, class teachers and subject teachers give
information on the child's performance, and the kinds of schools that match their
child academically. The kinds of information include the teachers' judgement of the
banding of each child and the identification of secondary schools suitable to the
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child's banding. During the consultation period, parents can ask questions
concerning the choice of school and the prospects of gaining entry to it.
Primary schools also give students some general information on the selection criteria
of some of the popular secondary schools at the parents' meeting or to individual
parents during the consultation interview. Some primary staff even help their pupils
to prepare for the interview with secondary schools. This depends on the eagerness
and experience of the primary staff. Findings on the issues surrounding the selection
criteria of DP schools will be presented later in 5.6. Now let us turn to parents'
satisfaction with the primary school's advice/information in ranking school/choice.
Table 5.23 shows that 79% of parents were satisfied and 169 (20.8%) were not
satisfied. Why were not they satisfied? 102 dissatisfied parents answered the open
questions. They referred to: a lack of adequate information (17.8%); wrong advice
and poor information (5.2%); primary schools being too authoritative (2.7.%); and
primary schools not being keen to help and identify with parents from their primary
schools.








Table 5.24. Reasons for satisfaction with primary school advice on ranking
Reasons Freguency %
Yes, professional knowledge and strategy
93
25.4
Yes, good arrangements and information 159 43.4




No, wrong advice and instruction 19 5.2
No, too authoritative 10 2.7
No, not enough information 65 17.8
No, not keen to help and identify with parents 7 1.9
No, their opinion was different from mine 1 0.3
Total 366 100
Regarding the satisfied group of parents, we found that: 159 (43.4%) commented that
the information supplied and the arrangements made were good. About one quarter
of the parents who answered this question stated that the information they received
indicated a high level of professional knowledge and included good advice on
strategy 93 (25.4%) (See table 5.24).
In the questionnaire, a few parents wrote that they were unhappy with the encounter
and the kind of information given by their primary schools. In the interview a few
parents said that they had to read magazines and learned how to choose schools
themselves. One parent said that the primary school had not provided enough
information about secondary schools:
I read magazines about how to choose schools. They taught me how to
choose a school. I kept all this information. Otherwise you don't know
how to choose. You don't know which school is good... They (the
primary school) didn't tell me about the schools. No. They didn't
mention it at all. They give you the website only. You have to see it for
yourself. They don't tell you which school is good or bad. They only
give you statistics about how many children go to which secondary
school. You then decide for yourself.
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Two other parents told the researcher that the primary teachers are too authoritative,
and order parents to change the choice of schools in the Choice Form, which they
had done, albeit reluctantly. One parent even voiced out her opinion that the primary
school staff had ignored her and did not offer her advice, as her child was a non-
achiever. She believed that the staff only cared about the bright students in the
school. Another parent also told the researcher how angry, upset and frustrated she
was when a very unpopular school was allocated to her daughter:
The teacher told me my daughter was a Band I student. She was so sure
and advised me to choose Band I schools for my daughter.... And a
Band III school was allocated. Afterwards, she admitted that she was
wrong. But I couldn't blame her. It's just estimation. The government
ought to give us the information on banding. There is so much at stake
here. Why didn't the government...? It's not right to put my daughter's
future in a lottery. But I couldn't blame her, she just estimated it...
One parent in the interview complained that her child's school's only concern was
about school statistics. She claimed that the school forced parents to follow its advice
in ranking schools in order to make the school statistics look good. The researcher
then conducted a follow-up check at a few primary schools' web sites. This
confirmed that some primary schools like to boast of the success rate of parental
choice, for example, which percentage secured their first choice...etc. at the expense
of the real preference of parents. This use of statistics in marketing the school is
problematic and often makes parents angry.
Furthermore, although parents in Hong Kong regard school choice as being very
important, not all the parents know the importance of gathering information and
knowing which strategy to choose. One parent told the researcher that she did not
know which school to choose and changed schools twice, one soon after the result
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was announced in July and the other a year later. When asked whether she had
collected any information before choosing schools, she answered 'no', saying that
the primary school had only given her a list of secondary schools that she could
choose from.
Findings in the present study show that some parents collected information
vigorously while other parents depended solely on information from the primary
school. Some received good advice from the primary school on strategy while others
did not. Some found that engaging in school choice was difficult, although others
found it easy:
I put all the very impossible ones at the end. The most possible one and
the most preferred ones, I put in the front. I ranked the schools this way.
It's because the primary school teachers told me what kind of schools
matched my child. Of course, I trust the teacher. After he told me how
many schools would suit, then I considered the schools myself. Then I
ranked the school. If the school was too far away, I put it at the end. I
live in Shatin. It's not reasonable that I put schools in Ma Hon Shun in
the front. I then put it at the end from choice thirty to the front...Not
very difficult. I felt that the primary school was very good in preparing
us. They gave us a meeting and analysed everything for us. They told us
about our children and the schools that matched them. We were well
prepared. I am very satisfied with the primary school... I felt very
comfortable and easy.
One parent stated that she was lucky and did not have any bad feelings about the
process:
My son got his first choice school. For me, I don't have any bad feelings.
But for some other parents who have daughters.... They couldn't get the
school they wanted. They felt very disappointed and panicky. For
myself, I have got the school I wanted. Maybe I am lucky.
All this evidence shows that parents had different experiences and that primary
schools provide information to parents in different ways. The claim that all parents
have an equal start when playing this particular game of choice is simply not true.
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Table 5.25. Satisfaction of primary advice on ranking by choices of allocated
school
Satisfied Not satisfied Total
F % F %
Choice 1-5 506 85 89 15 595
Choices 6-31
(31-did not choose
the school at all)
118 62 73 38 191
Total 624 162 786
Chi square: 47.851, df. 1, p<0.001, (statistically significant)
Regarding information and success, I asked the parents' how they had ranked the
school, which they were eventually allocated. Those who got one of their first 5
choices are regarded as successful. As I cross-tabulated this answer with their
satisfaction of primary school information, I have the following result (See table
5.25).
We can see that out of the 624 who were satisfied with the primary school
information, 506 (81.1%) received their first 5 choices and 118 (18.9%) did not
obtain their first 5 choices of school. For the not satisfied group, 89 (54.9%) secured
their first five choices and 73 (45.1%) did not. We know that primary school advice
on ranking schools is vital for success. However, we still need to acknowledge that
securing one's first 5 choices of school may not really equal 'success'.
As mentioned previously, the reason for this is that a small number of parents
commented that some primary schools are very authoritative and sometimes even
force parents to change their own ranking in order to make the school statistics look
good. The school can then claim that it has a high percentage of parents securing
their first five choices. This use of statistics is also found in the interview data with
the parents. Therefore, the success rate here is considered by the researcher to be to a
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certain extent problematic, although the number of parents affected is small.
Fortunately, I have a further question that can give us information about whether
parents accept their allocated school or not (See table 5.26).







F % F %
Yes, accept the
allocated school
531 85.9 95 59.7 626
No, not accept 87 14.1 64 40.3 151
Total 618 100 159 100 777
Chi square: 55.334, df1, p<0.001 (statistically significant)
In the satisfied group, more people accept their allocated school than those who do
not accept it (85.9%, 14.1%). In the dissatisfied group, 59.7% accept their allocated
school while 40.3% do not. So, some parents were satisfied with primary school's
advice but did not accept the allocated school and some, though they were not
satisfied with their primary school's advice, accepted allocated school. For those who
did not accept the school, they either appealed or found another school place
themselves.
For those who were not satisfied with primary school advice, may be they did not
follow primary school's advice at the last minute of ranking or may be they followed
it but did not get what they wanted (did not accept the allocated school). Therefore,
dissatisfaction may be an outcome effect caused by the failure of getting the school
place they wanted.
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In short, from the above two pieces of the quantitative evidence, we know that there
is a significant link between information, success and satisfaction. When parents
have good advice, they were likely to be successful. When parents got the school
place they wanted, they, in turn, were satisfied with the primary school's advice. This
may be just an 'outcome effect'
Furthermore, from the qualitative evidence, I also find evidence that parents were not
on an equal footing in making school choice. How to ensure that every parent is on
an equal footing, can gain access to information that they need and can then make an
informed choice? This is perhaps the future task of the EMB.











F % F % F % F %
Satisfied 84 82.4 323 78.6 128 76.6 535 78
Not satisfied 18 17.6 88 21.4 39 23.4 145 21.3
Total 102 100 411 100 167 100 680 100
Chi-square value:1.234, df:2, p< 0.05 (si atistical y significant)
As my interest is on equality of opportunities of the SSPA, I come to the findings of
the links between this evidence and that of different groups of parents with different
educational backgrounds (See table 5.27).
It is interesting to note that the lower the educational level of parents, the more they
are satisfied with the primary school advice on ranking, while the higher the
educational level of parents, the less they are satisfied with the primary school
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information. When using chi-square test, it is found that the association is
statistically significant.
Besides the above analysis of different education groups of parents, I am also
interested in parents' experience with child of different gender (See table 5.28).
Table 5.28 Primary school advice satisfaction by child gender
Gender of child Male (% within child
sex)
Female (% within child
sex)
F % F %
Yes, satisfy
420 81 204 76
No, not satisfy 98 19 63 24
Total 518 100 267 100
Chi-square:2.364, df.1 (statistically not significant)
Although more parents with a male child than parents with a female child expressed
satisfaction with primary school advice (81.8%, 76.4%), when using chi-square to
test the association it is found that the association is statistically not significant. Hong
Kong parents with a female child are not different from parents with male child.
They regard academic aspects as the most important criterion in choosing school and
have same aspiration in their child's future career prospect when considering school
choice too. As I have mentioned before, I have strong evidence of the link between
success and gender in the 2001 SSPA cycle. When the society seemed to favour male
child and treated them differently, unequal opportunities occurred.
Regarding the information of selection criteria of DP school, some parents also stated
that schools have the right to select the best students but that this procedure should
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not depend on friendships or relationships. The selection criteria, as one parent
stated, should be transparent and fair:
I think each school has the right to select students. What kind of students
they want, they have the power to decide. I think they have the right to
do so. A good school can select the best students. They can't just allow
their friends into the school or depend on any kind of relationship... they
have the right to decide what kind of criteria. If they don't base it on this,
that is their administration problem.
The transparency of selection criteria for the DP secondary schools was very low in
the 2001 survey. Only a few secondary schools in 2001 directly stated in the
application form what their selection criteria were. When parents were asked if they
knew the selection criteria, only 138 (23.8%) said they did. And of these, only 27
(24.1%) were from DP secondary schools (See tables 5.29 & 5.30).
Table 5.29. Known selection criteria of DP





Irrelevant (99-not participate in DAPS) 311
Total 905
Table 5.30. Source of DP secondary school selection criteria
Sources F %
From primary school 45 40.2
From secondary school 27 24.1







In the interview, one parent stated that she did not know the DP selection criteria and
felt that it was not fair and was difficult to choose:
I always feel that this is not fair...Many parents found it hard to follow.
Many parents just choose a school blindly.
One parent told the researcher that she had attended a meeting about applying for a
DP school but found it ridiculous:
1 think it's very ridiculous. They told you one thing and acted another
way. 1 attended the meeting. A student told us his story. He hadn't
performed well but still got into the school...My son was upset when he
couldn't get into the DP school.
Another parent was luckier; she learned about the criteria from the primary school
and from her friends:
For the discretionary (DP), we just applied. I haven't got a very clear
idea. I just know what kind of grade they demand, what kind of mark
they required for the core subjects...No, not the application form, just
the primary school teachers. They told me. Other parents who had
chosen the school before told me about this. I learned about the
requirements from them, not from the application form.
Perhaps some parents are more aggressive in this way in obtaining information from
other sources in order to complement and compensate the insufficient information
they receive from their primary school.
5.5. DP participation, choice barrier and equality of opportunities
When I asked parents about their child's present school place (See table 5.31), I
found that the higher the education of the parent, the more often they secure a place
through DP (11%, 8.5%, 5.4%).
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F % F % F % F %
Through DP 6 5.4 37 8.5 19 11 62 8.6
Through CA 78 69.6 292 67.1 111 64.5 481 66.9




6 5.4 21 4.8 11 6.4 38 5.3
Don not know (DP
orCA)
15 13.4 66 15.2 21 12.2 102 14.2
Exceptional case-
-Move house
0 0 1 0.2 1 0.6 2 0.3
Total 112 100 435 100 172 100 719 100
As there is luck in the random computer allocation, participation in the application
for places in the first round of the DP seems to allow parents more control in the
process. In fact, in the survey (See table 5.32), of the 724, parents who answered this
question, 477 (65.9%) respondents participated in the DP and 247 (34.1%) did not
participate. And I found that the higher the education of the parent, the higher was
the participation rate in the DP. When using the Chi-square test to find the degree or
confidence of association between parental education and participation in the DP, it
is also found that the association is statistically significant.








F % F % F % F %
Yes 56 49.6 293 66.6 128 74.9 477 65.9
No 57 50.4 147 33.4 43 25.1 247 34.1
Total 113 440 171 724
Chi-square value: 19.619, df:2, p<0.001, (statistically significant)
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In the interview, one parent from a lower educational group, said that even although
her son had been allocated to a band I school through CA, she did not have the
confidence to apply for a DP school and expressed the view that the DP application
is confusing:
For the discretionary places system, you must have a certain standard
in order to find the school... I have thought of doing so, but...I think
applying to the school myself is very confusing.
From this piece of qualitative information, I can say that there is a psychological
barrier for some group of parents to overcome before they can apply for a DP place,
even though their children are better achievers.
Furthermore, for over-subscribed schools, it is not only the parents who choose the
school, it is also that the case that the school selects the student (See chapter 6). The
barrier here can be found in the application requirements, for example: conduct,
academic achievement, social services...etc. In some schools, the school also
interviews the parents and has group interviews with the students. Thus, the
confidence of parents and students can affect their chances of success.
Another barrier to choice is tuition fees and transport costs. Readers should know
that only DSS schools can charge tuition fee and there were only a very small
number ofDSS schools in 1999-2001 cycle.
For parents who have more material capital, the choice of a school further away from
home does not pose too much of a problem. However, for parents with less material
capital, any tuition fee or transport costs may hinder their application. In the
interview with parents, I learned that a few tried to avoid the unpopular schools by
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changing schools. Another parent told me she could not afford to change school, as
the uniform was too expensive. Yet another parent did not go out and find another
school because it was also too expensive:
When my elder son found a school, my heart tumbled. Every school said
no place for my son. They collected application fees but told me no
place for my elder son, $ 20 for just an interview... I just feel it's very
expensive...! can't say anything. This time, I appealed but failed.
Besides the interest of choice experience of different educational groups of parents
mentioned above, 1 am also interested in the choice experience of parents with child
of different gender. When I analyse DP participation (See table 5.33) slightly more
parents with female child than parents with male child participate in DP. However, it
is statistically not significant. Readers should note that the number of male child
nearly double that of female child, the validity of this finding may not be valid too.




Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
F % F %
Yes
355 64 194 66.9
No 200 36 96 33.1
Total 555 100 290 100
Chi-square: .720, df.l (statistically not significant)
5.6. DP success, school selection and equality of opportunities
The survey could not reveal the success rate of DP applications. Firstly, if the
allocated school is outside the local school net then we can tell that the school is
from DP since all the CA school must come from the local school net. However, if
the DP school is inside local school net, there is a problem since parents are
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encouraged to rank the DP school as their first choice in the Choice Form in the CA.
So, as one parent commented below, there is no way to know whether the allocated
school is from DP or in fact from CA.
Therefore, although the questions in the survey on DP success have been asked
separately (Q1.3.C. Was the application a success? Q1.6. Were you happy with the
result?) in the questionnaire with different wordings, the answers to these two
separate questions to a certain extent become 'perceived success' and 'perceived
happiness'. We can also say they are low in validity, as it is difficult for the parents
to answer, as they have no way of knowing whether the allocated school belongs to
the success ofDP or CA.
Another problem with assessing the DP success is that there were only 20% of places
available in each school in 2001. The competition was so great that many parents,
though claiming to know the criteria, still failed in the DP. Thirdly, although the
questionnaire had been tested in the pilot study and the wording revised afterwards, a
number of parents seemed confused by this particular question (the mix up over
whether the success was due to DP or CA) and thus the answers are considered to be
low in validity.







Success 70 27 186 73 256 46
Failure 65 21 242 79 307 54
Total 135 100 428 100 563 100
Chi-square:2.916, d F:1, (statis ically not significant)
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However, when I cross-tabulated the success and known criteria (See table 5.34), I
learn that for those who claim to know the criteria, the number of successes is 70,
greater than the number of failures, 65. For those who claim not to know the criteria,
the number of failures, 242, is higher than those who succeeded, 186. There may be
some errors in this finding because of some invalid answers. When I test the
association, it is found that it is statistically not significant.
Table 5.35. Known Criteria by happy with DP result
Known Not known
F % F %
Happy 91 24.3 284 75.7
Not happy 37 22.2 130 77.8
Total 128 414
Chi-square:.285, df: 1, (sta tistically not significant)
Fortunately, I have another question about whether parents are happy with the DP
result. Then, as I cross-tabulated the known criteria and those happy with the DP
result (See table 5.35), I have the following finding. For the happy group, 24.3%
knew the criteria, while 75.7% did not know it. The percentage of parents (71.1%)
who knew the criteria and were happy with the result is slightly higher than the
percentage of parents who did not know (68.6%), the difference being only 2.5%.
When use chi-square to test the association, again it is statistically not significant.
Here, with regard to the selection criteria of DP schools (See table 5.36), the less
well educated the parent, the less they know the selection criteria (76.4%, 73.5%,
71.1%). As we already know, the transparency of selection criteria was low in 2001.
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It seems that the better-educated group knows how to obtain more information from
other sources than less well-educated group, whether it is from friends, or through
visiting a school, through searching a school homepage or by reading a newspaper
article on the subject. However, when using the Chi-square test to test the confidence
of association, it is found that the association is not statistically significant.









F % F % F % F %
Known 13 23.6 77 26.5 37 28.9 127 100
Not known 42 76.4 214 73.5 91 71.1 347 100
Total 55 100 291 100 128 100 474 100
Pearson Chi-square value: 0.586, df:2, (statistically not significant)
Table 5.37 DP success by child gender
Child gender Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
by DP
success
F % F %
Yes
159 44.7 85 44.5
No 197 55.3 105 55
Do not know 0 0 1 0.5
Total 356 100 191 100
Chi-square: 1.868, df.2.(statistically not significant)
Table 5.38 DP result happy or not by child gender
Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
F % F %
Happy
235 69.5 124 67
Nothappv 103 30.5 61 33
Total 338 100 185 100
Chi-square:.347, df. 1 (statistical y not significant)
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When I cross-tabulated with whether they succeed in DP and are happy with the DP
result (See tables 5.37 & 5.38), the figures of boys and girls are similar too. When
using chi-square to test the association, both are statistically not significant. Again,
readers should be reminded that there were more parents with a male child than with
a female child, which may affect the validity of the findings.
5.7. Skills, ability and equality of opportunities
Information is obviously important, but the ability and skill to maximise the
utilisation of information is important too. As I have already noted, to engage in
secondary school choice in Hong Kong is in no way a simple process. Indeed it
requires inside knowledge of the school system and the use of some sophisticated
skills by parents. The task of ranking 30 preferences/schools in the School Choice
Form is already a complicated one. Parents who have little understanding, strategy
and inside knowledge of how the mechanism works can easily make errors and
mistakes.
A few parents in the survey said that they got a bad result simply because they made
a mistake in filling in the School Choice Form. One parent in the interview told me
that:
You fill in the numbers only, not the names of the schools (different
schools have different code numbers), I just filled in the number
incorrectly. What can I say? I can't blame anyone, it's my own fault.
Every year stories of band I students being allocated to band III schools appear again
and again. Although many of these students obtained a band I school place through
161
the second round DP, parents still expressed how scared and worried they had been
while travelling around searching for Band 1 school places. If they had had the
correct strategy and knowledge in filling in the School Choice Form in the first place,
then their first application would probably have been successful. Readers should be
informed that the second round DP is the informal arrangement of schools, it takes
place in July after the results of the allocation are announced.
One parent said that it was like experiencing a heart attack. Another parent stated that
information from the primary school is important but which strategy to employ is not
as simple:
It all depends on the primary school teacher, whether they are sincere
or not... Some teachers just told you the method. But the method is just
a method. You have to choose according to your child individually.
You have to employ different strategies in different circumstances.
Actually, it can be a subject to learn, it's not simple. It can cause a
headache.
In the interview, parents who engaged in choosing a school for the first time often
told the researcher that without any past experience of the process, it was difficult for
them:
The bad thing is it's the first time. We have never chosen a school
before.
Another parent told the researcher that she is illiterate and her daughter was the one
who had to fill in the School Choice Form:
My daughter, she aimed at a very good school. She wanted a popular
school. This time, we have made the wrong choices. Her performance is
not bad. But this time the allocated school is very bad... She was very
upset and cried a lot...She cried and cried and asked why. This is her
29th choice. She was very upset. Also it's far away, I was worried, so I
want her to change school...I walked around and found 5 schools. No
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school would give her a place. I brought with me her report and all her
prizes. In her primary school, she got many prizes. She got A and B in
her report but no school gave her a place...I panicked. I was heart¬
broken. My daughter is not bad. For her examination result, she could
have got a better school. I feel very upset but I could not comfort her...I
panicked and went everywhere to try to find a school for her. My health
is not good. One time, I walked with her and I fainted...I have high
blood pressure. At that time it's 200 something. I panic. I was afraid that
there would be no school for her. She is not bad... Everybody told me to
find another school for her but we can't find any. Every school told me
they didn't have places.
She said that her daughter did not have the skill and knowledge to fill in the School
Choice Form:
...She filled it in not right and therefore was allocated the wrong school.
This year, unfortunately, they scaled boys and girls differently, this year
that's not fair to the girls. My daughter was too young. For her age, she
is Form I this year. But she studied earlier than other children.
One parent from a low educational group also said that it was difficult for her to fill
in the School Choice Form and, as a result, two of her elder children did not get their
preferred choice of school. However, on this occasion, she seemed to learn from her
previous experience and is more optimistic regarding her youngest son:
It's rather difficult for me to fill it in. It depends on luck...For my two
elder ones, I listened to others wrongly. I was busy at my work at that
time...This time, I went to see the schools myself when I had time.
As equality of opportunities is the main focus, is there any difference in the skills and
abilities of different groups of parents? Again, is the claim that each parent has the
same start in playing this game true?
1 now turn to analyse whether parents have different abilities and skills in choosing
(See tables 5.39 & 5.40). I use two questions to find whether there is a link with
parental education level. First, 'now, you have been through the Discretionary Places
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System, you would have gained knowledge and experience, would you go about
things differently if you choose again?', second 'you have been through the centrally
allocated places system, you would have gained knowledge and experience. Now, if
you were to rank schools of preference again, would you rank schools differently?'
Table 5.39 Rank differently by parental education level (CA)
Parental
education
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(include postgraduate)
F % F % F %
Different 54 54 202 49.4 74 49.3
Same 46 46 207 50.6 86 50.7
Total 100 100 409 100 160 100
Chi-square: 1.480, df.2 (statistically not significant)
When parents were asked if they had a second chance would they rank school
differently in CA (See table 5.39), it was found that the higher the education of
parent, the higher the percentage were satisfied with their CA ranking when
compared to the lower educational group (50.7%, 50.6%, 46%). When use chi-square
to test the association, it is statistically not significant.
Within the ranking in CA, it is interesting to note that one parent stated in the
interview that 'I believe in my ranking, though I failed to get what I wanted. 1 will
not change anything' So, for some parents, parents' personality and confidence in
how they rank also influence their response to this question.
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Table 5.40 Choose same by parental education level (DP)
Parental
education
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(include postoraduate)
F % F % F %
Same 37 77A 191 69.5 99 82.5
Different 11 22.9 84 30.5 21 17.5
Total 48 100 275 100 120 100
Chi-square: 7.653, df.2.p<.05(statistically significant)
When parents were asked that if they had a second chance would they choose the
same DP school, it is interesting to note that a higher percentage of secondary group
parents than the primary group (30.5%, 22.9%) would not choose the same DP
school (See table 5.40). Only 17.5% of the highest educational group would change.
It seems that the highest educational group was satisfied with their choice of DP
school (82.5%) and would not want to change, according to the 2001 survey. When
use chi-square to test the association, it is found that the association is statistically
significant.
Parents who participated in the DP may have more knowledge and confidence to do
so than parents who did not participate at all. Thus, the finding of the link in DP is
indeed very interesting. However, readers should be informed that parents' answer of
'same' or 'different' after the choice result announced might be influenced by the
'outcome' effect.
I asked parents whether they thought that the Scaling system of ranking students in
different bands was fair (See table 5.41). Around six in ten felt it was fair. This
proportion did not vary significantly across educational levels.
165
Table 5.41. Opinion of fairness of the scaling system of ranking students into
different band s by parental education level
Parental
education
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(include postgraduate)
F % F % F %
Yes, fair 59 56.2 247 60.7 94 59.1
No, not fair 46 43.8 160 39.3 65 40.9
Total 105 100 407 100 159 100
Chi-square: .722, df 2, (statistically not significant)
Table 5.42. Explanation of fair or not by parental education level
By parental education
(% within education
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and
above
group) F. % F. % F. %
Fair, large proportion 1 2.4 5 3 4 5.7
of pps gained entry to
their preferred school




0 0 6 3.6 5 7.1
Matching 0 0 3 1.8 1 1.4
Not fair, computer 13 31.7 50 29.8 13 18.6
lottery decided
everything
Five band into three,
notoood
1 2.4 2 1.2 3 4.3
Not fair, they treat
boys and girls
differently
3 7.3 3 1.8 1 1.4
Labelling too early, not
good
1 2.4 8 4.8 6 8.6
Total
41 100 168 100 70 100
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When parents were asked to explain their answer further (See table 5.42), most
parents, answered that it was allocated according to academic level. However, I find
that the lower the education of parents, the more likely they were to say it was not
fair because the computer lottery decided everything.
When I asked parents whether the reduction of five Bands into three Bands was a
good development, majority (See table 5.43) said it was not good. It is statistically
not significant. When I asked them to give reasons for their answers (See table 5.44),
41.4 % out of 307 answered that it was not good because it caused confusion and it
was difficult to match the right school. Among them, I find that the lower the
education of parents, the more they found confusion (54%, 43%, 30%).
Table 5.43 Comment on reduction of 5 bands into 3 by parental education
level
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 & above
Good
31% 32% 28%
Not good 69% 68% 72%
Chi-square: 1.673, d1f: 4, (statistically not significant)
Do their feelings illustrate their actual experience of engaging with the SSPA? To a
certain extent I can only guess, but perhaps their experiences relate to a feeling of
powerlessness in their dealings with the SSPA. From the data above, it seems I now
have some evidence that the SSPA in Hong Kong is not neutral to parents from
different socio-economic backgrounds.
When I analyse whether there is gender difference to the answer of rank different in
CA and choose same in DP by gender (See tables 5.45, 5.46 & 5.47). It is found that
more parents with girls than parents with boys wanted to rank differently in the CA
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and it is statistically significant. Also, regarding 'choose same' or not in DP, it is
found that more parents with boys than parents with girls wanted to choose same and
it is statistically significant. The survey sample (11 schools from 11 school nets)
included parents from boys-only, girls-only and co-educational schools. However,
the fact that parents of a female child were a minority of the sample may possibly
indicate that the sample of parents of female children is more affected by self-
selection bias in favour of dissatisfied parents.
Table 5.44 Explanation of parents' comments on reduction of 5 bands into 3
by parental education level
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 &
above
Good-more chance 8% 6% 5%
Good-shorten students distance 12% 8% 8%
Not good-cause confusion 54% 43% 30%
Not good-too much competition
for limited band I places
2% 3% 1%
Not good-lower quality and name
of school
20% 32% 48%
Not good-teach mixed ability is
difficult
2% 3% 4%
Not good in short term 0% 1% 0%
Not good-decrease choice 2% 3% 1%
No band is good-let school select 0% 1% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 5.45 Rank differently or not by child gender
Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
F % F %
Different
239 47.3 148 56.7
Same 266 52.7 113 43.3
Total 505 100 261 100
Chi square:6.054, df: 1, p<.02 (Statistically significant)
168
When analysing whether parents regard the banding system is fair or not, to my
surprise, similar percentage were found for both gender and it is statistically not
significant.
Table 5.46. Choose same or not by child gender
Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
F % F %
Different
78 23.6 61 35.3
Same 253 76.4 112 64.7
Total 331 100 173 100
Chi square:7.781, df: 1, p<.01 (Statistically significant)
Table 5.47. Fair or not by child gender
Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
F % F %
Fair
305 60 161 60.1
Not fair 203 40 107 39.9
Total 508 100 268 100
Chi square:.000, df: 1 (statistical y not significant)
5.8. Appeal participation, success and equality of opportunities
Besides the discussion on the above topic, 1 will also find out what kind of solutions
parents have adopted to tackle an allocated school place that is unacceptable to them.
This includes the findings about how effective the remedial mechanisms were, the
number of appeal cases, participation and success...etc.
It was reported (28/7/01 Hong Kong Economic Journal) that there were a total of
7,722 appeal cases, of which 2,261 were successful in securing preferred school
places, while 740 students qualified to appeal did not achieve re-allocation due to the
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limited number of places in their preferred school (See table 5.48). It was also
reported (28/7/01 Sing Tao Newspaper) that the waiting list of some popular EMI
schools in the second round of DP increased to more than 100. Students who were
not allocated the school of their choice in the public sector then started to apply for
DSS places.
A report stated that (28/7/01 Sing Tao Newspaper), out of the 26 DSS schools, only 9
of them were full, while in 15 other DSS schools there were still 300 school places
available. From this piece of information, it would be interesting to learn why DSS
places are not as popular as schools in the public sector (government and aided
school). Obviously, in 2001, they were a clear second choice and only then with
parents who could not get their preferred school place in the public sector.
Table 5.48. Appeal cases in 2001 by child gender
Male student Female student Total
F % F % F %
Appeal cases 2,622 34 5,100 66 7,722 100
Did not qualify for appeal 1,963 41.6 2,758 58.4 4,721 61.1
Qualified for appeal 659 22 2,342 78 3,001 38.9
Appeal success and gainec
entry to the school
267 11.8 1,994 88.2 2,261 75.3
1. Got first choice school 43 6.9 584 93.1 627 27.7
2. Got one of first three
choices of school
113 8.3 1,252 91.7 1,365 60.4
3. Got one of first five choices
of school
178 10 1,605 90 1,783 78.9
Appeal success but did no
qain entry to preferred school
392 53 348 47 740 24.7
Sources: National data from ED
From the national data (See table 5.48) provided by ED (now EMB), we can see that
many of the appeal cases and successful allocations went to female students. This is
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due to the different scaling system operated for boys and girls. This kind of
differential treatment was criticised as being gender-biased and unfair. With the help
of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the subsequent victory of the Court case,
many female students succeeded in their appeals and gained entry to their preferred
school.
Again, however, there is no current national study on whether there is class-bias
surrounding participation in the appeal mechanism or on the success rate of different
educational groups of parents. This study, however, is interested in finding out
whether there is any difference between different educational groups of parents and
their participation in the process. Which group of parents knows their rights and
which groups do not? These issues will be addressed in this section. In addition, we
will hear the grievances of the parents who lost out in this perilous game of choice.






F % F % F % F %









29 100 79 100 29 100% 137 100
Chi-square: 15.077, df: 6, p<0.02 (statistically significant)
In my survey, from the choice outcome mentioned previously, I know that 562
(80.4%) out of the 699 who answered this question accepted the school they were
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allocated and 67 (9.6%) did not accept their allocation, but appealed. 70 (10%) did
not accept the school and did not appeal, but found their own solution instead.
Within this group of parents who did not accept their allocated schools (See table
5.49), I find that those parents with the highest education had the highest rate of
participation in the appeal. When using Chi-square to test the confidence of
association, it is found that the association is statistically significant.
It would be interesting to know why there was a difference in the participation of
appeals amongst parents who did not accept the allocated school. The illiterate parent
mentioned previously told the researcher that she regretted that she and her daughter
did not participate in the appeal mechanism. She told the researcher that if they had
appealed, her daughter would have got the school place she wanted. A few of her
classmates, who were less able/achievers than her daughter, had appealed and were
successful. She told me that her daughter cried and was very upset that they did not
appeal. When asked why she did not appeal, she said:
At first we wanted to appeal, but her friend told her if she failed, she
would be more upset by it. In the end, she didn't appeal. Some of her
classmates, who weren't any better than my daughter appealed and got
the school they wanted. When my daughter heard about that she
cried...she lost her chance. If she appealed, she would have the
school...We were just scared...We didn't know...We worried.'
From both the survey and the interview, we know that there are psychological
barriers that some people are opposed by in participating in the appeal process. This
is sometimes linked to ignorance and to the social and cultural capital of parents and
students.
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Within the appeal group (See table 5.50), parents with the highest education
(secondary 6-7 to postgraduate) had the best rate of success (52.9%) when compared
with other groups of parents. However, when using Chi-square to test the confidence
of association, it is found that the association is statistically not significant.
Table 5.50. Appeal outcome by parental education level
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(includes postgraduate)
Total
F % F % F % F %
Success 6 40 9 23.1% 9 52.9 24 33.8








100 17 (23.9%) 100 71 100
Chi-square: 5.045, df:2, (statistical y not significant)
Table 5.51 Appeal pari icipation/reasons by child c ender
Child gender by
appeal participation
Male (% within child
sex)
Female (% within child
sex)
F % F %
Never chose the
school
6 16.2 4 11.8
Not happy with the
allocated school
29 78.4 30 88.2
If appeal, 1 can get
my preference
school
2 5.4 0 0
Total 37 100 34 100
Chi-square:2.294, df.2 (statistically not significant)




Male (% within child sex) Female (% within child sex)
F % F %
Success
10 22.7 18 48.6
Failure 34 77.3 19 51.4
Total 44 100 37 100
Chi square 5.971, df. 1, p<0.02 (statistically significant)
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In 2001, the gender factor in the appeal also played an important part as girls had to
contend with a different scaling scheme and seemed to be treated unfairly. From our
survey data (See tables 5.51 & 5.52). girls certainly seem to have a much higher rate
of success than boys. When chi-square is used to test the association, it is found that
it is statistically significant. However, as mentioned before, the successful rate may
be due to the aid and contribution of the Equal Opportunities Commission in Hong
Kong in the wake of their successful court case of 2001. After the court case, the ED
removed the gender-biased features and since 2002 the same scaling system has been
used for both boys and girls.
As well as the above findings, I also obtained some comments on the appeal
mechanism from both the survey and interviews. In the survey, six parents
commented that the system is better now than it was before as they now have the
right to appeal and, if necessary, put things right through the courts. However, 11
parents commented that the appeal mechanism is nonsensical and useless. In the
interview, one parent said she could not have any feelings about the SSPA changes,
as it was the government that wanted the change, and not her:
I can't have any feelings. The government wanted to change. What can I
say? If more parents speak out, it may be effective. I have no more
comment. It's not up to me.
She also stated that the appeal system is good, and is better than in the past:
Many parents appealed. They found justice after an appeal. In the past,
we didn't have any chance to appeal.
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5.9. End products, perceived satisfaction and barrier to change schools
Given that students have now spent almost one year in their new schools, it is now
important to know how they have adapted to these schools and to find out about their
parents' feelings toward the school, that is, their perceived satisfaction or
dissatisfaction.









F % F % F % F % F % F %
Through DP 23 32.9 26 37.1 12 17.1 4 5.7 5 7.1 70 100
Through CA 110 19.7 160 28.6 182 32.6 77 13.8 30 5.4 559 100
Either through
DP/CA
47 39.8 33 28 29 24.6 6 5.1 3 2.5 118 100
Through
Appeal
8 20 11 27.5 12 30 9 22.5 0 0 40 100
Find own
solution
7 18.4 16 42.1 4 10.5 7 18.4 4 10.5 38 100
Others e.g.
move house
2 33.3 0 0 3 50 1 16.7 0 0 6 100
Total 197 23.7 246 29.6 242 29.1 104 12.5 42 5.1 831 100
So, one year on, I found that more parents are satisfied with their child's present
school than those who are dissatisfied (See table 5.53), irrespective of whether their
children gained entry to the school through DP and CA. However, a higher
percentage of parents whose children gained entry through the DP are satisfied with
their allocated school than those parents who were allocated through CA. Those
parents who did not choose their child's present school are still very dissatisfied,
although some parents stated that they like their child's present school.
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One parent commented that her child could not even hear what the teacher was
saying as there were too many students talking in the classroom. She asked: 'How
can she leam in such an environment?' One parent said that though the school was a
band III School, the new Principal was very good and her child liked the school. She
said 'The most important thing is that he likes the school and feels happy'.
Another parent said that choosing such an unpopular school is like choosing to be a
loser and nobody would do that. This parent told the researcher that her son had lost
the incentive to learn. 'The school is very bad,' she commented. A few parents from
the two EMI schools told the researcher that teachers did not care about students
nowadays. They said that their children could not catch up and that no teacher offers
to help: 'Teachers just teach, they don't care.'
One parent said she is not optimistic and that ' teachers nowadays are different from
teachers in the past as they only teach and don't care any more about their pupils':
I am not optimistic. The conception and responsibility in schools has
changed quickly. The teachers are very different from the past. In the
past, teachers had the ambition to educate their pupils and not to just do
a job. They don't spend much time in caring and understanding the
children now. It's not good for the students.
When I asked parents if they wanted to change school, 707 respondents answered
this question, 92.8% stated that they did not want to change school while 6.9% stated
that they did want to change school (.3% stated that they did not know). When I
asked why they wanted to change school and cross-tabulated this finding with the
parents' educational level, I found the following results (See table 5.54):
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From this explanation (See table 5.54), I found that the higher the parental
educational level, the more satisfied parents were and so they did not want to change
schools. Regarding the parents who wanted to change schools, the higher the parental
educational level, the more parents wanted to change to a school with a better ethos.
With regard to the dissatisfied parents, it is interesting to note that it seemed that the
lower the parental educational level, the more they felt powerless to make a change
of school.
Table 5.54. Explanation of change school or not by parental educational level





Change, do not like the
present one, find one with
good school ethos.
4.9% 8.4% 11.1% 8.4%
Do not bother, no need 19.5% 11.9% 9.3% 12.6
%
The school suitmy child 17.1% 21% 25.9% 21.4
%
1 am satisfied with the
present school
41.5% 46.9% 48.1% 46.2
%
Too late, can not go to
good school now
12.2% 9.1% 3.7% 8.4%
Move house 4.9% 2.8% 0% 2.5%
Go study abroad 0% 0% 1.9% .4%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
* Only 238 out of the 707 respondents who answered yes or no gave explanation
In the parental interview, one parent told the researcher that she could not change
school because her son refused to change after he had made a lot of friends in the
school:
He has got friends here, it's difficult for me to ask him to change. He
doesn't want to listen.'
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For this parent, then, although she is not satisfied with the school, the student did not
want to change school due to peer group pressure. Another parent told me:
It's difficult to change. The school uniform (Hong Kong schools have
school uniforms) are very expensive. You know, we just can't afford it'
So, for this parent, although she wanted to change school, financial reasons were a
barrier to such a change.
178
Chapter 6 School in the market place
6.1. Introduction
This chapter aims to present findings that address the fourth and fifth research sub-
questions: How do schools with different popularity, respond to the changes in the
SSPA? And how does the new SSPA impact on schools with different popularity?
The chapter starts with a brief introduction of the characteristics of the four case
study schools in 6.2 and an account of the interview data and treatment of the data in
6.3. Third, findings on any institutional change: school image and publicity activities
featured in the four case study schools will be in 6.4 and the reasons for changes in
student recruitment/selection will be presented in 6.5. The findings of changes in the
selection criteria in other schools other than the four case study schools as
triangulation will also be presented in 6.6. Lastly, the findings of the study on school
enrolment will be in 6.7, social composition and the issue of equality of opportunities
will be presented in 6.8.
6.2. Characteristics of the four case study schools
To begin with, I will give a general picture of the four case study schools (See table
6.1) and their neighbourhoods. EMI1 is surrounded by public housing estates and
with buses and MTR (Mass Transit Railway) station nearby. EMI2 is near a train
station and is surrounded by both private and public housing estates. CMI1 is
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surrounded by public housing estates, while CMI2 is situated in a remote, rather rural
hillside area (comparatively) with no public transport available and is difficult to
access.
Table 6.1. General characteristics of the four aided case study schools in
2001-2:
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activities
Over 40 in 01-
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Regarding the demand for and supply of secondary school places, I learned from the
two Principals of EMI1 and EMI2 that the demand and supply situation in their
school nets are even and not over-supplied or under-supplied. Regarding schools
CMI1 and CMI2, however, the situation is different. According to information from
CMI1 administrator, many families have migrated to the newly developed area just
next to the school net of CMI1. Though new schools are on the way in the newly
developed area, these new schools will not be ready until 2008. Therefore, prior to
2008 there is going to be a great demand for places in the CMI1 school net.
According to information from the CMI2 Principal, the school population has
declined in the CMI2 net areas; there was an over-supply of primary school places,
causing many primary schools to close down. However, the CMI2 Principal stated
that from the government perspective, secondary school places are different from
primary school places as they are counted in a Hong Kong wide context, rather than
in a local one, and so CMI2 could provide places for the area next to the CMI2
school net.










F % F % F % F %
EMI1 3 8.6 26 74.3 6 17.1 35 100
EMI2 11 9.7 69 61.1 33 29.2 113 100
CMI1 8 17.8 30 66.7 7 15.5 45 100
CMI2 13 28.3 29 63 4 8.7 46 100
Total 35 154 50 239
Chi-square:17.492; df:6; p:.01 (statistically significant)
Remarks: the figures show the number of the respondents who were willing to provide
information on their education levels in each school, not the total number of students in the
schools.
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The parental education levels of the respondents in School EMI 1 and School EMI2
are higher than in School CMI1 and School CMI2; this association is statistically
significant (See table 6.2). The qualitative interview data with the school
administrators also suggest that the social class levels in schools EMU and EMI2 are
higher than in CMI1 and CMI2. In both CMI1 and CMI2, the school administrators
said that many students in their schools lacked parental help and care and that their
expectations were lower, particularly because of the poor financial situation of the
parents.
Regarding the position of schools in competition with each other, I have learned
from the interview data of parents that EMI1 and EMI2 are popular schools which
many parents would like as their first choice of school. This may be due to the
reasons that both schools are band I schools and both employ English as the medium
of instruction, these two factors being amongst the five most important factors
mentioned in chapter 5 with regard to parents choosing schools.
Moreover, I find that EMI1 is more popular than EMI2. EMI2 Principal and parents
stated that the banding (degree of popularity of schools perceived by the public) of
EMI2 dropped in 2003 from band I to band I-II as the delinquent behaviour of a few
students in the school was publicised in the press and led to parents worrying about
the school's ethos. From the data, CMI1 and CMI2 schools are not popular schools,
while CMI1 is marginally preferable to CMI2. A few parents chose CMI1 as their
discretionary place school. CMI2 school, however, has an even worse reputation and
it did not receive any discretionary place applications at all.
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Parents' comments of CMI2 include:
I would never choose this school' and: 'nobody would like to choose this
school; choosing this school means choosing to be a loser.
From these pieces of information, we know that CMI2 is the kind of school that
parents would like to avoid and if their children were allocated this school, they
would feel as if they had lost face. This is because nobody wants to be a loser or
regarded by others as a loser.
Table 6.3. Leadership style and attitude of the four case study schools











































Regarding the schools' attitude toward changes (See table 6.3) it is interesting to note
that the two CMI schools are more willing to change and innovate than the two EMI
schools. EMI1, the most popular of the four, is the most sceptical and unwilling to
change. It has not changed its curriculum or teaching methods.
Its Principal is proud of its traditional teaching methods and questions the current
reforms:
In short, we are very careful and selective in implementing the reforms
in our school...Generally, after I read the policy, this is what all my
colleagues agree, many topics in the education reforms are not
practical...We implement some of the policy put forward by the
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government. But basically, our school has done some of the things they
put forward for a long time...Why don't we learn what other countries
are doing now? Why must we learn from what other countries' mistakes
were ten years ago? They were their mistakes, so we don't learn from
them. I just don't understand, there are so many pieces of research and
evidence. Why do we need these kinds of reforms?
EMI2 has undergone some changes and planned to revise its syllabus according to
the University Entrance requirements. In general, the school seems to be
overcrowded with problems and lacks a school-wide consensus for change and
innovation. As the Principal stated, he is accountable and faces pressures on every
front - from the EMB, the public, the teaching staff, the School Sponsor Body and
the parents.
By comparison, EMU has faced the abrupt and extensive reforms in a calmer
manner, while EMI2 has found it difficult to gain a consensus of agreement that
would help to deal with the demands upon it more successfully. The following
comments made by the EMI2 Principal inform us of his difficulties in facing the
situations created by the reform:
For administrators, there are so many documents, paper work,
difficulties and pressures from outside. From the political perspective,
you now face the public, the school government body, and the mentality
of all your teaching staffs. Other than all this, you have to face your own
educational values. All these are bringing you into conflicts. Under all
these changes, education reforms are not easy. You say this, he says
something else. You say his teaching is not good. He says he is good at
non-teaching aspects, why don't you look at this and only look at one
aspect? These are all problems deriving from decentralisation. New
circumstances emerge. From my point of view, this is the political
aspect. The role of administration increases, on the one hand, there are
so many expectations upon you. Everybody's expectation is different,
you have to find consensus. Otherwise you don't have the ability to face
all these situations. On the other hand, you have to handle so many
documents. You hope to adopt a good system. But you have to write all
the reports on all the people you encounter in your work.
In 2005-06, the Principal of EMI2 resigned.
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CMI and CMI2 are the two schools that have undergone far-reaching and radical
changes. Lots of innovations can now be seen in the school. 'The world is changing
and we need to change' is what the policy makers proclaim and this is echoed by the
two CMI school administrators. According to the administrative staff (delegate
teacher) CMI1 has cut down, merged and created new subjects in junior years
(Secondary 1-3) in order to cater for their students' abilities and interests.
The Principal in CMI2 also stated that the staff has initiated lots of innovations and
can now tell the public of their success. Their students have shown great leadership
and won many awards in sport activities, both locally and in the wider Hong Kong
context. The Principal of CMI2 told the researcher that there was not any vandalism
in school any more. He said this was a tremendous improvement as there had been so
much vandalism in the school in the past. He is very proud that some of his students
who had previously been expelled from popular band I schools had changed their
behaviour and now had a sense of belonging and were studying hard in their new
school.
It seems that this Principal is using the interview as a publicity activity, to sell his
school. He may well have been trying to persuade the researcher that the school has
improved and made its contribution. Thus it is reasonable that EMB should give the
survival space to this school. However, parents in this school also confirmed with the
researcher that the school had changed a lot and thanks to the efforts of the new
Principal and that the students were now more polite and happier than before. So,
innovation and successful stories abound in CMI1 and CMI2. But there were still
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problems and worries. Problems included severe education budget cuts, the decline
of the school population, and school closures.
6.3. An account of the interviews data and treatment
Upon knowing the characteristics of the four case study schools, their popularity and
the Principals' attitude toward changes, we may learn that Principals may take the
chance of the interview to promote their schools and attempt to justify their own
positions. In this section, I describe the interview situation, discuss the validity of the
data, and explain how I have endeavoured to retain a critical perspective and to
triangulate their reports with other pieces of evidence.
The interviews with the four school administrative staff (3 Principals and 1 Delegate
teacher) were conducted in February-March 2003, at the time of the DP stage in the
2001-03 cycle. As mentioned in chapter 4, among the four interviews, the interview
with CMI1, the delegate teacher, was the shortest. And the interview with the CMI2
Principal, on the other hand, was the longest. Generally, the interview relationships
were friendly, especially with EMI2 Principal, sharing his conflict and difficulties
under the reform with the researcher quoted in section 6.2.
However, the researcher acknowledged the fact that Principals might try to take the
chance of the interview to promote the schools and the likelihood that Principals
attempt to justify their own positions. Thus the researcher was cautious of the data
obtained in the interview and used triangulation with data from other sources, such as
parent interviews, school homepages, and newspapers, to ensure validity. I will tell
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more about this in the later sections. I next present the findings on some institutional
changes of the four case study schools.
6.4. Improving school image and increasing publicity activities
These changes include increasing publicity activities and building the school image.
In the 2001 survey, parents said that they did not have enough information about
secondary schools and that they did not attend any parent meetings or open days,
because Secondary schools simply did not arrange those kinds of meetings for
primary 6 children at that time. However, when 1 interviewed Principals, researched
schools homepages and collected printed matter from schools in 2003, it confirmed
that there were an increasing amount of publicity activities in the four case study
schools.
Such activities included more communication with primary schools, parents and the
public. The modes of communication included: the delivery of printed matter such as
school bulletins, brochures...etc, organised school open days, parent nights, school
anniversary variety shows, talent shows, concerts, English camps, conferences,
seminars and a variety of differently-designed school homepages.
The school homepages were similar in that they aimed at building the school image
on academic performance, school discipline/school ethos and extra-curricular
activities. Of course, there was a difference in each school's banding and in the
content of academic performance, but the emphasis was the same. Perhaps this is
what parents and the government want from schools. It is true to say that some
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schools have had such activities in the past, but not of this magnitude and with such
momentum as at present. As the Principal ofEMI 1 stated:
...Our communications with primary schools are gradually increasing.
Starting from last year, we had an English day camp...one primary
school joined our English day camp...They wanted to join...last year,
we sent our Form I bulletin to the primary school. We introduced our
educational philosophy and listed all our achievements in the
bulletin...we organised a career talk, there were 500 to 600 primary
school children who joined us. This year we have 600 to 700 children.
This year, we also have our own school profile posted to the primary
schools in the local school net.
Besides the increase of primary school children involved in the local school net, the
promotion or the publicity activities of EMI 1 also extend from the local school next
to another school net:
We also posted to X (another school district). Our aim is to provide
information of our school to the parents, so that they have enough
information and can make a rational decision.
The school has a Public Relations Committee to organise all these:
We have a public relations committee which is responsible for all the
information given to the public. For example, our Form I Bulletin. They
are responsible for such information. We also have career talks, when we
talk about higher education and further education. Since we give such
talks to our students, then why not we give these talks to students from
primary schools? So we organised such activities for primary schools in
the local school net. We can also introduce our school to these primary
schools.
The EMI 1 Principal told the researcher that they have extra work because of the
change of the choice policy. However, the Principal said that it was a response to a
'need' and a change in education ecology in Hong Kong, and not just for the sake of
succeeding in the competitive education market. He stated that they are now not only
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dealing with 10% of places as in the past, but with 20% of places and, of course, they
need to publicise their school:
Obviously, we have extra work because of the change of the choice
policy. But we use the existing committees to bear the extra work. But if
you say this is caused by competition, it depends how you interpret it.
There is a need. It's simple. In the past, there were only 8 or 10 places in
the discretionary places system. But now it is 30 or more places. There is
a great difference here. We don't bother to organise activities for only 10
persons. But now, it is 30 places, in our applications we have 250
applications. It's worth it to have more communication with them, to
give more information to them, so that they can make a good choice.
This is why we have a Form One Information Day. This is very
important.
The number of persons involved is important...On the other hand, this is
the change of education ecology. You can't deny it. This is not only a
competition problem...Secondary school education ecology is very
different now. I know that I need to tell parents our inclination, our
orientation. I want them to have knowledge of our school before they
choose.
In EMI2, the Principal also confirmed that there were lots of different kinds of
publicity activities in the school:
Yes, we have publicity activities in several aspects. Firstly, the sports
day, we invite all the primary schools in the school net to our sports day.
Secondly, we deliver printed matters like school profile, school
news...etc to all the primary schools within the area. Thirdly, every year
we have a School Open Day, we have exhibitions and talent shows, we
invite primary schools. Fourthly, I will go to the feeder primary school
to introduce our school. Because it is our feeder school, 25% of our
places are allocated to this primary school. Of course we hope that these
25% are the top students. This primary school and our school are in the
same school governing body, so we have links.
In school CMI1, although only a few people applied for the DP, the school engages
in publicity activities in the same way as EMI1 does:
Yes, we have school bulletins. We usually post them to the primary
schools. We also use the school web-site to publicise our school. We
will have our school Anniversary soon and will have lots of celebration
activities in year 02-3. We will have lots of publicity activities to
publicise our school to the local community and local primary schools.
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We will have a talent show this Summer in the X City Hall. It's a variety
show to let our children show their talents in front of their parents. We
are preparing and organising it now.
The school also has a specialised committee to organise these activities and the
whole school will participate in it:
Yes, we have a committee to organise these activities this year and the
Principal is in charge of this committee. But many staff are involved in
it. The PE teachers are responsible for the sport activities. The music
teachers are responsible for the music activities. The whole school
participates in it.
CMI1 wants the parents and public to know that the school is improving and that it
has changed much of its school policy, for example, no tolerance towards school
violence and destructive behaviour. It is, in fact, a strategy to build a better school
image in the eyes of the public and here it seems that competition really can force the
school, the provider, to improve. At least in behavioural terms, the school really is
trying to improve and not just promoting a better school image by publicity
activities:
We are thinking hard how to promote the school. We are undertaking
great changes to promote our school. We have put great emphasis on
students' behaviour outside the school. We hope to improve every aspect
of our school, from academic performance, students' behaviour and
discipline...etc. Eventually we hope we can improve our school and
promote the banding so that parents like to choose our school.
We have curriculum changes. We design our own school-based
curriculum in Chinese, in social subjects...etc. All these cater for the
needs of our students. Our students generally are not very bright ones,
they are band IV, V and even the bottom 10%. If the curriculum is too
difficult for them, they lose their incentive to learn. This is why we cut
some of our subjects and made things easier for our students. We want
them to be happy in school. Our reform is very progressive, we are
ahead ofmany other schools at the moment.
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Regarding CMI2, despite the fact that CMI2 have no DP in school, they still wish to
publicise their school. Indeed, the Principal and the staff are trying every method to
improve their school image and publicise their successes. They know that building a
better school image is very important, as parents like to choose school by word-of-
mouth:
In the past, we didn't have publicity activities in primary school. This
year, we have these activities. In fact, this year, many Principals and
teachers from other schools have come to visit us. These include the
local primary schools inside the school net. My colleagues, including
myself, were invited to be speaker in a big seminar. We talked about the
changes inside our school...Look, these are our achievements in big
competitions.
Actually, our students have many achievements...But how do other
people view us? The worst thing is they have their first impression. Our
main difficulty is that many people don't know about all the current
changes in the school...we are engaging in all these publicity activities.
Besides the pamphlets for primary school, we know it's not the most
effective way because parents won't look at it. They only ask which
school is the best. People told them XXX is good, XX is good. Then
they will go to that school.
The Principal welcomes all the changes in school and regards it as positive
competition. However, although they have worked very hard to improve and have
been recognised by the ED (now EMB) and other secondary schools, their intake in
2001 was still very low, as was their morale:
Certainly, competition, positive competition is good. It means everybody
improves. Then we can change others' attitudes toward the school. In
fact, I don't mind having poor achievers in our school. Really, I don't
mind. Last year, in fact, our intake was not good. The problem mainly is
the ED. I don't know how they plan and count. We used to have 4 Form
1 classes in the past. Last year, ED demanded that we have two more
classes. In total, they wanted us to have 6 Form I classes. But eventually,
our intake is very low this year...they didn't allocate enough students to
us. I don't know how they plan and count. They demanded that we open
6 classes...As a result, this caused confusion in our school. Our morale
was very low.
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CMI2 Principal stated that the dramatic drop in intake of this school is caused by an
over-supply of places at new schools and a low-birth rate in the school net. The
school has undergone great changes and a number of students' former destructive
behaviour has improved greatly under the new Principal. The Principal stated that the
problem is that the parents of the primary 6 pupils have failed to acknowledge this
type of improvement and so the Principal has to take every opportunity to publicise
the school.
This piece of information was triangulated with parents' interviews. It is confirmed
that generally students' behaviour has improved, for example: no vandalism, but the
schools still have lots of other discipline problems. Regarding the decline of student
population in this school net, it is confirmed with the policy maker from EMB during
interview. For some of the achievements of the school and school staffs were invited
as speaker to talk about their success, the Principal was able to provide the researcher
with documentary evidence.
Regarding publicity activities and improving school image, from the above findings,
we can now tell how different kinds of schools respond to competition and to their
particular situation in the education market. Even though both the EMI1 Principal
and the policy maker denied that this was a response to competition, we can clearly
see that all these changes have been initiated through competition. Of course,
opinions will differ on whether such competition is a positive or negative move. The
policy maker from the Education Commission saw competition as a positive change
for the better. He stated that over-supply is a good thing in that it can help eliminate
bad schools, as parents always choose school rationally:
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It's because it's not popular that nobody wants to be in these kinds of
schools. Why aren't they popular? It is because they are bad, not
responsible. If you don't eliminate them, they will continue to
exist...Generally, parents are objective, if you are good, parents still
trust you. There is less possibility that if you are good and parents still
not trusting you. In fact, the chances of elimination are very, very little.
The number of band III schools that you can eliminate is still very, very
little. If you don't have an oversupply, you have no way of eliminating
this very small number of schools at all.
The CMI1 and CMI2 schools are working hard to improve and have made
improvements, but can they survive in the education market in the future when many
of the new schools have been built and when the student population is decreasing?
Do the two schools have a survival space and still contribute to education in Hong
Kong? Can competition always be 'positive'? We will learn more in section 6.7.
6.5. Changes in student recruitment in the four case study schools (01-
03)
According to the survey carried out by the Sing Tao Newspaper in 2002 (27/11/02
Sing Tao Newspaper) on selection strategy, the increase in DP places from 10% to
20% in 2001 had a big impact on the schools selection in Hong Kong. There are
different changes in school in response to competition and the reform policy. In this
section, I will analysis changes directly related to marketing, including the number of
discretionary place applications, the selection criteria and their arrangement.
Firstly, let us look at the number of Discretionary Places applications. As the policy
increased the DP places in each school from 10% to 20% and will increase these
further to 30% in 06, we can find that the number of DP application for EM11 is also
increasing (See table 6.4).
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School CMI1 also has some discretionary place applications (See table 6.4). The
researcher met a parent coming to the school for an application form on the day she
interviewed the administrate staff of the school. However, the school is unwilling to
reveal the actual number of DP applications, stating that it was confidential. CMI2
has no discretionary place application form, as no one bothers to apply there.





Number Places Applications Places Applications Places Applications
EMI1 30 270 32 250 32 250
EMI2 30 ? 30 187 30 187
CM11 7 ? ? 7 7 ?
CMI2 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
Remarks: NIL means there are no discretionary place applications, while (?) means the
school has discretionary place applications but is either unwilling or unable to reveal the data
to the researcher.
Table 6.4 shows an increase in applications in the period 2000-03 in EMU, and
applications in EMI2 remained the same for two years. Unfortunately, EMI2 did not
provide data for the 2002-03 cycle. Thus, we do not know whether there was an
increase or there was a reduction. From this data, we can confirm that for more
popular schools, for example EMI school, it is the school that chooses the student
and not the parent who chooses the school. The evidence for this is that in year 2001-
02 the chances of getting a DP place was 32/250 in EMU and 30/187 in EMI2. In the
2002-03 cycle, EMI2's slipping banding (become less popular) status I mentioned in
table 6.1 may be the reason that the school did not provide such data, though I have
no way to confirm it.
Of course, one could comment here that as well as the DP applications, parents can
still choose schools through the CA, and this point was made by the policy maker
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interviewed for the study. He said that in the CA everyone has formally the same
chance and everyone has 30 choices. However, as have already stated in chapter 5,
given the variations caused by the different information offered to parents and their
differing abilities in making their choice in the first place, the chances of gaining
entry to one's preferred school may not be as equal as what the policy maker stated.
When we have some knowledge about how schools respond to competition, we can
then find out about the kind of student likely to be selected and what problems and
issues emerge from this.
With regard to the selection criteria of the DP in School EMU and EMI2 in 2001-03,
both EMI and EM12 Principals stated that it is clear that they have undergone some
changes in recent years. The readers need to be informed that in 2001, no overt
selection criteria were listed in the DP application form. Administrators in the four
case study schools reported the changes in selection criteria from 2001 to 2003.
In year 2003 the application form of EMU and EMI2 (See table 6.5) included criteria
such as conduct, extra-curricular activities/services, awards both inside/outside the
school, the primary school's comments, as well as individual and group interviews.
The selection procedure has changed from there being no interview to an individual
interview in the recent past, while this year both individual and group interviews
were being employed. In addition to academic requirements, it is now the case that
good conduct and extra-curricular activities or services are required. Letters of
reference and awards can also help achieve a successful outcome.
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Regarding the rationale for all these changes/strategy in selection, the Principal of
EMI2 stated:
Yes, there is that dynamic here. We change according to different
situations. The culture now is to run an education business. From this
perspective, we need to decide what is necessary, what is our focus and
then we plan a relevant strategy to tackle it. Of course we keep some of
our good models and change others. For the selection process, we have
changed a lot. In the past we only select according to academic
performance, there was no interview or written test. Then we have
interviews. And now we not only have individual interviews, we have
group interviews to assess the student's ability. We not only select
according to the ED's ranking. We also consider his personal
achievement, extra-curricula activities and whether the student has a
reference letter from the primary school. With all these procedures and
criteria, we then decide whether to offer a place or not.
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In EMI1, the Principal told the researcher that conduct is a very important criterion
as only students with conduct A and B assessments can become prospective students.
This is a kind of conduct bar. In this school, they emphasise discipline and school
ethos. They have a school-wide policy to tackle behavioural problems. They even
boast of their strict disciplinary policy as being their strong point on the school's
homepage. This is very different from EMI2 where the school seems to have
discipline problems and which has slipped from being a band I to band I-II school.
However, all these changes in strategy and selection procedures are not done without
conflicting with the educators' educational philosophy. From the interview data with
the Principals in February-March 2003, there is evidence that being an educator can
conflict with their desire to compete for students from more affluent backgrounds.
The EMU Principal told me that:
Everybody knows that students from the middle class can afford violin
lessons. They can afford the tuition fees. Do we want this kind of
students in our school? We do. Everybody does, but this is not our
educational philosophy. Our educational philosophy is to serve the
neighbourhood. Most of the students in the neighbourhood are not
middle class, they can't afford it.
The Principal of EMI2 also states that the school is forced to select students from
better backgrounds through pressure from parents and the School Sponsor Body. He
said that this is not his educational aim. His educational aim is to educate,
irrespective of the students' abilities and backgrounds:
Basically, we give students' data to the ED. We don't know the
academic ranking of each student after the scaling, only the ED has it.
This is why we need to give the students' information to the ED and
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have the ranking data from them. We hope to have the top list students.
The reason is we hope to have good quality intakes...
This is just from the perspectives of running an educational business. Of
course there are good things and bad things. From my point of view, this
is not suitable. It should not be like that. The aim of education is to
educate, no matter what kind of students. You know, everybody needs to
be educated.
But now we have to face competition, we have to compete for students
from better backgrounds. We now have to consider according to our
situation. But from the educational aim, we have to educate. The student
may not be very good now but he may be good in the future. We may
need to spend extra time to educate the student.
But now the situation is parents want you to teach only good students,
bad students have to go. They are afraid that their children may be
affected by the bad students in school. Parents have their voice and we
have to listen. We now have to announce our academic performance.
People will say why is the performance so bad? How do you teach?
Everybody is going in this direction.
The School Sponsor Body give you pressure from above. Every school
has to compete. This is contradictory to our educational aim. National
education must not be like that...
Besides, EMI2 Principal seemed very uneasy and powerless with all the pressures,
difficulties and constraints to his education principles:
We have to build up our students, we have to spend time and energy to
accomplish our educational aims. But as I have mentioned, now it's like
running an educational business, we have to be cost effective and we
now have many constraints and have to face all kinds of pressures. The
one in power, the School Management Board, not everyone in it knows
about education and has educational ideals. Their focus is different from
mine. I have to be accountable to them and can't follow my own ideals. I
have a conscience but nobody understands your conscience; there are so
many difficulties.
6.6. Triangulation: selection criteria of other schools (Newspaper
reports, school homepages & DP application forms analysis)
Besides the findings on selection strategy in the two EMI case study schools, in this
section, I will present findings of selection criteria in other schools. The sources of
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data include application forms and school homepages of some famous DSS (former
aided schools) and newspaper reports in February and March 2003 during the DP
stage.
It is found that large proportion of schools and especially EMI schools, still regard
academic performance as the most important criterion in 2002-03 (27/11/02 Sing Tao
Newspaper). However, compared with past years, it was found that extra-curricular
activities were more emphasised than before. These include sport, music,
dancing...etc. Among them, 22 EMI schools stated that extra-curricular activities
contributed 20% or more in their overall selection criteria. If students have
participated in extra-curricular activities in the past and have earned a certificate, or
an award...etc, they have to bring with them to the interview (27/11/02 Sing Tao
Newspaper). One very popular school openly specified what kind of sport the school
would consider favourably. Some schools even add a physical fitness test and talent
show for candidates skilled in playing the violin, piano or flute...etc in the course of
the interview (27/11/02 Sing Tao Newspaper).
Besides the emphasis on extra-curricular activities, 60 secondary schools also
demand a parental interview in the selection process, while 16 schools frankly
confessed that the behaviour of parents might influence the selection outcome. The
EMI and some DSS schools require interviews in English and if a parent can speak
fluent English, it will certainly increase the chances of his/her child in securing a
place. The newspaper concluded that the competition for places in EMI schools is
very high (27/11/02 Sing Tao Newspaper).
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In 2002-03, application forms of a few very popular DSS (former popular aided)
schools, which recruited all their students through DP, were collected and analysed.
It is found that they required a thorough student resume. One parent commented that
the student resume was even more demanding than an adult one.
According to the report of Sing To newspaper on school selection criteria (27/11/02
Sing Tao Newspaper), if students and parents can express themselves in fluent
English, the better the chance they have of securing places in the school. One would
have thought it was the student's own ability that mattered most. However, a detailed
student resume written by parents added to the requirement of interviewing the
parents suggests that the middle class family is strongly favoured.
It is interesting to note that, the EMI1 Principal did not express conflict in selecting
students as EMI2 Principal did, but instead strongly opposed the double standards of
the selection criteria of aided schools and DSS schools. EMI 1 Principal stated that on
the one hand, DSS schools are allowed to use written tests for the selection of
students while on the other hand aided schools are not permitted to use it. This kind
of policy, as mooted by EMU, reveals another double standard which, when added to
the MOI policy, indicates that the government prefers DSS schools to aided schools:
They have this kind of policy. They shorten the academic distance between
aided schools. And at the same time, they are promoting DSS schools, so that
their academic achievement can become very popular. The reason is very
simple, not because DSS schools are better than us aided school but because
they have more freedom. They have more autonomy. We aided schools are
controlled by the ED. They have the freedom to select students. They can
have a written test. This is simply what I regard as conflicting policy.
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He further stated that DSS schools receive tuition fee and it is not fair to students
who could not afford it:
Maybe people think that I am too extreme. 1 don't deny that. But if you
have money to pay the fees, then you can have the written test. You can
not only choose one school, but you can choose more.
In the past, no matter whether you have money or not, you have one
examination. But now, if you have money, you can choose the school. If
you don't have money, you don't have this chance.
By favouring DSS schools over aided schools, the EMI Principal also accused the
government of transferring education expenses to parents:
It's clear. There is no doubt about that. From my point of view, it is very
clear. As a matter of fact, the government promotes DSS Schools. The
burden on education is lessened. If you count the funding per capita, it is
the same as the students in aided schools. However, if you count the
teachers' pension scheme, the government can pay less. For aided
schools, the government have to provide 10% -15% of the teachers'
pension, but for DSS schools, the government only provides 5%.
Therefore, the government, in this way, can pay less.
However, during the interview in 2003 the policy maker from EMB denied that the
above accusations of transferring education expenses to parents were true and stated
that some DSS schools are free, while aided schools and DSS schools are forbidden
to use the written test in selecting students.
The policy makers were asked to comment on changes of selection criteria and
criticisms that schools were selecting students from better backgrounds. The policy
makers stated that they encourage diversified criteria as well as the requirement of
multiple intelligence in selection. The policy maker from the EMB also stated that by
increasing DP from 10% to 20% is good because the new DP policy can act as a
mechanism for encouraging whole person- development in the primary sector.
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This statement resonates with the new SSPA policy rationale in chapter 2 which
stated in the Education Blueprint that the old policy put too much stress/pressure on
the intellectual development of students, rather than on the development of their
ethical, physical, social and aesthetic faculties. Furthermore, the EMB policy maker
stated that the new policy also reinforces the policy of lifelong learning and generic
skills: communication, team working, creative thinking...etc. that are needed in the
knowledge economy in the 21st Education Blueprint (See chapter 1).
The policy maker stated that this kind of emphasis on multiple-intelligence rather
than relying solely on academic performance for DP school selection can release
pupils from unnecessary drilling on tests and can facilitate real learning in the
primary school years:
In the past, we emphasised the memory kind of knowledge. But now, for
the education reforms, we want to reform the curriculum in school to
develop a lifelong learning attitude, to develop their generic skills, to
develop their self learning ability in the future. Thus they can have life
long learning. This is what we want to achieve from the increase of
discretionary places in secondary schools. We hope that secondary
schools select students not only on their academic performance but from
different aspects of students, from their multiple intelligence.
For example, their sport and art ability, their social service aspect...etc.
This kind of selection criteria can encourage primary schools to enhance
whole person development. So we increase the discretionary places from
10% to 20% and encourage schools to use a diversified selection criteria,
not only on academic performance...They also propose a further
increase of the discretionary places from 20% to 30%. When this
percentage is higher, this kind of multiple intelligence, diversified
selection criteria will influence the teaching and learning in our primary
school...
Whether the present procedures and arrangements really enhance this kind of
learning in primary school education is still unknown and requires more research.
However, one thing we can be sure from the finding in the four case study schools in
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6.5 and selection criteria of other popular schools in 6.6, is that popular schools
select students, rather than parents choose schools. Often popular schools, whether
the Principals wanted to or were pressurised to, tended to select students from better
backgrounds.
6.7. Changes in intake size
After this brief examination of the four schools" selection criteria in 6.5 and
triangulation of findings of other schools' selection criteria in 6.6, it is now an
appropriate time to come back and look at some of the changes in the enrolment size
of the four case study schools (See table 6.6), which may illustrate the earlier impact
of the SSPA on the four different case study schools. However, the use of cross-
sectional data on enrolment to each form as a proxy for trend data on enrolment to
Form 1 in successive years may not be totally accurate as they may be affected by
dropout or recruitment after Form I.
Subject to this, there was an increase in the enrolment size over a period of three
years in EMU, EMI2 and CMI1. Enrolment in EMU increased by nearly 10% in two
years. That means for 5 Form I classes, each class has 43 students. From the
interview with the Principal in EMI1, we learned that the school employed a second
round discretionary place application (informal arrangement) in July, after the
announcement of the allocation result. The Principal stated that each Form I class can
hold 43 students and their school has five Form I classes. Therefore, after allocated
40 students in each class by ED/EMB (43-40=3), the number of the so-called 'second
round discretionary places' is five classes times three equals to fifteen. This explains
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why they had 214 Form 1 students in 2001. In 2003 the number of applications for
just 15 places in the second round totalled about 250. This gives us an idea of the
intensity of Hong Kong students as they circulated in search of that vital school
place.









Inside outside total Inside outside total Inside outside total
EMI1 165 49 214 151 56 207 166 30 196
EMI2 168 31 199 172 25 197 166 25 191
CMI1 ? ? 191 ? ? 147 ? ? 142
CMI2 69 1 70 117 3 120 199 18 217
Remarks: CM 11 refused to give information on outside and inside school net data
There was an increase in EMI2's numbers, but they never exceeded 200. It reached a
peak of 199 in 2001, meaning that the class size would not exceed 40. Different
schools employ different strategies in recruitment and have different views regarding
large class sizes. This is because the number of EMI schools is limited, although
there are very favourable factors that may influence parents in choosing them. This
certainly reveals something interesting regarding school response, strategy and belief
in the competitive nature of the system. For example, what is seen as a gain in some
schools may be regarded as a loss in others. Is a large class size a gain for a school or
is it a gain for the students in that school? This controversial issue is certainly worth
debating.
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There was also an increase in CMIl's school enrolment that year (142, 147, 191).
This was due to an increase in the migration of people to a newly developed area
next to the CMI1 school district/net and thus a larger number of students were
allocated to the school. At the moment the government is building new schools in the
newly developed area, although building has not finished yet. Once the building is
finished, CMIl's survival may be at stake as it is a band III school. Proximity and a
new school campus certainly are attractive factors as parents indicated during
interviews and local parents may prefer the new schools with new campus facilities.
There is also a gender imbalance in CMI1, particularly since the court case of 2001
was won, which brought about the abolition of different treatment of boys and girls
in 2002. However, in CMI1 the number of boys (121) is nearly double that of the
number of girls (71). The school administrative staff indicated that this has caused
discipline problems within the school.
In the past, they used to have four Form I classes, but in this year, they were arranged
by the government into five Form I classes. That explains the increase in the
enrolment numbers from 147 the previous year to 191 in the year I am researching.
However, how many students were allocated to the school and how many moved to
other schools is unknown as that data was unavailable. The administrative staff stated
that once the building of the new schools is completed, the EMB will allocate a
number of students to the new schools instead of to CMI1. Places in the school net of
CMI1 will then be over-supplied. That means that school CMI1 may face a threat to
its survival in the near future. The administrative staff told the researcher that they
may face very tough competition and there may be a dramatic drop in school
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enrolment by that time. This is why they are working vigorously to improve the
school reputation and to build a positive school image.
CMI2 has experienced a dramatic drop in numbers (217, 120, 70). Both Principal and
parents indicated that the school has improved a lot over the last four years. But its
bad reputation in the past, the decrease of the student population in general, the
advent of new schools in the neighbouring school net and the banding of the school
all account for the sudden drop in school enrolment in 2001. The school Principal
stated that the ED (now EMB) and some other secondary schools have
acknowledged and recognised the improvement in the school. In fact, members of
their staff were invited to speak in a seminar about the school's success. In 2001,
when the ED (now EMB) planned to allocate 6 classes of students to CMI2, the
school staff were shocked at the low turn-up rate. According to the Principal, the
morale of staff in the school is now very low as a result.
Fortunately, the government still gave the full funding for 6 Form I classes to the
school so that the school manages to have a very small class size and can employ
resources for different kinds of innovations. The school really took advantage of this
generosity by the government and improved throughout the year. The school also
plans to improve the school building and facilities in the school. But the Principal
also worries about the future. Will they, for example, still have enough funding in the
future when the intake size continues to drop? The school's survival may come under
threat. This is the case with CMI2 this year as there is an over-supply of places in the
school net stated by CMI2. This data is confirmed with data from other source:
namely the policy maker from ED/EMB and from Principals of other schools.
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In 2005, I learned that no Form I students were allocated to CMI2 and that the
Principal of CMI2 left the school in 2005-06.
The readers should be informed that one of the policy makers stated that more supply
than demand is a good thing as the bad schools could then be eliminated. However
he denied that over-supply is the government's policy. He said:
Parents know how to choose better schools, their eyes are sharp...But in
fact, it is good if there is an oversupply of places...The good thing is we
can eliminate some very bad schools. If you get students no matter if you
are good or not, you have no incentive to improve. But elimination and
over-supply is not the aim of the government. The government just
wants to save money. They don't want an over- supply. But from my
point of view, over-supply is good as we can eliminate some
schools...It's because it's not popular, nobody wants to be in these kinds
of school. Why aren't they popular? It's because they are bad, not
responsible. Ifyou don't eliminate them, they will continue to exist.
6.8. School enrolment social composition and the issue of equality
As equality of access is one of the main concerns of this thesis, measuring and
comparing the social characteristics of school enrolment is therefore vital. However,
school Principals stated that the school did not have any data on parental occupation,
parental income and parental education. All such data is regarded by the school as
being very personal and contentious, especially as the unemployment rate has risen
due to the economic crisis in Hong Kong over the last few years. The researcher also
tried to obtain information from EMB, but was refused as 'no such information is
available'. The only data the researcher acquired is the sampling data from the
respondents who were willing to answer questions on their educational level in the
parental survey of 2001. Without a few years' data, it is difficult to compare and
ascertain the changes over time. In the UK the number of free meals in schools is
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used as an indicator of the social composition of the school enrolment, so the
researcher asked the four schools for data on the number of textbook allowances and
the number of private musical instrument lessons. Fortunately, the schools were co¬
operative and gave the data on these two items: receipt of a textbook allowance (See
table 6.7) and music lessons, though they must be classed as imperfect indicators.
Table 6.7. Enrolment social characteristics I (100% textbook allowance-data















allowance in Form III
(2000-01)
N/Total % N/Total % N/Total %
EMI1 20/214 9.3 23/207 11.1 27/196 13.7
EMI2 16/199 8 19/197 9.6 16/191 8.4
CMI1 27/191 14.1 21/147 14.2 20/142 14.1
CMI2 6/70 8.6 10/120 8.3 38/217 17.5
Although textbook allowance is not a perfect measure of the social characteristics of
students, it is the only available data that I can use to compare the four schools and
the changes to the school social intake over the period of three years. Ideally, it is
better to have details of parental occupation, income and education level as a means
of measurement. However, at present, one has to accept it as a limitation of the
research.
Families with a total income of under $ 19747 (about 1463 pounds) yearly, are
eligible for a 100% textbook allowance. Families with a total income of between
$19748 to $52737 (about 1463 to 3906 pounds) yearly are eligible for a 50%
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textbook allowance. Any parent's household yearly income limit falls in the category
are eligible and there is not any quota in each school.
Students who have a 100% textbook allowance generally come from very poor,
deprived families. The changes in the social enrolment characteristics of those with a
100% textbook allowance are as follows (See table 6.7): In EMI1 students from
deprived families in its intake is decreasing. In EMI2 its intake from deprived
families dropped from 9.6% to 8%. In 2001, the intake of students from deprived
families reached a rate of 9.6%, the highest recorded over the 3-year period.
So CMI1 did not seem to change much, although it is higher than that of EMI1 and
EMI2. CMI 2's students from deprived families is high in Form III, but not in Form I
and II when compared to the other three schools.
Table 6.8. Enrolment social characteristics II (outside private musical lessons



















? 7 27 ? 6 28 ? 0 21
EMI2 ? ? ? 18 0 15 10 11 7
CM11 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
CMI2 0 0 10 0 0 15 0 0 5
Remarks: ? means the school did not have the data or was unwilling to reveal the data to the
researcher.
The number of students who have private musical instrument lessons in school may,
to a certain extent, reflect some sense of social class, but it is an imperfect indicator.
On the one hand, since such lessons are private, the school may simply not have the
information and therefore the data may not be very reliable. On the other hand,
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whether one has musical instrument lessons depends not only on the family's
financial situation but also depends on the student's interests, talent and incentive to
leam.
In EMI2, 18 students learned piano and 11 learned violin. In EMU, 13 learned violin
while no students learned piano. If we use the number of students taking private
musical lessons as an indicator, from the data above, it seems students in EMI2 are a
little bit better off than those in EMU (See table 6.8).
In CMI1 and CMI2 no one at all takes private musical lessons. However, we should
bear in mind that the indicator is imperfect and may also be highly invalid, thus no
conclusions can be drawn. Furthermore, taking into account the economic depression
of the last few years and population shift in that period, any change in the social
composition of enrolment may or may not be due to the impact of the SSPA.
After presenting the findings that address the fourth and fifth research sub-questions:
How do schools with different popularity, respond to the changes in the SSPA? And
how the new SSPA impacts on schools with different popularity? In the next chapter,
the writer will present the findings which address the third and sixth sub-research
questions: how parents comment on the detailed changes in the SSPA and the quasi-
market reforms from their perspective, and how Principals of schools with different
popularity and different competitive positions in the education market comment on
the SSPA and quasi-market reforms.
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Chapter 7 Attitude toward the SSPA and quasi-market
reforms
7.1. Introduction
This chapter presents findings which address the third and sixth sub-research
questions: namely, how parents comment on the detailed changes in the SSPA and
the quasi-market reforms from their perspective, and how Principals of schools with
different popularity and different competitive positions in the education market
comment on the SSPA and quasi-market reforms. Policy-makers' reactions to
comments of parents and Principals will also be presented.
The framework of this chapter is as follows. First, findings on the comments
regarding the two changes in the DP policies will be presented in 7.2. Second,
different perspectives on the abolition of tests and the new scaling system will be
presented in 7.3. Third, findings on different perspectives of band cutting, the
increase in the random factor, mixed ability teaching, information on aided school
adaptation, government support and on the idea of comprehensive education will be
presented in 7.4. Overall assessment of the SSPA, will be presented in 7.5. Finally, a
conclusion on parents and school administrators' attitude toward the SSPA and the
quasi-market reform will be drawn in section 7.6.
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7.2 Individual choice and school selection—views toward increase of
DP schools and DP places
To begin with we will look at how parents view the increase in DP places from 10%
to 20% in 2001 From the findings, we can conclude that most parents (81%)
welcome this change. Out of the 281 who answered the open question (See table 7.1
below), 142 parents (50.5 %) explained that they liked the increased number of DP
places because it could increase their chances of securing a DP school, while 100
other parents stated that it was good that schools could select students.
Table 7.1 Explanation of parents' comments on increase of DP places from
10% to 20%
Parents' explanation F %
Good, more choice and chance for better school 142 50.5
Good, school can select students with similar ability,
higher standard
100 35.6
Not fair, relation may influence selection 15 5.3
Not right, it is elitism similar to the past AAT elimination 5 1.8
Not good, better give the places back to central
computer allocation
14 5
1 do not know, not clear about the policy 1 .4




However, as most parents welcomed the increase of DP places and regarded it as
increasing freedom and choice, EMI1 Principal regarded the policy as contradictory:
I welcome this trend. This is just a first attempt. But I have to say, I
welcome this trend passively. The reason is this is a policy full of
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contradictory elements. You move 5 bands into three bands to increase
mixed-ability. But on the other hand you increase discretionary to
encourage selection. This is a contradictory and conflicting policy. This
is silly!
He further commented about the changes in policy as giving parents false choice:
The Secondary school choice policy emphasises the increase of parental
choice. They said this is empowerment...So the discretionary will
increase to 30%. You can choose, but how? This is a false choice.
Another proposed DP change is that in future parents can make a second choice of
DP school. In general, parents (88.7%) in the survey welcomed this. Out of the 234
parents who explained their answer (See table 7.2), 89.7%, stated that it increase
more chance, hope and choice while other 10% view the other way.
Table 7.2 Explanation of parents' comments on increase of one more DP
school
Parents' explanation F %
Good, more chance, hope and choice 210 89.7
No, not fair 5 2.1
No, depend only on academic 2 .9
More school means more stress and confusion 17 7.3
Total 234 100
Though CM12 Principal, told the researcher that parents were blind in choosing
school and stated that the SSPA reform did not give parent real choice but 'false'
choice.
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7.3. Attitude toward streaming—views toward abolition of tests
When I asked parents and school administrators about their views on the abolition of
tests, parents generally welcomed the abolition of tests: 64% considered that it was
'good', with little variation across parents at different educational levels.
Table 7.3. Parents' comments on the abolition of tests
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(include postgraduate)
Total
F % F % F % F %
Good 68 64.1 267 64.1 106 64.2 441 64.2
Not good 38 35.9 149 35.9 59 35.8 246 35.8
Total 106 100 416 100 165 100 687 100
Chi-square:3.149,df:4, (statistically not significant)
Those who welcomed it explained that the AAT was problematic with regard to
streaming, as it was stressful and hindered real learning in primary schools. Those
parents who did not welcome the abolition of tests explained that tests were good for
streaming and that they increased motivation and competition (See table 7.4).
However, many of the parents agree with the abolition of test just because they
thought the test itself is problematic, not the streaming of students into different
bands.
Some parents also complained that the policy had changed too quickly. Abolition
came suddenly without much thought given to planning and to the arrangement of
the new mechanism for their replacement. In addition, the new scaling system that
replaced the abolition of tests proved to be very problematic. Some primary schools
that welcomed lots of new immigrants from China over the past three years
experienced lower test scores as a result.
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Table 7.4 Explanation of parents' comment on abolition o test
Parents' explanation F %
Good, less burden and stress 164 36.9
Good, the questions in this test are problematic 83 18.7
Good, more time for real learning 31 7
Good, the test is useless 17 3.8
Not good, test is good for streaming 118 26.5
Not good, test is good for competition 15 3.4
Not good, no test is difficult to match children and
school
11 2.5
We need to find another better test 1 .2
The policy change too rapidly 4 .9
No matter what and how to change, the education in
HK is a failure
1 .2
Total 445 100
Parents commented that the new scaling system was not fair and that it was not a
valid way of streaming primary students' performances. Furthermore, as this was the
first year that this scaling system had been used, many teachers were unfamiliar with
it and estimated the children's banding incorrectly. This caused confusion. All these
comments reveal that parents were more concerned about the problematic streaming
mechanism this year than the long-term result of the real learning the policy maker
overtly addressed by abolition of the test. Hong Kong parents, to a certain extent are
used to the streaming created long time ago by the government.
The three school administrators of EMI2, CMI1 and CMI2 also welcomed the
abolition of the tests. But the school Principal ofEMI 1 questioned their abolition and
worried about the consequences in the future. The Principal worried that the standard
215
in aided schools would be lowered if there were no public measurement to assess
school performance in the future:
...we need a standardised assessment to measure students' academic
achievement... For me, I hope they have some measure to evaluate
students' academic achievement, a standard one.
As a result of this kind of policy, the effect will be seen after 3 to 5
years. Every school will be the same, there will be no difference.
Whether you work hard or not, one third of your students will be in band
1 and one third will be in band III. In the long term, the consequences
can be easily seen. In the past in China, whether you work or don't work,
you earn the same kind of salary. You cancel public assessment. No
matter whether I teach or not, one third of my students will be band I.
You can see what kind of development will come as a result of this kind
of policy.
What makes me feel so disappointed is the government has given up any
standard measure. They cancel all the public examinations, no matter
whether in primary 6 or in secondary.
He stated that the belief 'whether you work or not, you earn the same kind of salary'
is damaging as he worries that people will lose the incentive to work hard due to
bureaucratic inefficiency.
In the interview, the policy maker of the EMB argued that there will be the BCA
(Basic Competence Assessment) in the future and that this public measurement will
be better than any public examination in measuring school performance. The policy
maker from the EC also stated that a school with lower standards than the basic
requirements is irresponsible and that it is the government's responsibility to
guarantee a good quality of education in Hong Kong schools.
Some parents also expressed concern that the school choice situation will also be
transferred to primary school allocation or, even earlier, to nursery.
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The policy maker from EMB stated that the government put forward the through
train policy that links secondary schools with primary schools in encouraging
continuity and real learning in the nine years of basic education. However, in 2001,
the so-called through train policy was not popular for a variety of reasons.
As well as this policy, the policy maker from the EC also told the researcher that
their aim is to create a 'Neighbourhood School' and 100% discretionary goal in the
future. This means that a student's address will be linked to the school's catchment
area and will no longer need a future central allocation but with 100% discretionary.
7.4 Attitude toward elitism and comprehensive education—views
towards cutting of bands and mixed ability
When parents were asked about their feelings about the cutting of 5 bands to 3, more
parents stated that it was not good (See table 7.5).
Table 7.5. Parents' comments on cutting 5 bands to 3
primary secondary Secondary 6 and above(including postgraduate)
F % F % F %
Good 32 30.8 129 31.5 44 27.7
Notqood 72 69.2 280 68.3 114 71.7
Total 104 100 409 100 158 100
ly not significant)
When asked to explain why (See table 7.6), 151 (44.3%) out of 341 said it caused
confusion and that it was difficult to match the child to a school. Another 112 parents
regarded the change as being problematic as it could lower the quality or the status of
popular schools. How this would have happened may be due to the mix of ability
caused by such change. Furthermore, 29 out of 341 explained that it was good
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because it could shorten students' distance among schools with different popularity.
19 parents stated that the cutting allowed them to obtain good school places. From
this data, it seems parents are more concerned with their individual right of choice
than the comprehensive (mixed ability) idea of education, though only 10 parents
addressed directly that mix-ability is not good in their explanation of their comment
to this question.
Table 7.6. Explanation of parents' comments on the cutting of bands from 5
to 3
Parents' explanation F %
Good-more chance to get into good school 19 5.6
Good-distance of students shortened 29 8.5
Not fair, causes confusion, difficult to match right
school
151 44.3
Not good, band 1 students more, but band 1 places
the same, competition
7 2.1
Not good-influence/lower guality & name of school 112 32.8
Not good-teaching mixed ability is difficult 10 2.9
Not good-in short term, long term is good, but needs
more provisions
1 .3
Not good-decrease choice 8 2.3
No band is good. Let school choose 4 1.2
Total 341 100
It is also interesting to note that the lower their level of education, the more likely
they were to feel that the cutting of bands was confusing (53.1%, 43.1%, 29.9%).
The higher the educational level of the group, the more likely they were to worry
about the effect on quality or the reputation of the school (48.1%, 31.5%, 20.4%).
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However, the number of parents in the table is small and may not represent all Hong
Kong parents' views.
In an interview, one parent even preferred more streaming and increased elitism:
I think the more the streaming, the better it is. If you change 5 bands into
3 bands, the difference between each band becomes lesser and lesser. It's
very difficult for the school to teach. It's easy to teach students with
similar ability. If their ability varies very much, it's difficult to teach.
Teachers then may lower their standards. For the poor ones, the standard
may not be suitable for them. But for the able ones, the standard may be
too low. I think elitism is good.
For another parent thought that the change of bands decreased her chance:
For the change of 5 bands into 3 bands, it certainly decreases my chance.
It decreases the fairness too.
The Principal of CMI2 stated that with the changing of bands and the effect of
random factor, this, added to the new scaling system and the inexperience of primary
staff, has really caused problems and confusion this year. It explains why there were
so many appeals cases in the 2001 allocation.
According to the two policy makers, the cutting of bands is necessary to increase
mixed-ability education in schools so that education becomes more comprehensive.
On the other hand, the school administrators ofEMI 1 and EMI2 really felt the impact
of mixed-ability education in their schools. As mentioned previously, the EMU
administrator worried that the standard of aided schools may be lowered due to
mixed-ability teaching as he felt that it was difficult for teachers to cater for students
of different abilities.
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EMI2 has already been influenced by it in terms of student behaviour and by their
subsequent method of tackling it. Their banding dropped from Band I to Band 1-11 in
2002-3. Readers need to be reminded again that there is no official banding of
school, the banding in Hong Kong schools are created by the school choice process.
The policy maker from the ED stated that they have not abandoned schools with
adaptation problems but that they are concerned with how schools adapt to the
demands ofmixed-ability teaching and will evaluate the situation in the new SSPA in
2004.
The Principal of EM11 stated that the impact is not only academic, but has a
behavioural aspect as well:
This is a great backward step and is contradictory. As a result of mixed
ability, not only the academic level will be lower, but the behaviour level
will be lower too. The point is, as a researcher, if you want me to prove
this to you, this is close to impossible. How can you prove the causal
relationship? There are so many variables.
His main concern is that mixed-ability teaching may lower the standard in the school:
Of course, there is. You can easily see. The effect is not only academic.
It includes behavioural aspects too. If you want statistical evidence, we
can't give you any. What 1 can tell is very simple. How many students
fail in one subject? How many students fail in two subjects? How many
students fail in three subjects? I discovered that there is a tendency for an
increase in the number of students who fail in many subjects. Although
in the past, academic achievements were not very stable, sometimes low,
and sometimes high. But this year, it is worse. Is this caused by the
reforms, as a careful researcher, I can't jump to conclusions. But I think
the effect is sure.
However, another parent thought mixed-ability teaching was good for her son's
confidence:
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Therefore I think mix ability is not a bad thing. In my son's case, he was
happy in class B with children who performed lower than he did. My son
was very happy because he was always the best in his class. If he were in
class A, he would have been the worst in the class. But in class B, he
was the first, therefore he gained more confidence because of that.
The policy makers stated that they wanted to reduce the labelling effects of streaming
and regard the cutting of 5 bands into 3 as a solution. But the Principal of EMI 1
stated that the cutting would not avoid streaming in class/groups or the labelling
effect on one's life. He argues that the sooner people have an adequate evaluation of
them and learn how to deal with this the better it will be. He believes this is one of
the functions of education:
1 think 5 bands are better. An interesting point is the mixed ability. When
you put students with different levels together in one school, naturally,
you want to stream them into different classes. We don't want to waste
able students' talent. We want to help them to develop their potential
fully. We want to give them this chance. It is natural to put them into one
class. Teachers usually care for the less achiever. If the range of ability is
too great in one class, bright students may feel very bored while the less
able students can't understand or grasp anything.
Many people argue that you don't need to tell someone his position so
early, when he grows up and starts work, he will know. But the point is
if you want him to know, want him to accept, you have to tell him
earlier...I don't think giving students their academic achievement
position is wrong. Sooner or later, you have to tell them. This is
unavoidable.
In short, one can say, some educators are similar to some parents, concern more of
their individual schools' competitive position, hold on to their opinion toward
streaming and resist to the change.
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7.5. Overall comments of the SSPA and the quasi-market reforms
When asked to comment on the new system as a whole, parents were divided, with a
majority preferring the old system to the new one. The higher the educational level of
parents, the more likely they were to prefer the old system (See table 7.7).
Table 7,7. Parents' comments on the old and new systems (Q2.12)
Primary Secondary Secondary 6 and above(includes postgraduate)
F % F % F %
New is better 42 48.8 124 42.6 41 38.3
Old is better 43 50 162 55.7 64 59.8
Both are not
good enough
1 1.2 5 1.7 2 1.9
Total 86 100 291 100 107 100
Chi-square: 2.228, df: 4, (statistical y not significant)
The lower the educational level of the group, the more likely they were to prefer the
new system. Only a very small percentage of parents replied that both old and new
systems were not good enough. When use chi-square to test the association, it is
statistically not significant.
Table 7.8 Explanation of parents' comments on the old and new systems
Parents' explanation F %
Old is better, fair, according to academic level, no
confusion
100 61
Old is better, clear of school banding 8 4.9
New is better, more chance 41 25
More place for discretionary is better 4 2.4
Both are not good 10 6.1
Total 163 100
When parents were asked to explain their answer (See table 7.8), majority of parents
stated that old is better because it is according to academic level, no confusion and
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clear of banding. Minority of parents stated that new is better because it offers them
more chance. Some even mentioned that the increase of discretionary places makes it
better. From all these evidence, we can say that Hong Kong parents are more
concerned with individual right of choice than with comprehensive education.
The school administrator ofEMI 1 stated that the new SSPA is a contradictory policy.
On the one hand he claimed it increased mixed-ability teaching by cutting the
number of bands, implying that it is now more comprehensive. On the other hand, it
increased the number of DP places as schools competed to select more able students,
and therefore was more elitist and could not be termed comprehensive. EMI2
Principal stated that the school was forced to select and that was opposite to his
education principle. For the CMI2 Principal who seemed to embrace the reform, the
policy did not increase choice. The administrator in CMI1 agreed that the school
needs to change in order to survive and that the school welcomes the changes.
When asked whether the new SSPA dealt with equality issues as parents with
different education level may have different ability to make school choice, the policy
maker from EC told the researcher that the government did not seem to take notice of
equality issues in the SSPA. The policy maker from EMB stated that every parent
has 30 choices and he denied any inequality issue in the process.
Regarding the quasi-market reform as a whole, both parents and Principals were
sceptical. Firstly, comments on whether the reform is leading to a bright future and
benefits the students. EMI 1 Principal, as already mentioned, was very sceptical, very
selective and even questioned the legitimacy of the reforms. The EMI2 School
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Principal, on the other hand, stated that all these dramatic changes brought many
problems with implementation. Schools and parents, therefore, needed to take time to
learn and adapt to them:
Firstly, all these changes have brought so many impacts. In this stormy
period, we have to stabilise our team building. Then in the next step, we
need consensus and planning can follow. If you don't have consensus
you can't change. These are the pre-conditions in reforms. If nobody
knows about the future, even the educators are not sure...They print out
many booklets e.g. learning to learn, how to be an administrator,
curriculum guides...etc. I tell you, they give out so many booklets, so
much information, You can see them...there are piles and piles of them
like mountains.
From my point of view, if we have a thorough plan and have all the
support provision, then OK let's do it. But now it's like changing the
soup without changing the medicine. You only tackle part of the
problem but not the whole problem. This is my own evaluation.
When faced with criticism and obstacles, the government changed plans several
times, an approach that the EMI2 Principal now questions:
If you change all the time and don't have persistency and confidence,
it's not going to work...If you have problems and asked them, they
don't provide any definite answers... You can see they don't have any
answer and don't even know where they are heading...Another
element to success is consensus. Right now, it's difficult to have
consensus.
He continued and stated they were like blind men who did not know what the future
holds:
We are like blind men, we don't know what the future holds. Under
these circumstances, parents don't have confidence. There are so many
changes in policies, great changes. We must have a period to adjust. You
can't say we have made improvements. We have to readjust everything,
we have to take time to think over everything, to adjust. How to adjust in
policy changes, how to encourage teachers to participate in these
changes - they are the front-line workers, you know. How to adjust in the
mentality aspect. All these organisational changes, all these ideas and
philosophy...etc. This is why nobody knows what the future holds.
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The EMI2 Principal stated that it was difficult to evaluate whether the innovations
were good for students and said that opinions are always one-sided:
Oh, I tell you it is difficult to evaluate. Firstly, who will conduct research
to find out the truth? There are always one-sided opinions.
However, CM11 administrator viewed it differently. The administrator (delegate
teacher) said that all the changes were beneficial for students and that school
welcomed these changes:
I think all these changes are good for our students. We have lots of new
changes in school. You know, we are a band III school. We are not
popular and ifwe don't change for the better, students won't come in the
future. Especially after all the new schools finish building, a large
number of students will select schools in Yuen Long and not here. We
will then be in danger of closing down. We welcome all these changes,
it's good for our school in the future. Of course, teachers' workload has
increased. All the teachers have to work very hard but we think we need
to improve our school. We welcome all these changes. As the world is
changing, we have to teach relevant knowledge to our students and adapt
to the new environment.
He added:
Under these adverse conditions and given that our school is an unpopular
one, we have to improve in order to survive. The changes are
unavoidable.
The CMI2 Principal stated that the changes were a challenge and if the school was
given enough time, it was possible that it would solve all its problems:
For me, it is a good challenge. We face so many problems now. We have
tried to solve all these problems. For example, we want to improve our
campus, the building, our teaching methods, our extra-curricular
activities, and our teacher management. We now have goals to aim for.
We have direction. Given time, it is possible for us to solve all our
problems. We have already seen many changes in our school.
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However, regarding the future of the school, the Principal also worried about budget
cuts, funding and the intake size of the school in the future:
Frankly, 1 think they will cut funding. We aided schools are very
passive. We can't collect funding from other channels. We can't have
sponsors from other channels. Our chance is very weak. Therefore we
can only depend on the government to give us funding. But given the
poor economic situation in Hong Kong, I am certain that they will cut
funding. If they announce that, then we have to react and plan. We must
have our own strategy to respond to the situation.
The demand for places in XX School Net has decreased, and in the
future the demand in this school net will be decreasing too. The reason is
the low birth rate in Hong Kong. Now the problem is very serious in
primary schools. After a few years, secondary schools will face the same
problem, although for secondary schools, the ED counts it as Hong
Kong-wide. But who knows the outcome? As I have said, they
demanded that we open two more classes but in the end we didn't have
enough students.
When I asked parents for their opinions on the reforms and on the quality of
education in the future, a number of parents said that they did not have any
confidence in them and that they were not sure about the quality of education in the
future.
Both parents and educators had strong feelings about the speed of change and
adaptation. Parents held the same view as the EMI1 and EMI2 Principals that change
had come too suddenly:
I think there are too many changes now. It causes confusion. I think
there are too many changes at the moment and they are changing things
quickly. Many policies have been in practice for a long time and we
have benefited from them so there is no need to change. The changes
also cause confusion to the schools, parents and students.
One parent commented that if the policy is always in a state of change, it just causes
a decline in Hong Kong standards, not an increase:
My comments on the future of Hong Kong education... If the
government keeps on this trend, I am really not optimistic... If the policy
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always changes, it just cause decline in the Hong Kong standards, not an
increase...I suggest that if there is any change of policy, don't change it
suddenly, but change it slowly in longer term. If there is any change,
don't change for short-term results, change it according to longer term,
for a more broader, overall view. My impression now is that all the
changes are for quick, short-term results. They don't allow for a
thorough and overall consideration. I can't give you very concrete
example. I am not an expert.
This parent also stated that under the reforms, the concept of responsibility in schools
had changed quickly and that teachers were different from those in the past:
I am not optimistic. The concept of responsibility in schools has changed
quickly. The teachers are very different from the past. In the past,
teachers had the ambition of educating our younger generation. But now,
they teach because it's just a job. They don't spend much time in caring
and understanding the children. It's not good for the students.
Thirdly, generally, parents did not favour the MOI policy that differentiates EMI and
CMI schools. One parent did not have much confidence in the future, especially in
the present MOI policy in schools:
I worry...I think it's not ok compared with the past...The reforms are not
good. They distinguish between EMI and CMI. It's not good. Every
subject is in Chinese. It's not good. For those who can't get into EMI, it's
not good. This is why I was very concerned whether my son could get
into an EMI school or not. English is international, Mandarin is not
international.
Another parent commented that the reforms had failed to achieve their aims and he
did not agree with the present MOI policy either. Regarding the encouragement of
multiple intelligence and the all round development taking place in schools during
the reform, he argued that his son's school was too small and that there was not
enough sports places for students:
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I don't agree with the mother tongue instruction policy. I like both
English and Chinese teaching. 1 don't look down upon the poor achiever,
no. 1 think we need to teach according to their ability... They pay too
much emphasis to academic achievement. This is related to the parents
but you just can't stop it. If you want your child to get into a band I
school, you have to drill them to achieve better results academically.
Then you lose sight of other aspects...There is a quota in the sports club.
The fact is that the school building is small. There is a limitation on
space.
Fourthly, regarding parents' knowledge and confidence about the reform. One parent
who said that she knew very little about education or the reforms, but she was aware
of the pressure on teachers and of the confusion they felt. She also stated that
government officers send their own children abroad to study because they themselves
do not have confidence in the reforms:
I know little about it. But I can feel the confusion. 1 have friends who are
teachers. It's hard for them. They need to look after the children and at
the same time need to spend extra time attending training courses. They
have a lot of pressure. I don't think the government has confidence in
Hong Kong education themselves. Many officers send their own
children to study overseas. If they had confidence in Hong Kong
education, they would have let their children study in Hong Kong. Why
do they need to send their children overseas.
One parent commented that we need to teach students in terms of practical
knowledge and added that she does not think the present reforms have achieve their
aims:
We need to teach them knowledge that is useful. You can't teach them
knowledge that is not useful, not practical in this modern world. I think
this is the way to create manpower...I don't think the reform has
achieved these aims.
The policy maker in the EMB rebutted the claim that parents send their children
overseas:
I think they must have a strong argument to back up their claim...I
understand that when there is reform, there is always resistance to
change. Whenever there is change, there must be an impact and people
need to adapt to the changes. In Hong Kong, there isn't any increase
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in the supply of international school places. There is a lot of gossip,
but such claims are without foundation.
However, the policy maker from the EC stated that those parents, by sending their
children to international schools or overseas were rendering a vote of no-confidence
in public education in Hong Kong. He said this was an alarming situation for the
public schools in Hong Kong, particularly as many of these schools are below
standard. He argued that DSS school policy could change the present situation and
provide parents with different choices and a better quality of education. And this is
the rationale behind the DSS school policy:
Actually, this phenomenon is a vote of no confidence in Hong Kong
education. From my point of view, this is a big drawback to the
education in Hong Kong On the one hand, public schools haven't
changed much over these years...Nowadays, students learn a lot of
impractical and unusable knowledge. This actually is an alarm call for
the public schools in Hong Kong... But parents have an outlet. The USA
has started the Charter school. Teachers and parents can gain a Charter if
they have a fresh educational philosophy that is convincing enough.
Then the government will give you money to open your own school. The
contract is only for two years. If after two years, your quality of
education is not coherent with your educational philosophy, then you
have to return the money. That means you have to close the school. This
kind of mechanism can ensure that the quality of education in public
schools is above the basic standard and not below it. It can be an outlet
for parents too. This is in fact the rationale behind DSS school policy.
7.6. Conclusion of views of educators and parents
In this section, I will draw a conclusion on the overall views of parents and educators
toward the reforms mentioned above.
Over all, the majority of parents welcomed the changes in DP, abolition of test and
cutting of bands from 5 to 3. However, from the analysis of parents' explanation of
their comments and the data from interviews with parents, it seems that generally,
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Hong Kong parents care more of their individual right of choice than the idea of
comprehensive education. From parents' response to school selection, it seems
parents still favour elitism over comprehensive idea.
For the four school administrators, the two CMI educators seemed to welcome the
changes while the two EMI educators felt the pressure to select students. The
Principal of EMI2 did not favour selection whilst the Principal of EMI1 disliked
mixed-ability teaching and believed that school standards would lower with the
absence of testing. He even criticised the policy changes as contradictory and argued
that they did not really increase choice of parents. Both parents and educators, after
their experience of the early impact of the reform, generally did not have much
confidence in the future. In the next chapter, I will discuss and draw a conclusion on
all the findings on the early impact of the SSPA on parents and on schools.
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Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusion
8.1. Introduction
This chapter draws together the evidence presented in chapters 5-7 and discusses the
findings on the impact of the quasi-market reform of education in Hong Kong, that
is, specifically, the early impact of the SSPA reform on parents and schools. The
framework of this chapter follows the main research question and research sub-
questions. Thus, the next three sections relate to the early impact on the consumers,
parents; the three later sections relate to the early impact on the suppliers, schools.
Firstly, section 8.2 provides a discussion of parents' school choice behaviour and the
kind of choice Hong Kong parents have: vertical or horizontal, pluralistic or
competitive. The research evidence mainly comes from chapter 5. Secondly, a
discussion of whether there is inequality of opportunities in the new school choice
policy will be in section 8.3. The research evidence mainly comes from chapter 5
too. Thirdly, a discussion of how Hong Kong parents perceive and respond to the
quasi-market reform will be in section 8.4. The research evidence mainly comes
from chapter 7. Fourthly, a discussion of how schools with different popularity
respond to the changes of the SSPA, especially school strategies toward the changes
of SSPA in 2001 will be in section 8.5. The evidence used mainly comes from
chapter 6. Schools' responses include improving the school's image, increasing
publicity activities and selection. Fifthly, a discussion of the impact of the SSPA
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reform on size and social composition of school intakes will be in section 8.6. The
evidence used mainly comes from chapter 6. Sixthly, a discussion of how educators
perceive and comment on the quasi market reforms will be in 8.7. The evidence used
mainly comes from chapter 7. A discussion of implications of the present study for
our general understanding of parental choice and "quasi markets' will be presented in
section 8.8. Finally, a conclusion about the early impact of school choice on parents
and schools in Hong Kong will be drawn in section 8.9.
8.2. Parental choice situation-demand and competition
To begin with, my findings in chapter 5 confirmed that Hong Kong parents attached
great importance to choosing the right school for their child because they thought it
was very important to their child's future opportunities, although some parents are
more able than other parents to make effective school choices.
I also found that the competition for schools is primarily vertical rather than
horizontal. As mentioned in chapter 3, vertical competition is based on choice from a
hierarchy of schools defined by academic level or status, while horizontal
competition is based on choice among schools with diverse characteristics or
specialisms that are not hierarchically ordered. Hong Kong parents generally
compete for the EMI, band I schools which are defined by academic level or status.
The DSS school policy is said to be encouraging such diverse characteristics or
specialisms of schools to develop. However the DSS school policy was not popular
and widely implemented until 2003, nor is it yet evident that the DSS school policy
can provide schools with more diverse characteristics or specialisms for parents to
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choose from. In 2001, there was only one specialised aided school for parents to
choose. It was the Jockey Club Ti-I College which specialised in sport and arts.
Furthermore, we found that the most important factors influencing the choices made
by Hong Kong parents in 2001 were academic level or status. And these factors
reflect distinctions that are primarily vertical rather than horizontal. Hong Kong
parents regarded good school ethos and banding as more important than proximity in
choosing school. And when parents chose DP schools, the higher the educational
group of parents, the more likely they were to choose a school outside the local
school net, although generally parents chose DP schools locally. The reason why
more highly educated parents chose more distant schools may be due to their better
off financial situation and capacity to pay transport costs, and their greater
knowledge of distant schools. I will talk about this more in the next section.
The current research, as a matter of fact, confirms the great demand for EMI
education in Hong Kong. Interview data shows that some parents could plan and
prepare for getting EMI education for their child a few years before actually making
the choice. The findings in this research show that parents' high regard for EMI
education does not come from nowhere, but is indeed often related to their own job
searching experience too. Hong Kong parents who wanted an EMI school often
mentioned their own experience but not other people's experience. One thing in
Hong Kong that needs to be noted here, as I have mentioned before in chapter 1 and
2, is that most EMI schools are band I schools. Many parents mentioned school ethos
as a factor in school choice and this related to good education or positive
environment and attitude toward learning. Thus it is still academic related.
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Parents with a lower-achieving child, like parents in other countries, avoid schools
with a bad reputation. Some parents really cared and hoped that their child would not
be affected by the perceived bad influence of other children. However, some parents
in Hong Kong simply regard getting the bad reputation school as losing face or being
a loser. That is why Hong Kong parents generally have very strong negative feelings
toward allocated schools with bad reputations. In both the survey and interview data,
it is found that some parents were very frustrated and felt no way out.
This also explains why Hong Kong parents, no matter whether their child is able or a
low achiever, often shift around trying to get a better school place after the choice
result is announced. Some parents moved schools in pursuit of a better academic
outcome while other parents just tried to avoid schools with bad reputations. These
mobile groups of parents included parents from both the high education group and
the low education group. Some very deprived parents who tried to move found out
that even the application fee was unaffordable and thus were scared off. I will talk
about this more in the next section.
Some Hong Kong parents prefer co-education for their child while others prefer
single-sex education. However, the specific demand for single-sex education or co¬
education was an important factor for only a small number of parents in the survey.
Academic or academic related factors, on the other hand, were more influential. It is
also found that the importance of academic factors was similar for parents with
children of each gender.
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There were many appeal cases in 2001. The reasons included the inexperience of
parents and teachers with the new SSPA and the different scaling systems for boys
and girls. But this fact also revealed that many parents knew their right of appeal and
exerted their right to appeal. Though some commented that appeals were useless
while other parents were ignorant of their right to appeal or lacked the confidence to
actually encash it. I will mention this more in the next section about inequality of
opportunities.
8.3. Inequality of opportunities: winners and losers
The second research sub-question is: is there inequality of opportunity for parents to
exercise choice in the new SSPA? The inequality of opportunities I refer to here is
inequality inherent in the school choice mechanism or process, not the education
outcome.
The findings confirmed that there are gender differences and social class differences
in the 2001 SSPA cycle. In the SSPA in 2001, there are clearly gender inequalities.
They first appeared in the choice process, where there were separate scaling systems
for boys and girls. They then appeared in the results of choice and in the appeal cases
and appeal successes. This is why the Equalities Opportunities Commission won the
court case and thus the different scaling for boys and girls was then abolished in
2002. However, the comments of the policy maker and some Principals indicate that
they still do not favour abolishing the treatment difference of genders. For the school
administrators and policy makers, it is the imbalance of boys and girls in the co¬
education schools that caused discipline problems.
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We also found social class inequalities in the choice process. These arose from the
greater knowledge, cultural capital, and participation in the DP of the more highly
educated parents. Selection of student from better background of over-subscribed
schools is also one factor. Besides, we also found inequalities of opportunities after
the result announced, with respect to finding another school place by parents
themselves, the participation in the appeal mechanism and changing school if parents
were very dissatisfied with their child's present school. I will present my findings as
follows:
To begin with, generally most parents knew how to collect information from
different sources, though some parents had more channels than others. Some parents
were dissatisfied with the information given by their child's primary school and
some others were satisfied. However, I did not have evidence of the link between
different social groups of parents or gender of child in this aspect.
Although the DP in each school increased in 2001 from 10% to 20%, there is
evidence that some parents with less educational attainment lacked the cultural
capital to exercise their right to participate in the DP.
Furthermore, the selection strategy of some schools also contributed to the inequality
of opportunities of school choice. For the educators, they acknowledged the
inequality problems in different social groups, but, under the pressure of competition,
they still select students with more cultural capital. The EMI1 school Principal
claimed that the school wanted to serve students from the local community which is
not so well off. However, the school's publicity activities, which extend toward other
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farther away communities, suggest that the school still wanted to select students with
more cultural capital in both the first round and second round DP, even from distant
communities. Parents could apply for a discretionary place in a school outside the
local school net. This suggests that the selection may extend with the increasing of
DP to 30% in the reform SSPA agenda, if the policy makers continue this trend.
Regarding the ability or skill of parents, it is found that there is a link between
parents' educational group and their success in DP application. There is not such a
link with CA success. In 2001, as five bands were converted into three bands, a more
random element was added into the mechanism of CA. This may have affected the
outcome in CA too. On the other hand, as parents rank 30 choices in the Choice
Form in CA, rather than choosing one specific school as in DP, the criterion of
success may be less valid. Besides, within the CA process, we still found that the
lower the educational group of parents, the more they found confusion and regarded
the process as unfair.
Inequality of opportunities not only happened before or during the SSPA but after the
SSPA. After the result was announced, evidence of inequalities of opportunities is
found in the shifting-around period when parents tried to find another perceived
better school place, in participation in the appeal mechanism and in changing schools
if parents were very dissatisfied with their child's present school.
Though shifting around and applying for other school places were common after the
results were announced, the fact that schools often asked for application fees could
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scare off very deprived parents as they could not afford it. It is sad to learn that an
application fee can be a barrier for very deprived parents.
Evidence of inequalities of opportunities found in participation of appeal and appeal
success. For the knowledge of appeal, we found that generally, parents knew the
right to appeal and how to exercise it. However, there were still some parents who
did not have the confidence to encash their right and thus did not participate to
appeal even though they might be eligible to get another school place. Readers may
remember that for one parent who was illiterate and interviewed by us, participation
in school choice depended on her very young child. It is comprehensible that the
child lacked of the confidence to take part in the appeal mechanism.
Evidence of inequalities of opportunities also found in changes of school when
parents were very dissatisfied with their child's present school in the later period. For
parents who wanted to change school, besides the application fee, there are other fees
for parents to consider such as transportation and uniform fees. These kinds of fees
can deter poor parents who can not afford them.
Finally, besides the above, unequal opportunities in the school choice process are
also revealed in the change of school intake social composition in Band I and Band
III schools in the three years after the reform in 2001. The full impact of the reforms
needs to be measured through a comparison with the social composition of intakes
before the reforms in 2001, not only after them. This, the researcher has to admit, is
one limitation of the current research.
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8.4. Parents' knowledge and attitude toward the reform
The third research sub-question is: how do parents view the changes of the SSPA on
the basis of their own experience? When the researcher revisits the findings in
chapter 5 and chapter 7, the following are found:
First, not all parents have enough knowledge about the reform policies, especially the
SSPA in 2001, let alone to take a head start in participating in the DP. We can see
these when some parents mentioned that they are not clear about the policy.
Parents' attitudes and feelings toward the reforms are mainly influenced by or
correspond to their success or failure of getting the school place for their child, the
'outcome effect'. That is, generally, if they succeed, they commented that the reform
is good, if they failed, they were angry and disliked the SSPA reform. A similar
situation occurred when parents succeeded in getting what they wanted. Parents often
commented that the SSPA reform increased their chance of getting the school place.
If they failed, parents often commented that the reform did not increase choice. They
also commented negatively toward the reforms.
The findings in chapter 7 also reveal that parents are more concerned with whether
their own child get a head start than with the principle of comprehensive education.
That explains why parents with able children complained about mixed-ability
teaching instead of appreciating its advantages. Parents with less able children were
positive about the reform and regarded it as giving them more choice and a chance to
get what they wished. But that does not mean they valued comprehensive education.
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8.5. Schools' strategies in response to the new SSPA
The fourth research sub-question related to impact on schools: how do schools with
different levels of popularity respond to the changes of SSPA? The following
findings related to how the four case study school administrators reacts to the
changes:
Firstly, there is evidence that schools increase their publicity activities in scope and
in number in order to publicise the school to attract students and parents, even to
distant communities.
Secondly, for administrative changes or response, there is evidence that schools also
have special committees to organise all the publicity events. Often the Principal is
the chairman of this committee.
Thirdly, over-subscribed school changed their selection criteria over a three-year
period. In 2003, in order to attract students with all-round ability, besides the
academic requirement, schools welcomed prospective students with other talents
such as in sport or music. They also employed group interviews to select students
with leadership ability or communicative skills.
Fourthly, we have evidence of more school selection. No matter whether it is in
conflict with educators' educational principles or not, they still select. One Principal
showed his concerns of whether there is a measurement of student achievement in
the future. It is because if school do not have the information, it is difficult for
schools to select able students academically.
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Furthermore, beside academic criteria, school also selected students with better
behaviour. School not only select more able children, but try to avoid children who
may misbehave. This shows in the conduct bar of EMI1. The criteria that stress
school discipline are a deliberate signal to parents that the school has a better school
ethos, which is regarded as an important factor for parents in choosing schools.
There is also evidence that over-subscribed schools often employed a second round
DP to maximise the school intake, that is, to increase the class size from 40 to 43. So
a Hong Kong school cannot open another branch like a supermarket but just
maximise its class size. Whether or not this is good for the quality of education
offered to students is another issue that is out of the scope of the current research.
8.6. Early impact on schools' intake size and intake social
composition
The fifth research sub-question is how did the new SSPA impact on the intake size
and social composition of schools with different levels of popularity?
I found evidence of an unpopular school decreasing its intake size dramatically.
CMI2 had a great reduction in intake size and its survival was under threat. CMI1
maintained its intake size and this may be due to geographic and demographic
difference. While CMI1 met a demand from the newly developed neighbourhood,
CMI2 was in a hard-hit area of population decline, which I have mentioned in
chapter 6. Another reason for the declining intake to CMI2 is the local transportation
problem. CMI1, though a Band III school, seemed better off with the demand in the
neighbouring newly developed area where new schools had not yet been built. Its
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own survival may be under threat after the schools are built in a few years time in
2008, but before these schools are built, there is still a demand for secondary school
places. So the two schools were actually facing quite different competition since they
were situated in different school nets with different student populations.
Although the EMB acknowledged school CMI2's improvement, it seemed that the
school did not have the positive reinforcement or support from EMB, that is the
survival space CMI2 asked for, to pay off its hard work.
Secondly, I found evidence of change in the social composition of schools with
different popularity. Chapter 6 reports the decreased number of very deprived
students in EMU and the increase in deprived students in CMI1. For EMI2 and
CMI2, they have different figures. The dramatic drop of intake size in CMI2,
however, renders the comparison difficult.
Finally, the impact of the reform on schools was not only confined to the size and
composition of their intakes. The resignation of the EMI2 and CMI2 School
Principals surely can not be ignored. As two Principals resigned from their beloved
schools, one considered popular and one very unpopular. It seems likely that these
resignations were connected with the school choice reform, mediated by the pressure
mentioned by the EMI2 Principal and by the survival threat mentioned by the CMI2
Principal.
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8.7. Educators' knowledge and attitude toward the reform
The sixth research sub-question related to how administrators (Principals and
Delegate) regarded the impact of changes in the SSPA on their schools? This is
revealed in chapter 6 and chapter 7. The main aim of this section is to analysis
educators' feelings and attitude toward the reforms. The four case-study schools, two
EMI and two CMI, include popular and unpopular, star and sink, over-subscribed
and under subscribed schools. These four schools can reveal how educators from
different position in the education market view the reforms in Hong Kong, though
each school may be unique in its history and characteristics.
First of all, educators have much more knowledge about the SSPA and the quasi-
market reforms than parents. Through interviews with the four school administrators,
the researcher learned that they knew the reform policies, the rationale behind them,
though some administrators might not agree or be willing to implement them while
some others seemed to embrace the reforms.
However, we can say educators are not very different from parents, although they
have more knowledge, in that their concern is also very 'individualistic'. As stated in
8.4, parents' main concern is not about comprehensive education, but whether their
own child gets the school place they favour. For educators, in a similar way, the main
concern is their school's position in the education market place. That explained why
educators tried to publicise their schools to attract and select the best students they
could get. The EMI2 Principal, who felt the conflict and dilemma between selection
and comprehensive education, seemed to be losing out in this reform. The banding or
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the popularity of EMI2 dropped due to the media's attention to the behaviour
problems of a few students in the school in 2002.
Even though selection conflicted with his educational principles, the EMI2 Principal
could not stop or slow down the trend, but he had to follow it in full measure. In
general, educators' main concern is the school's competitive position in the school
market. So, although some educators may disagree with the principle of selecting
students, schools may still employ all the selection criteria mentioned in chapter 6. It
seemed that schools could not stop or slow down this trend of selecting the best
students which are opposite to the notion of comprehensive education. As the EMI2
Principal commented: 'it is not right to select, we have to teach students, no matter
who they are'. But he, under pressure from every side, could not stop the trend of
selection.
With respect to educators' attitudes towards the reforms, the two EMI School
Principals make rather negative judgements or comments on the reform, while the
two CMI Band III schools seemed to welcome it. Were the two CMI school
administrators really welcoming the reform? The CMI 1 delegate, though considered
very passive in the interview, like the CMI2 Principal, spent comparatively more
time telling the researcher that the schools had tried to change and had improved a
lot. He mentioned that the school's survival was under threat and they knew they had
to change in order to survive. On the basis of this information, the schools seemed
more likely to react to the reform in order to survive rather than to welcome the
reforms. The CMI2 Principal, too, wanted to take the chance in the interview to
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publicise the school, to tell the researcher the school had changed and made
improvements.
By triangulating this evidence with the data in parent interviews the researcher
concluded that the school really had made improvements. However, it was this
Principal who told the researcher that parents were blind in choosing schools and the
SSPA reform did not give parents real choice but a 'false' choice.
Finally but importantly, another aspect of the research is that educators were too
busy engaging in implementing all the policies. This may lead them to lack a holistic
view on evaluating the impact of the quasi-market reform on education in Hong
Kong.
8.8. Implications
This section discusses the implications of the present study for our general
understanding of parental choice and quasi-market. It makes sense to begin by
comparing the Hong Kong case with the ideal type of a quasi-market mentioned in
the literature review in chapter 3.
To a certain extent, the Hong Kong reform can be considered a case study of parental
choice rather than of a quasi-market. The situation in Hong Kong differs from the
ideal type of a quasi-market in a few ways:
Firstly, within both the Computer Allocation System (CA) and Discretionary Places
Allocation System (DP), the fact that parental choice in Hong Kong coexists with a
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system of academic selection makes it different from the quasi-market in many
countries. However, it is not unique as open enrolment has been introduced in other
selective systems, such as that ofNorthern Ireland.
Secondly, the Hong Kong reform, on one hand, moves from a streamed system with
5 bands into a slightly more comprehensive one with 3 bands. The goal of the reform
is said to be to improve education and to provide the kind of human resources that
the knowledge economy needs. However, on the other hand, the reform also includes
privatisation and quasi-market policies emphasising increased choice. This blurring
of the public and private sectors is also found in other quasi-markets in other
countries, although in some other quasi-markets vouchers are used to purchase
education in the private sector while there are no vouchers in the Hong Kong system
yet.
Thirdly, the computer allocation system in Hong Kong is very centralised. Open
enrolment is limited to DSS schools (which can have 100% Discretionary Places) but
not aided school. For aided schools, although the percentage of Discretionary Places
increased from 10% to 20% in 2001 or 30% in the future policy agenda, it is still
limited and not comparable to the 100% open enrolment found in many other quasi-
markets. These two very different allocation mechanisms - the centralised computer
allocation and discretionary allocation - coexist, making the Hong Kong model
distinctive.
Fourthly, the enrolment related funding formula (per capita funding) in other quasi-
market did not apply completely to the Hong Kong case. In Hong Kong, two funding
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principles co-existed, a fixed amount of funding was provided to each aided school
and funding based on student numbers (enrolment-related) was provided to each DSS
school on top of its tuition fee. Within aided schools in Hong Kong, funding, to a
certain extent, remained unchanged. This is why in our findings in chapter 6,
although CMI2's intake size dropped in 2001-2, its funding did not decrease and the
school could employ small class sizes (with a teaching staff of 57) and cater for
individual needs of the students. Both the unpopular CMI schools (CM11 and CMI2)
seemed very positive to change. If school funding did decrease according to the
school's intake decrease, their experience and their response to the reform may not
have been the same Also, as funding related to material and human resources,
funding differences may create impact on the quality of education in different types
of school (DSS schools with tuition fee on top of government funding may have
more funding over aided schools).
Lastly, the Hong Kong allocation process involved a complicated procedure and
arrangement that required matching of students with schools academically (See
Chapter 2 and Appendix A). The fact that Hong Kong parents needed to know the
band of their child and how to match their child to a school was very different from
quasi-markets in other countries.
In short, the differences, when compared with other quasi market, to a certain extent,
can be attributed to features of the HK context: allocation mainly based on
banding/streaming of students; a complicated procedure and arrangement of the
Hong Kong school choice; the coexistence of two different funding mechanisms.
Thus, the concept of a quasi-market in education, applied to Hong Kong, needs to be
247
qualified by reference to other principles of selection/allocation with which it is
combined.
For the evaluation on the impact of the policy, Hong Kong case is not yet 100% open
enrolment but is increasing—discretionary places is expected to increase from 20% to
30% or even 100% in the future . A comparison of the sizes and social compositions
of school intakes at different stages of the school choice reform, as the proportion of
discretionary places rose from 20% to 30% and continued to rise above that, would
be interesting and may offer policy makers some insight on the impact of the school
choice reform.
For the impact of parental choice on school and parents, our empirical findings
support the findings of other studies. With respect to the supply side, we clearly see
the increase of publicity activities and school image-building activities among our
four case study schools. Whether the school was popular or not, the pressure to
attract students and maintain its intake size affected all four schools.
In the past, secondary education allocation in Hong Kong was highly centralised. But
with the present reform policies, increasing the percentage of discretionary places
(DP) in aided schools and 100% DP in some popular DSS school, the allocation
system became less centralised.
Another issue of school choice concerns parents who choose without what Lawton
(1992:85-86) termed as 'perfect information'. Our study of the Hong Kong case also
shows that not all parents have the perfect information to encash their right of choice
for their children.
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Besides imperfect information, there are other issues related to confidence of parents
in DP application; participation in the appeal and participation in the 'second round'
Discretionary Places employed by schools (adding each class size from 40 to 43)
after the allocation result was announced in August. Furthermore, the application fee
that parents have to pay in order to apply and change school are common in Hong
Kong but not in other countries. However, the experience of some Hong Kong
parents that it was difficult to change school, confirms Bartlett's (1993:143)
observation that 'It is relatively difficult and costly for pupils to switch schools if the
quality of educational provision does not meet up to expectations'
As some groups of parents with more social and cultural capital may have an
advantage over those who have not, the Hong Kong case confirms Jonathan's (1997:
51) observation that 'people do not differ merely in their preferences and their
resources for obtaining them. They also differ in abilities, understanding, experience
and cultural capital, all of which structure preferences, making some possible and
others not'. Bowe et al (1992:53) similarly argued that 'choice' is not neutral or
classless: choices in fact, have 'class bias'. Social and cultural capital played an
important role in choice making.
With the language policy, which limited the number of EMI secondary schools after
1997, the demand for EMI education complicated the market even further in the
Hong Kong case. As mentioned in chapter 5, competition among schools is mainly
vertical rather than horizontal, and the competition for EMI school places is likely
become more severe. Lawton distinguishes between offering real choice (where
there is a high chance of meeting those choices) and 'lottery' choice (where parents
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might be encouraged to choose, but where there will be a very low chance of
satisfaction). The idea of parents being able to choose schools was 'splendid in
principle' as Lawton (1992:105-108) stated, but the Hong Kong case also shows that
there were bitter complaints about the failure of the system to deliver choice.
In the Hong Kong case, with respect to the popular schools, it was more a matter of
schools selecting students, not parents choosing schools. The selection criteria of our
two popular EMI schools, are consistent with Bowe et al's (1992:53) observation that
schools, especially the popular ones, compete to attract greater cultural capital in the
hope of yielding higher returns. This kind of selection is likely to cause social
segregation among schools with different popularity in the Hong Kong education
market.
Bartlett & Le Grand (1993:32) noted: 'If "cream-skimming" occurs: purchasers can
choose for whom they will purchase, and providers can choose for whom they will
provide, that is, if they can skim off the cream, then welfare services may not reach
those who need them most and equity will not be achieved'. So, they (Bartlett & Le
Grand 1993:34) argued that there should not be an incentive for providers or
purchasers to discriminate between users in favour of those who are least expensive.
However, EMU created a conduct bar as a priority selection criterion, thus
discriminating between users in favour of those who are least expensive.
Feintuck (1994: 64) stated that choice did not really empower parents, but just
encourage selection by oversubscribed schools. The consequence of marketisation in
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education might result in exclusion, segregation and the polarisation of school
intakes.
In short, there are a few differences in the findings of our study when compared with
other studies - for example, we find that Principals of unpopular school are positive
toward the reform, and that unpopular schools have more resources to cater for
individual needs of students - but these can be attributed to features of the Hong
Kong context. For the larger part, despite the very different market model, features
and parental choice context of Hong Kong from other countries, the impact of school
choice on parents and schools has many similarities with other quasi-markets. The
researcher agrees with Brown and Lauder (1997:187, 190) that 'when education
becomes a positional good and where the stakes are forever increasing in terms of
income, life-chances, and social status, powerful individuals and groups will seek to
maximise their resources to ensure that they have a stake in the game by whatever
means...Therefore, how the state intervenes to regulate this competition in a way
which reduces the inequalities of those trapped in lower socio-economic groups must
be addressed...'.
8.9. Conclusion
This research has come to the conclusion, and agrees with Tse (1998:101) on this
that 'despite the implementation of universal education for nearly twenty years, an
increase in educational opportunities did not result in an equal sharing of the
opportunities or a reduction of inequality. In fact, differences and inequalities along
different levels of school still persist in the current Hong Kong educational system,
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which are closely related to the factors like class, family background, gender and the
like'. However, it also has analysed the early impact of the SSPA on both the
consumer and the supplier, on their response and attitude toward the SSPA. Though
the policy detail and market context is unique in Hong Kong, there are still many
similarities with other quasi-market situations in other parts of the world. Evidence
such as: over-subscribed schools selecting students from better backgrounds, changes
in schools' intake sizes, early signs of changing school social compositions and
increasing school publicity activities.
The current research has its limitations, associated with such factors as access,
opportunistic sampling, the lack of a longitudinal approach permitting comparisons
before and after the reform, and the time factor in the SSPA reform agenda.
Moreover, the quasi market in Hong Kong is stili in an early stage and not yet fully
developed. Nevertheless the present study, with qualitative and quantitative
evidence is believed to serve as one piece of historical evidence, on a unique case
like Hong Kong, to add to the research literature on school choice. Future research
can build on this study for comparisons of the further development of the quasi-
market and its impact in Hong Kong at a later date.
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Appendix A Secondary School Places Allocation (SSPA)
(found in the government policy website in 1999-2001)
Secondary School Places Allocation (SSPA) System
An Outline of the Secondary School Places Allocation System (for the 1999/2001
Cycle)
The Government has adopted the Education Commission's reform proposals on
education system in its Report published in September 2000. These include the
transitional measures to reform the Secondary School Places Allocation (SSPA)
System. Accordingly, changes have been made to the System as from the 2000/01
school year. The main features of the revised SSPA System are now described
below:
1. Internal Assessments
A Primary 6 student's chance of allocation to a school of his/her preference depends
largely on his/her position in the order of merit of his/her own school. This order of
merit is based on the school's internal assessments at the end of Primary 5, and both
in mid-year and at the end of Primary 6 and is formed by standardising all the
students' marks for all subjects. To ensure that students will receive a balanced
education, all subjects taught in the school are assessed, except Physical Education in
all schools and Religious Knowledge and Putonghua in some schools.
2. The Scaling Mechanism
As different schools may have different curricula and the standard of marking or
assessment may vary from school to school, it is not appropriate to put the marks of
all schools side by side directly to form an order of merit for the purpose of
allocation. Elence, a scaling mechanism will be used to scale and convert schools'
internal assessments, such that the converted marks of all participating schools may
be put into an order of merit fairly. Before the 2000/2001 school year, the Academic
Aptitude Test (AAT) performed the role as a scaling instrument.
As recommended by the Education Commission, the Education Department has
abolished the AAT with effect from the 2000/2001 school year. During the
transitional period (i.e. from the 2000/01 school year to the 2004/05 school year), the
average of each primary school's AAT results in the past three years (i.e. 1997/98,
1998/99 and 1999/2000) will be used to scale students' school internal assessment
results for the purpose of determining their allocation bands.
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According to research findings, there are significant discrepancies in the performance
of boy students and girl students in school internal assessments and in the AAT. In
the scaling process, it is more fairer to treat boy and girl students separately.
Therefore, the internal assessments of boy and girl students are scaled independently.
3. School Nets
In line with District Administration boundaries, the whole territory is divided into 18
school nets. Each school net comprises all the participating primary and secondary
schools physically located in the area and a number of different types of secondary
schools of other areas providing school places for the net.
4. Allocation Bands and Random Number
As there are significant developmental and performance differences between boys
and girls, to make due allowance for these differences and to provide equal
opportunities for boys and girls in the school places allocation process, boy students
and girl students are ranked separately into allocation bands in allocating school
places.
The scaled internal assessments of all boy/girl students in a school net are put into a
separate order of merit for determination of their allocation bands. Commencing
from the 2000/2001 school year, the allocation bands will be revised from five to
three for boys and girls separately, each consisting of 1/3 of the total Primary 6
boy/girl students in the school net. The order of allocation within the same allocation
band (disregarding boy or girl students) is determined by the computer-generated
random number allotted to each student. This random number is generated by the
computer before the running of the allocation programme and has no connection with
the Student Reference Number.
5. Parents' Choices of Schools
Every year in early May, the Education Department distributes to each Primary 6
student a Secondary School List showing the secondary schools which provide
school places for the school net he/she belongs to. Parents then make their choices
from the list and place them in an order of preference. School places allocation
procedure is done according to the order of preference indicated.
6. Allocation by Net, by Band and by Parental Choice
Allocation is done on a net basis. When students in a school net are allotted a random
number, the process of allocation commences. Students in Allocation Band 1 are first
allocated Secondary 1 places according to their parents' choices, then students in
Allocation Band 2 and 3 consecutively.
If a particular secondary school has more applicants than places, applicants of the
same band with smaller random numbers will be allocated a place first. Within an
allocation band, first choices will be allocated first, then second choices and so on.
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This process will go on until all the students in the school net have been allocated a
place.
7. Example of Allocation
In order to keep a good balance of boy/girl ratio of each co-educational secondary
school for encouraging co-education, the places of each co-educational secondary
school are divided into places for boys and places for girls before the allocation
process commences. The number of places available to boys and girls in each co¬
educational school reflects the sex ratio of the applicants of the respective school nets
(after deducting the places in single sex schools) so as to ensure that boys and girls in
a particular school net have equal opportunities to study in each co-educational
school in that net.
In allocating school places, boy students and girl students are dealt with separately in
the Secondary School Places Allocation System. The following example illustrates
the actual allocation procedure for a boy student :
Boy Student
Name : CHAN Tai-wai
Allocation
Band :1
School Net : X
School Choices : First - School A
: Second - SchoolB
In School Net X
No. ofAllocation Band 1 boy
students : 1000
No. of Allocation Band 1 boy
students choosing School A as first
choice : 150
No. of boys' places available in
School A : 100
As only 100 boys' places are available in School A in School Net X but there are 150
Allocation Band 1 boy students in the school net choosing that school as their first
choice, the computer will choose 100 of them to fill these places in School A
according to their random numbers. Suppose CHAN Tai-wai's random number is
within the first 100, CHAN will be allocated to School A. Otherwise, he will not be
allocated a school place according to his first choice. If CHAN is not allocated a
place according to his first choice, the computer, after screening the first choices of
all the boy students in the same allocation band, will read the second choices of all
boy students (including CHAN) in the same allocation band who have not been
allocated a place in their first school choices. Suppose there are 650 boy students still
unallocated after the computer has processed the first choices of all the Allocation
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Band 1 boy students, and among them, 8 (including CHAN) have chosen School B
as their second choice. Say School B has 10 places left after the first school choice
allocation. Since School B has enough places left to accommodate the 8 boy
students, CHAN will be allocated to the school.
On occasion that more than 10 (including CHAN) out of the above mentioned 650
boy students have chosen School B as their second choice, the computer will then
select 10 boy students according to the boys' random numbers to fill the 10 available
boys' places in School B. If CHAN is still not chosen, the computer will read his
third choice, fourth choice and so on in the same manner until he is allocated a
school place.
Hence, though both CHAN and his classmate Lee Kwok-keung are in Allocation
Band 1 and have made identical school choices, CHAN may be allocated to the
school of his third or fourth choice while LEE may be allocated to the school of his
first choice. This is so because the order of allocation of the boy students in the same
allocation band is determined by the random numbers allotted to them. This may
happen even if CHAN were in a higher position than LEE in the order of merit based
on their internal assessments. This is in line with the policy of mixed ability intake
for schools.
The above allocation procedure also applies to girl students.
8. Feeder and Nominated School Schemes
Under the Feeder School Scheme, a parent secondary school may reserve, after the
deduction of repeater and discretionary places, a maximum of up to 85% of the
remaining places for its feeder primary school.
Under the Nominated School Scheme, a parent secondary school may reserve, after
the deduction of repeater and discretionary places, only a maximum of up to 25% of
the remaining places for its nominated primary school.
A student studying in a feeder/nominated school is eligible for a feeder/nominated
place in his/her parent secondary school only if he/she is in Allocation Band 1 or 2
and has chosen the parent school as his/her first choice. If there are more eligible
Primary 6 students in the feeder/nominated primary school than the feeder/nominated
places available in its parent secondary school, allocation of such students in
Allocation Band 2 will begin only after all their classmates in Allocation Band 1
have been allocated. If there are more Allocation Band 2 feeder/nominated students




In general, secondary schools participating in the System are allowed to reserve not
more than 20% of their Secondary 1 places as discretionary places for admission of
students before the central allocation.
Parents can apply to ONLY ONE secondary school for the discretionary places they
wish their children to take up. It should be stressed that application to more than one
school for discretionary places will automatically result in the forfeiture of all rights
to a discretionary place.
It is up to schools to decide whether a student is accepted in accordance with its
admission criteria. Schools may arrange interviews but no written test should be
conducted. A student accepted by a school to fill a discretionary place will not be
allocated another place in the central allocation. If not accepted, the student is still
eligible for the central allocation and will be allocated a Secondary 1 place in the
public sector.
10. Enquiries
Parents seeking further information may contact the School
Places Allocation Section of the Education Department.
Address : 5th Floor, Lui Kee Education Services
Centre,
269 Queen's Road East,
Wan Chai, Hong Kong.
Telephone No.: 2832 7740 or 2832 7700
272
Appendix B1 Letter of Invitation to all the secondary schools
in Hong Kong to participate in the parental choice project
(both survey and case study) and their consent forms
Dear Principal,
Request for Participation in Education Policy Research
Education policy in Hong Kong has undergone dramatic changes in recent years.
These changes have become major concerns for parents and for people involved in
the education sectors. Of these changes the Parental Choice Policy adopted in 2001 is
of unprecedented importance affecting the schools, the pupils, and the parents to this
day. A study of this policy will be of great importance for an understanding and
review of education policy ofHong Kong in the past and its prospect in the future.
My name is Mei Siu Chan (Ruth), and 1 come from Hong Kong. I had been a teacher
for eight years in Hong Kong. In December 2000, I completed a MSc degree in
Education in the University of Edinburgh. Currently, I am working on a PhD degree
in the same University. For my PhD thesis, I am conducting a study of the parental
choice policy adopted in 2001 in Hong Kong. My focus will be on the parental
choice process for Hong Kong secondary schools. Special attention will be given to
the schools' and parents' views on the new policy. I believe that this research will
provide a major academic review of this policy and will be of great value to
educators and policy makers who want to improve on the education policy in Hong
Kong.
Therefore I would like to request your consent for your school's participation in this
project. In my planning minimal administrative procedures on the part of the school
are required. I only require Form One students from your school. The project
includes issuing questionnaires (in Chinese) for the parents of the Form One









collecting them from the parents. This can be done by issuing the questionnaires to
the students, who then take them to their parents. The students will collect the
questionnaires from their parents and return them to the class teacher. Executed in
this way, administrative complexities will be simplified. Then I will collect the
questionnaires from your school in person in Hong Kong. Once I have analysed the
questionnaires, in the second stage of the project I plan to select a few schools in
which I will conduct interviews with the Principal and a few parents. If your school
is selected for the interview, each interview will take about thirty minutes so that
interruptions will be minimised. My hope is that this project will achieve a better
understanding of the new school choice policy in Hong Kong and contribute to the
future policy making in this system. Your kind co-operation will help realise these
aims.
This research is subject to the researchers' codes of practice which guarantee the
confidentiality of information on individuals and on schools. Thus, while 1 will
appreciate your co-operation and participation in this research, all data and
information relating to the identity of the school, the staffs, the students, and
their parents, will be kept private and confidential: No school, parent or student
will be named or identifiable in my report.
I would be very grateful if you kindly give your consent for your school to
participate in this project soon.
If you have any questions about the study, I would be happy to answer them. I can
be reached by phone, by e-mail or by post: Contact address of me (I am in H.K. from
3rd ofApril to 2nd of July)




PhD Candidate, University of Edinburgh
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(Please complete the tear-off slip below and return your reply with the provided
envelope)
Parental Choice Research Project Return Slip
I give consent to my school
(name of the secondary school)
to participate in the Parental Choice Research Project: Stage I (survey) only, or
both Stage I (survey) and Stage II (interview)
Signature Date
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Appendix B2 Letter of Invitation to parents, the parental
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Appendix B3 Letter of Invitation to parents, the parental
questionnaires and interview consent forms (English version)
Dear parents or guardian,
Invitation to participate in the secondary school choice research project
My name is Mei Siu Chan (Ruth), and I come from Hong Kong. I had been a teacher
for eight years in Hong Kong. In December 2000, I completed a MSc degree in
Education in the University of Edinburgh. Now I am working on a PhD degree in the
same University. The topic I have chosen for my PhD thesis is "Secondary School
Choice in Hong Kong" which, I feel, reflects my concern for the Education Reforms
undertaking in Hong Kong.
I have gained consent from the school principal in conducting this research and I am
writing to ask if you would be willing to spare some time to participate in this study.
1 would be very grateful if you would participate, however, your decision to
participate in this study is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, Please fill
in the 'Parental Choice Questionnaire' below.
All the information you give will be kept private and confidential. The school









please seal the questionnaire in the provided envelope before you return it to the
school
If you have any questions about the study, I would be happy to answer them. You
can reach me by phone or my e-mail. (Edinburgh phone-0131-6683389, Hong Kong
phone 93251147, e-mail address: m.s.Chan@sms.ed.ac.uk).
Thank you very much for taking time to fill in the questionnaire.
Yours sincerely,
Mei-siu Chan (Ruth)






Please answer the following questions as appropriately as you can.
All answers will be kept private and confidential. The school will not be
informed about your reply.
Introduction:
The questionnaire is about the new secondary school choice policy in Hong Kong
and is expected to be filled in by one of the parents (father or mother) or the guardian
who chose the school for his/her child in 2001. This research is very important and
therefore I hope you will be willing to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire
has two main parts. Part I is about the choice policy. Part II is about your child and
your family. All of the answers you give to these questions will be kept confidential:
please seal the questionnaire with the envelope provided before you hand it in to the
school. If you cannot answer a question, please feel free to leave it out and continue
with the remainder. The questions relate to your choice of secondary school for your
child who has entered secondary school last September. Please answer (tick or write
in the answer) as many questions as possible and feel free to add any comments.
Name of the school and name of the studentwill not be mentioned in my report but
it isfor my own record keeping to know them in order to categorise statistically.
Name ofthe secondary school
which your child attends now
Name of the student
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Part I Your child's promotion to secondary school
This part contains four sections. Section I is about the discretionary places system.
Section II is about the Centrally Allocated places system. Section III is about the
appeal mechanism. Section IV is about your level of satisfaction with the secondary
school your child attends now.
Section I Discretionary places system
All the questions below are about the discretionary places system and the school you
choose through the discretionary places system
1.1. Did you apply for any school through the Discretionary Places System last
year? (Please tick the appropriate box)
Yes (go to the next question.) No (go to Section II.)
1.2. Please name the secondary school which you applied for in The Discretionary
Places System:
1.3.a. Was that school inside your local school net? (Please tick the appropriate box)
School.
Yes, it was inside. No, it was outside.
1.3.b. Was that school belongs to... (please tick the appropriate box)
Band I Band II Band III Not clear
1.3.c. Was the application a success? (Please tick the appropriate box)
Yes. No.
1.4. Why did you want your child to go to that secondary school?
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1.5. A number of factors have been suggested as important when choosing a school.
Please identify the five most important factors for your choice and write the level of
importance (please write 1 for the most important,...etc) of the following factors in
choosing the school through the Discretionary Places System.
Factors Please tick the five
most important
factors here
And rank from 1 to 5




3.Advice from primary school teacher
4.Advice from friends
5.Advice from other family member
6.Nice environment




11 .Good discipline (school ethos)
12.School tradition
13.Band of the school
14.Good Education Good teaching staff
and principal
15.Good teaching staff and principal
16 Good reputation for a particular subject
(e.g. sport, music...etc).
17.Wide subject choice is available
18.English as medium of instruction
(English School)
19.Wide range of extra-curriculum
activities.
20.Well-equipped/good facilities
21.Good public examination results
22.Better career prospects
23.High rate of entry to Universities
24.Sibling in the school
25.Friends in the school
26.Relatives in the school
27.Because it is popular
28,Other factors (please specify here)
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1.6. Were you happy with the result? ((Please tick the appropriate box and explain)
Yes, No,
1.7.a. Do you know the school criteria for selecting students? (Please tick the
appropriate box)
Yes, No,
17.b. If yes, what are the reasons:
1.7.c. If yes, how did you find out the criteria for selecting students?
1.8. Do you think the selection criteria of the school are fair? ((Please tick the




1.9. Before you applied for that secondary school, did you obtain information about




1. By reading the school information handout
2. By visiting the school to see round it
3. By talking to a teacher/head teacher at your child's primary school
4. By talking to a teacher/head teacher at that secondary school
5. By contacting the Education Department
6. By talking to family and relatives
7. By talking to other children
8. By talking to friends or neighbours
9. From television or radio
10.From newspaper
11 .From the school Web-site
12.Had no information about that school
13.Other ways (please specify here)
1.10. Which of the above sources of information had most influence on your choice
of school?
1.11. Now, you have been through the Discretionary Places System, you would have
gained knowledge and experience, would you go about things differently if you
choose again? (Please tick the appropriate box and explain)
Same Different
Expalin:
1.12. Do you approve the increase of percentage of the Discretionary Places rose
from 10% (before 2001) to 20% (in 2001) and to 30% (from 2006 onward)?




1.13. As a parent, do you think it is good for you to choose more than one school
(from 2006 onward)? (please tick the appropriate box and explain)
Yes, No,
Explain:
1.14. How much involvement did your child have in the decision about the choice of
school?
A lot None
1 2 3 4 5
(please circle the appropriate number)
Any comment on this section?
Section II Centrally allocated places system
The following questions are about the Centrally Allocated Places System and your
ranking of preference schools in the school net.
2.1. Generally, what considerations influenced your choice (ranking) in the Centrally
Allocated Places System Choice Form?
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2.2. A number of factors have been suggested as important when ranking possible
schools in order of preference. Please identify the five most important factors for
ranking and write the level of importance of the following factors in ranking your
choice of preference school through the Centrally Allocated Places System.
Factors Please tick the five
most important
factors here
And rank from 1 to 5




3.Advice from primary school teacher
4.Advice from friends
5.Advice from other family member
6.Nice environment




1 l.Good discipline (school ethos)
12.School tradition
13.Band of the school
14.Good Education Good teaching staff
and principal
15.Good teaching staff and principal
16.Good reputation for a particular subject
(e.g. sport, music...etc).
17.Wide subject choice is available
18.English as medium of instruction
(English School)
19.Wide range of extra-curriculum
activities.
20.Well-equipped/good facilities
2l.Good public examination results
22.Better career prospects
23.High rate of entry to Universities
24.Sibling in the school
25.Friends in the school
26.Relatives in the school
27.Because it is popular
28.0ther factors (please specify here)
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2.3. Before you ranked your possible schools of preference for the Centrally
Allocated Places System, did you obtain information about schools in any of the




1. By reading the school information handout
2. By visiting the school to see round it
3. By talking to a teacher/head teacher at your child's primary school
4. By talking to a teacher/head teacher at that secondary school
5. By contacting the Education Department
6. By talking to family and relatives
7. By talking to other children
8. By talking to friends or neighbours
9. From television or radio
10.From newspaper
1 l.From the school Web-site
12.FIad no information about that school
13.0ther ways (please specify here)
2.4. Which of the above sources of information had most influence on your ranking
of preference secondary schools?
2.5. Are you satisfied with the advice provided by your child's primary school for





2.6. How much involvement did your child have in the ranking of preference schools
in the Centrally allocated Places System?
A lot None
1 2 3 4 5
(Please circle the appropriate number)







6. Others (please specify here)
7.1 did not choose this school at all
2.7.b. In which Band is the secondary school your child now attends?
In Band I In Band II In Band III Not clear
2.8. Now, you have been through the centrally allocated places system, you would
have gained knowledge and experience. Now, if you were to rank schools of





2.9. As a parent, do you think the abolition of Aptitude test in 2000 is good (please
tick the appropriate answer and explain)?
Yes, No,
Explain:
2.10. As a parent, do you think the Scaling system of ranking (into different bands)
students is fair (please tick the appropriate answer and explain)?
Yes, No,
Explain:
2.11. As a parent, do you think the reduction of five Bands into three Bands is a
good development (please tick the appropriate box and explain)?
Yes, No,
Explain:
2.12. If you have older children and have chosen schools for another child in the




Any comment on this section?
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Was the school allocated to your child acceptable to you or not (please tick)?
Yes, I accepted it (go to Section IV please).
No, I appealed and got another school (go to Section III, please).
No, I appealed but I didn't get another school (go to Section III, please).
No, I didn't accept it or appeal, I found my own solution (go to Section IV
please).
Section III Appeal System/mechanism
All the questions below are about the appeal system/mechanism after the result
announced last July:
3.1. Why did you appeal?
3.2. How did you know that you could appeal?
3.3. What was the outcome of the appeal (please tick the appropriate box)?
Success Failure





3.4.b. If failure, then what did you do (please tick the appropriate box)?
Accept the outcome of the appeal. Find another school.
3.5. Please give your comment on the appeal system.
Any comment on this section?
Section IV Satisfaction with the present school
The following questions are about the school your child now attends:
4.1. The school your child now attends was the school
Please tick the appropriate
answer
1 .Allocated through the Discretionary Places System
2.Allocated through the Centrally Allocated Places
System
3.Allocated through appeal
4.Not allocated, I found another school for my child
5.1 don't know
6.0thers (please specify here)
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4.2. How satisfied are you now with the school your child attends (please explain)?
very very
satisfied dissatisfied
1 2 3 4 5
(please circle the appropriate number)
The reasons are




Any comment on this section?
Part II About your child and your family
To help us classify your answers statistically, please answer the following questions
about your child and your family. All answers will be kept private and confidential.
(If you find that parts of some questions do not apply to you, please leave the space
blank and go on to the next question.).
1. Is your child? Male female
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2. Please fill in below the details of your child's primary school in 2000:
Name
Inside your local (home)
net? (yes or No)
Public or private primary
school
3. According to the information from the primary school, which Band did your child














5. Housing of your family: does your family live inside your local (home) school net
(please tick the appropriate box)?
Yes, No,
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6. What is your relationship to the child? (Please tick the appropriate box).





5. Other (please specify here)
7. What was your age when you left school and what academic qualifications (if
any) did you get from schooling?
Your age when you left school
Academic qualifications (if
any)
8. Please give your partner's age of leaving school and academic qualifications (if
any)?




9. Please provide your professional qualifications
Your professional
qualifications




Any comment on this part?
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Thank you very much again for taking time to fill in the questionnaire.
If you would be willing to explore these issues further and participate in an
interviewed (or telephone interview),




E-mail address (if any)
(To ensure confidentiality and anonymity, please seal the questionnaire in the
provided envelope before you return it to the school)
310
Appendix C1: Interview schedule for Parents
Main themes and questions (all the questions are designed to encourage the parent to talk
about each main theme for about 10-20 minutes):
*AI1 the information you give will be kept private and confidential
Themes I: Quantity and quality of information
The interviewer bears in mind the focus of this section is about the kind of information
the parent had and how he/she assesses the information in order to make a decision
1. Were you happy/satisfied with the advice/information given by your child's primary
school? What was the advice/information you have from the primary school?
2. Did you visit any school before you made up your mind? If yes, what sort of
information you were looking for during the school visit to help you make a decision?
Please tell me how did the information help in choosing a school?
Probe questions:
Did you attend any open day (parent night?)
How many schools did you visit? How many school bulletins did you collect?
Did you collect any other school information apart from those within the locality?
Did the school visit make a difference in your school choice?
Themes II: Demand, supply & most important factors
Interviewer bears in mind: What were the most important factors in ranking/choosing
school?
3. Please tell me about the local school net? How many schools in the local school
net, and in your opinion which school(s) suit your child? Have you ever thought of
applying to any other school out of your school net? (yes, no) Why?
4. Please name the school of your first choice. Why did/didn't you choose this
school (one of the four case-study schools in his/her local school net) as your DP
school/CA as first choice?
5. What were the most important factors in your choosing school for your child?
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Themes III: Strategy/skill and ability of choice
Did the parent have any strategy in making school choice last year? Didparent have any
idea of how to examine school? Didparent have any idea of how to evaluate school?
Did parent have any idea of ranking school for his/her child (sort of matching to the
school)?
6. Did you have a plan in choosing school for your child? Please give details in
your process of choosing? Actually, how did you rank the school? Please tell me about
how you did it? How long did it take you to make a decision? Did you have any strategy
in ranking the schools for your child? If yes, please explain more.
Probing: Did you find it easy/difficult to rank the schools for your
child? If yes, please elaborate. Did you consider other schools before you made up your
mind of your first/first-five choice(s)? How many schools did you consider? How did you
select among them? Or how did you weigh them? Was it an easy or difficult to make a
school choice? Please describe in detail about your choice making process. (Was the
parent confident in making school choice?) Was it easy to apply for a DP place? Was it
easy to fill in the DP application form? Was it easy to fill in the CA Choice Form?
7. Did other people influence your school choice? For example: friends, neighbours,
your own child. (Was the parent an independent chooser or dependent chooser)
Probe questions:
Did you have any evaluation of school before choosing?
How did you evaluate a school?
Could you easily pick the right school for your child?
Did you have confidence in making a choice?
Did you feel very difficult or confused at making a choice?
Have you ever attend (pay a school visit) any meeting—to talk about how to approach a
school?
Have you ever talk to the school principal about your child?
Have you ever talked to any good friend that can recommend your child to a school?
Did you negotiate with the school for a place for your child?
Did you choose independently or were you influenced by others? How?
Was opinion of friends the most important factor in making school choice?
Was proximity the most important factor in making school choice?
Was transportation fee a key factor in decision making?
Was transportation time a key factor in decision making?
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Theme IV. Inclination to choice
Interviewer bears in mind that the focus of this section is about inclination to the choice
ofthe respondent (strong or weak, eager to engage or detachedfrom it).
Main questions on inclination to choice
8. Did you regard school choice very important to your child? Did you think that school
makes a difference in his/her future opportunity in life? How? e.g. good career.. .etc?
9. Did you try your best to rank a school? (Check the parent's participation: why did
they participate/not participate in the DP? If the parent did not accept the school place,
why did he or she participate/not participate in the appeal mechanism? Was the parent
self-confidence or calculative)?
10. Please describe your choice process: active or passive, eager or detached? Please
elaborate. (If parent was detached, why? What were the reasons?)
Themes V: Comment and feelings related to the SSPA reforms:
Interviewer bears in mind the focus of this section is about opinion and feelings toward
the changes of the SSPA
11. How did the change of the SSPA policy affect your chance of getting the school you
want for your child? Did the new arrangement increase chance or decrease your chance?
Was it easier to get what you want with the new SSPA? How did you feel about the
changes of the SSPA?
Probe questions:
For parents who participated in the DP:
Do you think it difficult/easy to get a place?
Do you know the number of applicants to this school and the number of places available?
Do you know how the school selected the students?
Do you think there were enough places for all the applicants?
12. Please tell me your overall feeling toward the school choice making? Were you
happy? Worry? Anxious?...etc. Are you happy with the new changes or are you happier
with the old SSPA?
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Themes VI: Satisfaction about the present school & comment on the
education reforms in Hong Kong
13. Are you happy with your son/daughter's present school? Do you want to change
school for your child? Please explain?
14. Please give your comment on the education reforms in Hong Kong.
The interview ended
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Appendix C2: Interview schedule for School Administrators
Main themes and questions (all the questions were designed to encourage the
administrator to talk about each main theme for about 10-20 minutes):
*A11 the information given by the administrator will be kept private and confidential
Theme I: Background data on demand and supply
1. How was about the demand and supply in local school net? Have there been any
changes in the local school net since 2001? In the local school net, how many band I
school, band II schools and band III schools? According to your knowledge, are there
enough places for students who live in the local school net? (Any balance in demand and
supply?)
Themes II: School enrolment composition and size
2. Enrolment size and composition: How many enrolments (F.l, F.2 and F.3) in the
school? What is their composition generally? Is the enrolment in terms of size and
characteristics changing? If yes, what are they and why? (Decrease, increase or same).
Any change geographically? Are there more students from outside local school net? Any
change socially? More students from middle class or more students from working class
parents? Or no change at all? Is the enrolment in terms of social characteristics changing
in these few years? Do you have these records in the school? (Data: Number of students
with 100% 'textbook allowance', Number of students with 50% 'textbook allowance',
number of students taking private 'musical lessons' in form I, form II and form III...etc).
How is the learning attitude ofmost of the students in school?
3. Discretionary places and selection: Does the school have DP? How many DP
applications in your school each year? How many places are available for DP
application? How do you select students? What are your main criteria? (For popular,
over-subscribed schools)?
*Can I have a copy of the DP application Form?
Themes III: Competition and publicity
4. Publicity activities: Are there any publicity activities? If yes, what are they (open
day...etc). Do you have any printed materials to help parents to know the school more
and to make school choice e.g. school bulletins? Do you have any open day for primary
school students? Can I have some copies of the publication materials?
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5. Parents in their questionnaires mentioned about their information of school from TV,
radio and newspaper. Do you have any publicity activities through TV, Radio and
newspaper.. .etc?
6. Do you have a special committee or personnel to organise (in charge of) publicity
activities? Can I talk to the person concerning these activities?
7. Do you have a special committee to organise activities to help F.l students to adapt to
secondary school life, e.g. counselling and curriculum?
Themes IV: Response to the SSPA reforms and competition
8. Specifically, are there any administrative and organisational consequences of changes
that are experienced in schools in relation to the competition created by the choice
policy?
9. Do you welcome these changes? Are these good for the school? What are the
positive and negative consequences of these changes for the school? What is your
perception of change in school in relation to competition and choice? How has the school
choice policy challenged you in managing the school now? Are there any conflicts in
decision making?
10. How has the new SSPA policy challenge you in managing the school now?
11. Wfiich way do you think is beneficial to H.K., mix-ability or streaming? What is the
emphasis or educational aim of the schools? Do the school select more able, bright
children, or prefer mix-ability students in school? (For popular, over-subscribed school)
12. Is there any change in the quality of student intake? Is there any change in the
academic aspect of students? Is there any impact of the change toward teaching?
13. What is your comment/feelings on the SSPA overall?
14. Finally, please give your professional comments on the education reforms in HK?
The interview ended
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Appendix C3: Interview schedule for the two policy makers
Main themes and questions (all the questions are used to encourage him/her to talk about
each main theme for about 10-20 minutes):
Theme I: Rationale of the policy (rationale of the new SSPA arrangement)
"The Government has adopted the Education Commission's reform proposals on
education system in its Report published in September 2000. These include the
transitional measures to reform the Secondary School Places Allocation (SSPA)
System. Accordingly, changes have been made to the System as from the 2000/01
schoolyear."
1. Why did the commission propose this policy (for EC) in 2000? Why did the
government adopt this policy in 2000 (for EMB)? What is the rationale behind the
policy?
2. Would you please be more specific? What was the benefit sought from the change in
DP (For example, parents can select more than one school, discretionary places can be
increase from 10% to 20% and then 30%...etc)?
3. What was the benefit sought from the change in CA (i.e. the policy changed five bands
into three bands)?
4. Do you think the rationale behind the policy still holds or has it been changed over
time (has been shifted)?
5. What is the role of the choice policy in relation to the Education Reforms to improve
the education system in H.K.?
Theme II: Equality issues of the SSPA
6. What responses are expected for parents who make school choice? Do you think all
the parents can make informed choices and have the same ability in choosing theirs?
7. How parents are engaging with schools? Are there any conflicts or tensions between
the two parties, I mean between schools and parents?
8. Did the government try to ensure equality of opportunities in both the DP and CA?
How?
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9. Do you think all the parents from all walks of lives have the same ability in
choosing? Has the government got any strategy on maintaining the equality of
opportunities of school choice? (e.g. parents with different financial/material, social
and cultural capital).
10. Some parents in my choice questionnaires mentioned that there was no use in appeal.
Do you have any comment on this?
11. What responses are expected in schools in relation to the new SSPA? Do you expect
schools to compete with one another or co-operate with one another? What is the
government's expectation of the choice policy on different types of schools (band I
schools, band II schools, band III schools)?
Themes III: Implementation, impact and problems of the policy
12. Are there any implementation problems found with the new SSPA? What are
problems found and what solutions are there? Is there any unpredicted effect of this new
arrangement after its implementation in 2001? How does it turn out and why? (There
were so many appeal cases. Why?)
13. Please comment on the competition issue: What impacts on schools with different
bands (Band I, II, III)? Increase intake size? Decrease intake size? Changes in schools'
intake social compositions?
14. Selection problems: A certain principal said schools were completing to acquire the
best students. What would you comment on that principal's saying about the competition
among schools? Actually, did you expect over-subscribed schools compete for better
students?
15. Some principals commented that it is a very contradictory policy for the government
to change 5 bands to 3 bands and at the same time encourages schools to select students.
Would you comment on the principals' criticism of the policy?
16. Some principals complained about mix ability and behaviour problem in schools
caused by the changing of 5 bands into 3 bands, what is your opinion on these two
issues?
Themes IV: Variety, choice and competition
17. What is the rationale behind the DSS school policy? Would you encourage more
schools to change to DSS schools? Some principals comment that some DSS schools can
select students earlier and can even use written test, this policy raised suspicion that the
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government aims to promote the DSS schools and suppress aided schools. Would you
comment on this?
18. One principal commented that since DSS schools collect fee, their resources certainly
are better than aided school which do not collect tuition fee. Please give your response to
this comment?
19. Would you please comment: In many school nets, student population declines and
therefore many schools find that they don't have enough number of enrolments while the
government are still building new schools. Do you think the government lacks a long-
term planning?
Themes V: Future
20. Some parents and principals are not optimistic about the reforms and its future. Please
give your comment on this?
21. What will be the future plan of the government in relation to the SSPA?
The interview ended
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